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Abstract 
The aim of my dissertation is to understand and critically evaluate how the idea of 
European memory has been conceptualised by different actors at the European level and to 
develop a novel, pluralist conception. 
Attempting to ground European integration and the attachment to Europe in historical 
narratives has become increasingly important for the EU since the loss of its main ideological 
“Other,” the Soviet Union. The projects adopted in this vein often have the explicit goal to address 
the “legitimacy problem” and the “democratic deficit” by promoting European identity. In the EU 
politics-academia nexus, where most of the related debate takes place, the buzzword “European 
memory” has become very fashionable in the last decade. The idea has been conceptualised in a 
variety of ways, but most of these are characterised by teleological frameworks and problem-
solving thinking. 
In my dissertation, I examine and critically evaluate how the idea of European memory 
has been conceptualised by different actors at the European level, and I develop a novel 
conception based on radical democratic theory. I analyse how the concept of European memory 
has been used in different European institutions and cultural projects (such as the European 
Parliament and the House of European History), and I critically reflect on these practices. In my 
pluralist vision of the European mythical space, conflicting visions of the past are not regarded as 
an anomaly that needs to be overcome by rational consensus or as an asset that can be harvested 
in order to bolster the legitimacy of certain political bodies. This vision takes difference to be an 
inevitable condition of social life and it argues that, instead of trying to resolve conflicting 
interpretations of the past, social difference should be embraced and the nature of conflict should 
be changed so that antagonistic relationships can become agonistic ones through dialogue and 
education. 
On the one hand, my dissertation contributes to the field of memory studies with a 
comprehensive pluralist approach to myth. On the other hand, I contribute to European studies, 
and more specifically to the academic discussion about European memory, when I contextualise 
this theory of myth in the contemporary European politics of the past. 
  
  
 To Lilla 
  
  
 This is the attempt to free mankind from Nietzsche’s “longest lie,” the 
notion that outside the haphazard and perilous experiments we perform 
there lies something (God, Science, Knowledge, Rationality, or Truth) 
which will, if only we perform the correct rituals, step in to save us. 
Richard Rorty 
Consequences of Pragmatism (1982) 
That was probably the reason that history was more of an oracle than a 
science. Perhaps later, much later, it would be taught by means of tables 
of statistics, supplemented by such anatomical sections... Until this stage 
was reached, politics would remain bloody dilettantism, mere superstition 
and black magic. 
Arthur Koestler 
Darkness at Noon (1940) 
... anything less than an encounter with traumatic ungroundedness is not 
an ethics or a politics but a technology. 
Jenny Edkins 
Remembering Relationality (2006) 
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1 
Introduction 
When I tell people that I write my doctoral dissertation on the idea of European memory, 
almost every time they ask two questions in rapid succession: “So tell me, does a European 
memory exist? What does it look like?” I found that these simple questions, casually thrown away 
by well-meaning people who just wanted to show a fleeting interest in my topic out of common 
courtesy, were extremely difficult to answer, especially within the ten-second attention span that 
is typical of a dinner party. Strangely enough, these are also the very questions that most of the 
scholarly works on European memory aim to answer. I soon realised that I found these questions 
so difficult to answer because they are based on the commonsensical assumption that regards 
memory as a thing that there is or there is not, as a thing that exists or does not exist. Motivated 
by the conviction that a collective memory is not a thing that a community has or does not have, 
but a practice that communities do or do not do,1 I propose a different set of questions: “Who 
does and should do European memory? How is it and should it be done?” These are the questions 
that I seek to address in my project. 
The Problem of European Memory and Its Relevance 
“In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, 
France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved 
and we had war.” The opening sentences of one of the founding texts of European integration, 
the Schuman Declaration of 1950, allude to the devastating experience of the Second World War 
and warn that only a united Europe can guarantee peace. As political references to past events in 
general, the Declaration appeals to history in order to set a vision for the future rather than to 
simply make a statement about what happened in the past. After reminding its audience of the war 
and the consequences of political fragmentation on the continent, the Schuman Declaration goes 
                                                          
1 As Jeffrey Olick put it, collective memory is “something—or, rather many things—we do, not something—or many 
things—we have.” Jeffrey K. Olick, “From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and Products,” 
in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 159. 
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on to propose the pooling of coal and steel production in France and Germany, and the 
establishment of a common High Authority to oversee the production, with the explicit ambition 
to safeguard peace. 
In the decades that followed, the development of the European integration project was 
accompanied by numerous visions for the future of Europe and calls for concerted European 
political action that were substantiated with references to historical events and processes. Many 
different conceptions of Europe have been argued for and as many different historical narratives. 
Soft power Europe, normative power Europe, Christian Europe, Enlightened Europe, Classical 
Europe, fortress Europe, open Europe—all of these visions have been supported with different, 
and often conflicting, interpretations of the past. Attempting to ground European integration and 
the attachment to Europe in historical narratives has become increasingly important for the 
European Union (EU) since the loss of its main “Other,” the Soviet Union. The projects adopted 
in this vein often have the explicit goal to address the “legitimacy problem” and the “democratic 
deficit” by promoting European identity. In the EU politics-academia nexus, where most of the 
related debate takes place, the buzzword “European memory” has become very fashionable in the 
last decade. The lively debate about this concept is usually centred around two questions: Does 
the EU as an organisation need to develop a more united approach with respect to historical 
narratives? If yes, what should this common approach look like? What is at stake in answering 
these questions is nothing less than the future direction of the EU. As visions for the future of the 
organisation are intimately connected to historical accounts of the continent’s past, determining 
the common European approach to the past is a highly influential decision for the EU’s future. 
All this is meant to show that the discussion about European memory is far from being 
a “merely” symbolic issue with no political consequences. Imagining Europe and its past in 
different ways will lead to different real political outcomes. For instance, thinking about Europe 
as an embodiment of the values of the Enlightenment (such as human rights, liberal democracy 
and reason) is bound to produce different political decisions with respect to enlargement than 
considering Europe as an entity built on the heritage of Christianity. Seeing European institutions 
as a guarantor of peace on the continent, as a guarantor of prosperity or as a guarantor that massive 
human rights violations like genocide will “never again” be committed on its soil all entail different 
political objectives. Similarly, thinking about European memory as a thing or a social construct, as 
one memory or as a plurality of memories, as the end point of deliberation or as a dialogical process 
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are not merely inconsequential cultural “froth on the tides of society,”2 but are crucially important 
issues with real political consequences. 
A New Approach to the Idea of European Memory 
Many previous scholarly works aiming to determine what the common European 
approach to historical narratives looks like or should look like start by asking if a common 
European memory already exists; if they answer in the affirmative, they seek to determine what it 
is; if they answer in the negative, they seek to determine what it can be in the future. These accounts 
of European memory imply either a search for a thing “out there” in the real world that needs to 
be pinned down, or a search for something that politicians and/or academics need to define and 
construct. On the one hand, the former approach is inappropriate because it is based on the 
presupposition that a collective memory exists or does not exist and that academic enquiry can 
study its existence from a distance. This approach considers possible, and even desirable, to 
observe the politics of the past in a detached way and not to engage with difficult normative issues. 
On the other hand, I find the latter approach inappropriate as it is entirely based on what Robert 
Cox called problem-solving thinking. This scholarly attitude considers the importance of solving 
the problem at hand almost self-evident; it “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social 
and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework 
for action”; its strength “lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area.”3 The works 
on European memory of this second type are problem-solvers in that they take it for granted that 
the EU faces a legitimacy problem and that it is important to address this issue, and they consider 
it their task to solve this problem. They do engage with normative questions, but their ultimate 
aim is to support the legitimacy of European institutions. As Gregor Feindt et al. noted, this 
“unreflected instrumentalization of European Memory”4 for political purposes indeed permeates 
both scholarly and public debates about the concept. 
In contrast to the first approach, I propose a consciously engaged scholarly attitude that 
instead of regarding memories as things existing out there, it considers them to be social constructs; 
it rejects that researchers can be the detached observers of the social world, and believes that 
researchers should be open about their normative convictions and should reflect upon the broader 
social implications of their work. In contrast to the second approach, I propose a critical attitude 
                                                          
2 William H. Sewell, Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
159. 
3 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium – 
Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 128–129. 
4 Gregor Feindt et al., eds., Europäische Erinnerung Als Verflochtene Erinnerung (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2014). Abstract 
at http://www.v-r.de/en/europaeische_erinnerung_als_verflochtene_erinnerung/t-211/1010398/. 
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which challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions upon which the questions asked by the 
problem-solving approach are based and believes that “the role of the intellectual is not to 
consolidate authority, but to understand, interpret and question it.”5 While the critical position that 
I advocate is engaged, its aim is not to solve the problem of legitimacy and to support the EU, but 
to question European memory policies. Its objective is not to propose a consensual narrative that 
can be the basis of a European identity, but to understand how the state, its institutions and its 
citizens should deal with social difference with respect to historical narratives, and how the nature 
of conflict can be changed so that it enhances democracy rather than undermines it. While 
problem-solving focuses on the end point of deliberation and on bringing the discussion to 
closure, the critical attitude emphasises the importance of the dialogical process, rejects the 
necessity of a rational consensus and embraces unresolved (and probably unresolvable) social 
differences. 
After posing the question about whether European memory exists, mainstream scholarly 
enquiry usually plunges into a historical discussion in order to determine what it is or what it can 
be. This way, the host of conceptual decisions and normative assumptions that these accounts 
make remain implicit, unacknowledged and ultimately unresolved. These commitments, however, 
are in no way self-evident, even if wrapping them up in historical “facts” may make them appear 
so. More often than not, the core concept of collective memory is left largely unexplained even 
though it is a highly contested and polysemous concept whose meaning is far from obvious. 
Indeed, getting a good analytical grip on the representations of history is difficult enough in 
national and subnational contexts, let alone in a vaguely defined transnational environment. 
European studies and memory studies have so far been preoccupied with the “European” part of 
the concept, with how a memory or a set of memories can be said to be European. In this process, 
these studies have built on the rather uncertain conceptual foundations of collective memory; they 
took it for granted that the debate about specific historical events would give us an answer to the 
problem of how a memory can be European. However, as William Sewell remarked, the addition 
of ever more empirical detail will not magically solve difficult conceptual and normative questions 
and it is a mistake to think that one can always “narrate their way out of” theoretical dilemmas.6 
For this reason, I argue that we need to be more attentive to the “memory” aspect of the concept 
of European memory and to shift the emphasis of the debate from historical discussions to ethical 
and conceptual ones. I agree with Feindt et al. that if we are to make sense of the idea of European 
                                                          
5 Edward W. Said, “On Defiance and Taking Positions,” in American Council of Learned Societies Occasional Paper No. 31, 
1995, http://web.archive.org/web/20160318122426/http://archives.acls.org/op/op31said.htm#said. 
6 Sewell, Logics of History, 11. 
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memory, we need to go beyond purely historical accounts that, inspired by Pierre Nora’s inventory 
of French lieux de mémoire, aim to build an “inventory of European landscapes of memory.”7 If a 
third, more theoretically and methodologically conscious, wave in memory studies is truly in the 
making, as Astrid Erll and Feindt et al. claimed,8 one of its most important objectives should be 
to reconsider the theoretical foundations upon which prevailing conceptions of European memory 
are (mostly implicitly) built. 
As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, there are five mainstream academic positions with the 
respect to the idea of European memory. Some reject it on the basis that it can only be an artificial 
creation, and some reject it because they deem it unnecessary for a rational, technocratic and 
performance-based political entity such as the EU. The dominant position has been explained 
above: the attempt to combine, harmonise and/or reconcile (mostly national) memories so as to 
form a common European view of the past (or at least some part of the past); the aim is to promote 
a certain loyalty to the European project on the model of national loyalties. Others argue for the 
harmonisation of the rules and practices of dealing with the past instead of the harmonisation of 
actual narratives; in this vision, national communities work through the dark parts of their history 
in accordance with some commonly agreed guidelines, a process that is constitutive of the post-
conventional identity of the citizens. Finally, some propose to study the political initiatives relating 
to a common European approach to historical narratives objectively, from a distance. 
The novelty of my take on the central problem of the common European approach to 
historical narratives is the attitude I advocate towards the existence of different and often 
conflicting interpretations of the past, and to minority and dissenting narratives. Whereas previous 
approaches assumed that social differences with respect to memories are undesirable and that they 
can and should be overcome by consensus, I see conflicting interpretations of the past as inevitable 
but not necessarily socially harmful; in fact, the plural and conflictual nature of memory can be 
embraced in a way that it enhances democracy. Whereas previous conceptions of European 
memory had the aim to legitimate political institutions by promoting new ways of self-
identification for citizens, I provide a framework within which prevailing institutions and identities 
can be continuously challenged and reasserted, and within which the aim is to encourage dialogue 
so as to overcome antagonistic relationships. 
                                                          
7 Gregor Feindt et al., “Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies,” History and Theory 53, no. 1 
(2014): 40; Pierre Nora, ed., Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. I Conflicts and Divisions (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996). 
8 Astrid Erll, “Travelling Memory,” Parallax 17, no. 4 (2011): 4–18; Feindt et al., “Entangled Memory.” 
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Simply put, the task for the EU in developing its common approach to historical 
narratives is not to “deal with the past,” as the popular translation of the German phrase 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung goes, but to deal with the necessarily multiple and conflicting 
representations of the past. And the way to “deal” with them is to embrace them and use them in 
a way that they enhance, extend and intensify democratic politics. 
The intended audience of this work are primarily the academics and the political decision-
makers involved in the debate about the common European approach to historical narratives and 
in the concrete initiatives in this vein. However, the overall message is intended to have a more 
general appeal. The pluralist European mythscape envisioned in the dissertation relies on the active 
participation of “ordinary” people in its creation and continuous renegotiation. In order to 
facilitate this, I hope to popularise the pluralist conception in the future in a more widely accessible 
manner than this scholarly work. 
Thinking Critically About European Memory 
My study of the idea of European memory is thus composed of two, interrelated and 
constantly interacting, parts. The first part addresses the most important theoretical problems 
related to the concept of collective memory; it engages with the fundamental conceptual, social 
theoretical and normative issues that underpin scholarly approaches to memory. On the one hand, 
it provides a critical (and necessarily incomplete) overview of the collective memory literature and 
suggests limitations on the use of the term. On the other hand, it proposes a comprehensive 
pluralist approach to publicly represented identity-constitutive historical narratives (myths) that 
builds on earlier promising but incomplete attempts in this vein.9 It remains to be seen whether 
the third wave in memory studies will in fact be successful, but I hope to contribute with this first 
part of my dissertation to such a welcome and long overdue development by specifying the 
conceptual, social theoretical and ethical frameworks of a novel agonistic approach to myth. 
The second part turns to debates about the idea of European memory with an aim that 
is twofold. On the one hand, it presents the history of the concept of European memory by 
identifying different interpretations of this idea and by mapping their evolution over time. The 
genealogy of the concept engages with the research questions about who does European memory 
and how they do it. On the other hand, this second part uses the analytical tools developed in the 
first part in order to critically examine what the most prominent conceptions of European memory 
                                                          
9 Duncan Bell, “Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory,” Constellations 15, no. 1 (2008): 148; Anna Cento 
Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen, “On Agonistic Memory,” Memory Studies 9, no. 4 (2016): 390–404; Maria Mälksoo, 
“‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 3 (2015): 221–
37. 
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take for granted, and also to put forward a pluralist take on the concept. The perspective here is 
heavily normative as it seeks to answer the core questions about who should do European memory 
and how they should do it. This dual objective might give the impression that I try to draw a fine 
line between the genealogical and the prescriptive parts, but in reality they are completely 
interconnected. Aspiring for a clear separation between facts and values, between descriptive and 
normative statements is not only theoretically problematic, but also politically irresponsible. Every 
statement is partly descriptive and partly prescriptive at the same time, and attempting to separate 
these two aspects only renders one blind to the normative assumptions that necessarily form part 
of “purely descriptive” statements, and to the empirical observations that necessarily form part of 
“purely normative” statements. Such blindness, in turn, renders one ignorant about the potential 
political implications of one’s statements, and this is irresponsible. I nevertheless find that asking 
separate questions about the “is” and the “should be” of European memory is useful in guiding 
the enquiry provided that I remain conscious about the interconnected and inseparable nature of 
the two sets of questions. 
Variations of the Idea of European Memory 
The two more “descriptive” research questions are answered using interpretivist 
methods. The first step in this direction is to give substantive interpretations of the research 
questions themselves (in positivist research, this would be called the operationalisation phase 
where particular theoretical concepts are translated into measurable variables). Interpreting the 
question about who does European memory, which practically delimits the field of analysis, 
required me to make some particularly difficult decisions. The first dilemma is determining what 
doing European memory actually means. If a European institution is promoting the dissemination 
of a certain historical narrative that is supportive of European integration, is it “doing” European 
memory? Or if a politician is calling for the Europe-wide commemoration of a past event, is he/she 
contributing to the “making” of European memory? If I said that these activities indeed “do” 
European memory, this would have two negative implications. First, labelling these activities as 
“doing” European memory would imply that I have a relatively clear preconception of what 
European memory can mean; this preconception, in turn, would necessarily prioritise certain 
practices as “doing” European memory and would ignore some other, less obvious, ones. Second, 
if any representation of historical events above the national level could be considered as the making 
of European memory, it would potentially encompass such a wide range of different activities that 
it would be difficult to say anything meaningful about them. For these two reasons, I have decided 
to limit the scope of the enquiry to utterances that actually use the term “European memory.” It 
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must be noted that I do consider some important utterances that do not satisfy this condition; they 
are taken into account as part of the socio-political context or as precursors to the idea of European 
memory, but not as part of “doing” European memory itself. This criterion, of course, creates 
some problems of its own. 
The introduction of this criterion allows me to focus on the social actors who actually 
use the concept and shape its meaning, and to remain open to its many different interpretations. 
However, simply limiting the enquiry to occurrences of the term “European memory” is not very 
helpful for several reasons. First, the term is used in many different ways; the phrases “European 
collective memory,” “Europe’s memory,” “Europe’s collective memory,” “memory of Europe,” 
“collective memory of Europe” are invoked in discussions as frequently as European memory and 
may or may not be interchangeable. Another problem is that in the plural the term might mean 
something substantially different from the singular. In a particular understanding, “a European 
memory” might very well be just one of the several “European memories,” whatever these are. 
But talking about “the European memory” might imply a belief in a single consensual narrative 
shared by all Europeans which stands in contrast with a “European memories” conception which 
might imply a plurality of narratives without broad consensus. A related issue is that of the definite 
and the indefinite article. Speaking about “the European memory” as opposed to “a European 
memory” makes a huge difference. To complicate things, the term is often used without article as 
“European memory.” The fourth source of ambiguity is that the memory in “European memory” 
might refer to a wide range of types of memory (such as personal, collective, literary memory). 
Finally, the part “European” is also open to broad interpretation. It can be understood in purely 
geographical terms in which case a European memory means a memory within the geographical 
boundaries of Europe; but “European” might also imply some degree of community so that 
European memory is based on something more complex than an arbitrarily defined geographical 
space. 
To illustrate the problems involved in determining the scope of research, let us consider 
the book European Memories of the Second World War10 from 1999. At first sight, this might be an early 
occurrence of the phrase in academia but, on closer inspection, one notices that this is less obvious. 
Its title actually refers to personal and literary memories in Europe. The term “European 
memories” is used twice in the whole book11 which suggests that it did not play an important role 
as an independent concept. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that “European memory,” albeit 
                                                          
10 Helmut Peitsch, Charles Burdett, and Claire Gorrara, eds., European Memories of the Second World War: New Perspectives 
on Postwar Literature (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999). 
11 Confirmed by search in Google Books. Cases when the title of the book is mentioned are not taken into account. 
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mentioned only once in this scholarly work, appeared in a context that gives it a certain weight. In 
the very last paragraph of the book, Louisa Passerini asserted that “[i]t is through a new 
compassionate understanding of our common past and of past enmities and conflicts that the 
construction of a European memory of the war becomes possible.”12 Here, the concept clearly 
stands out from the preceding parts of the book, but it still remains an isolated occurrence of the 
phrase; the author does not attempt to link this concept to any wider discussion about the idea of 
European memory. Trying to pin down the singular point in history when the concept “originated” 
does not make much sense and is anyway irrelevant for understanding how the debate about the 
idea of European memory has evolved. If we are interested in the debate, isolated occurrences 
such as the one mentioned in this paragraph do not need to be considered. 
For the reasons explained above, only considering utterances of the exact phrase of 
“European memory” is not open enough in some respects (as it excludes some closely related 
phrases such as memory of Europe or European collective memory), but it is too open in others 
(as it includes a host of widely different utterances, some of which would have little connection to 
each other, such as a personal memory and the representation of an unrelated historical event in a 
literary work). Therefore, if the condition about the utterance of the term “European memory” is 
to be of any use, some additional qualifying criteria are necessary. The dilemma again is about 
striking a good balance between breadth and depth. Some additional criteria are needed, but these 
should not amount to a substantive conceptualisation of European memory which would dismiss 
too many interpretations of the concept by definitional fiat. A good compromise in this regard 
could be reached if I return to the initial puzzle, to the question about how the current debate 
about European memory has evolved over time. What separates this systematic debate from the 
casual, sporadic use of the concept is the transnational element. Considering European memory 
as having a certain transnational character is what distinguishes the current debate from the earlier 
“memory in Europe” uses. Adding this transnational criterion also means that the condition about 
the use of the term “European memory” can be relaxed to allow for the inclusion of the very close 
variants of the concept (such as memory of Europe or European collective memory). 
An issue that still remains is the linguistic differences. The problem is not only that 
discussion about European memory could be taking place in all the twenty-four official languages 
of the EU (or even more), but that certain terms are not completely equivalent in different 
languages. For instance, there is only an imperfect correspondence between memory and mémoire. 
                                                          
12 Louisa Passerini, “Memories of Resistance, Resistances of Memory,” in European Memories of the Second World War: 
New Perspectives on Postwar Literature, ed. Helmut Peitsch, Charles Burdett, and Claire Gorrara (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1999), 296. 
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Due to the limitations of my own language skills and to the observation that most of the 
transnational debate about European memory occurs in a handful of languages, I will concentrate 
on English sources, which is the de facto common language of the EU, and complement them with 
French and German sources where appropriate. My assumption is that a serious intervention in 
the debate about European memory would try to make an impact in at least one of these languages. 
Who Does European Memory? 
Based on the considerations explained in the previous section, Chapter 6 answers the 
question about who does European memory; it also delimits the scope of the debate about 
European memory, identifies its most important arenas and the sources of information. In the 
following, I will give a brief introduction to the history of the concept by summarising four 
interrelated trends that I observed. First, the idea of European memory has been most widely 
discussed in academia and in EU institutions. Several private initiatives have set out recently to 
strengthen the “European perspective” on history13 and national history museums also seem to be 
more and more “Europeanised,”14 but the usage of the term “European memory” has been 
reserved to these two interconnected (and sometimes overlapping) fora. Among others, the fact 
that there is virtually no trace of national newspapers using this term seems to support the claim 
that the debate is heavily dominated by, and so far constrained to, the “top” (the intellectual and 
political elite). More broadly, the rise to prominence of the idea of European memory can be 
considered to be part of the “memory boom.”15 Our times are often described as a “mnemonic 
age,”16 an “age of apology,”17 an “age of shattered time.”18 For good or ill, the obsession with 
memory19 has indeed become a factor to count with in most societies, and memory studies is 
considered by many as an emerging academic field in its own right.20 
Second, the discussion of the idea of European memory has not only been quite 
technocratic, but the concept has also assumed prominence relatively recently. Within academia, 
historians have been particularly active in addressing this problem with the earliest relevant works 
                                                          
13 For instance, Musée de l’Europe (Brussels) or Unitas Foundation (Tallin). 
14 Wolfram Kaiser, Stefan Krankenhagen, and Kerstin Poehls, Exhibiting Europe In Museums: Transnational Networks, 
Collections, Narratives, and Representations (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014). 
15 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 9. 
16 Bell, “Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory.” 
17 Mark Gibney et al., eds., The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008). 
18 Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
137. 
19 Andreas Huyssen, “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia,” Public Culture 12, no. 1 (2000): 26. 
20 Henry L. Roediger and James V. Wertsch, “Creating a New Discipline of Memory Studies,” Memory Studies 1, no. 1 
(2008): 9–22. 
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in this field dating from the early 2000s. There have been isolated occurrences of the term earlier, 
of course, but the specific debate about the idea of European memory has only emerged in the 
last decade. In the European political arena, the idea of European memory has become important 
since the late 2000s, but some initiatives emerged in the early 2000s which can be considered to 
be the precursors of the idea. The Stockholm Declaration (2000) played a crucial role in 
transnationalising the commemoration of the Holocaust. It was in sharp contrast to earlier less 
successful attempts at commemorating the end of the Second World War and its atrocities such 
as the Bitburg affair of 1985 and the commemorations hosted by the Polish and German presidents 
in 1995. Also, it has been an important point of reference for subsequent transnational attempts 
at commemorating mass killings ever since. The first EU initiatives to introduce some “memory 
politics” at the European level were put forward in the mid-2000s. Some of them failed. Unlike 
the generally forward-looking texts of previous treaties, the preamble of the rejected European 
Constitution (signed in 2004) already made a number of references to a common European 
heritage.21 In 2005, the European Parliament (EP) discussed and finally dropped the idea to ban 
the use of totalitarian symbols. It also encouraged the adoption of 27 January as a European 
Holocaust Memorial Day, but this attempt became redundant when the General Assembly of the 
UN made this day an international remembrance day.22 Other less ambitious initiatives, however, 
succeeded in the following years when a series of resolutions were adopted commemorating certain 
historical events of the twentieth century: the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War in Europe (RWW2), the twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity, the tenth anniversary of 
Srebrenica, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Holodomor. In the first two of these 
resolutions, the EP explicitly referred to European memory. The idea of European memory 
became even more central a few years later. In 2008, a loose network mainly composed of 
politicians and academics signed the Prague Declaration (PD) and called for the establishment of 
an Institute of European Memory and Conscience. Its agenda was largely absorbed by the EP a 
year later when it adopted the Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism (RECT), 
proclaiming 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism 
and proposing the establishment of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience (PEMC).23 
The third observation to make is that, over the course of the last decade, the idea of 
European memory has quickly gained popularity in EU institutions, has made its way into official 
                                                          
21 Its drafters drew “inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe” and were “convinced 
that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to 
transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.” 
22 To be fair, it did become an official European Parliament event. 
23 Other European international organisations have also adopted documents on memory issues. See Council of Europe 
Resolution 1481 (2006) and the Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE (2009). 
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EU documents and has become a key concept of orientation for five European institutions, 
broadly defined: the European Parliament, the Reconciliation of European Histories Group 
(REHG), the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, the Europe for Citizens programme 
(ECP), and the House of European History (HEH). The Reconciliation of European Histories 
Group is an informal group of forty-one members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It has 
close connections to the Platform, an educational project linking governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations. The Europe for Citizens programme is an initiative of the 
European Commission which aims to promote European citizenship. The House of European 
History is a developing museum due to open in May 2017. It is important to consider that its latest 
conception explicitly defines the project as a “reservoir of European memory”;24 this is a significant 
conceptual change as previous EU exhibition projects, such as the Schengen Museum (2010), the 
Parlamentarium (2011) and even the earlier conceptions of the House of European History, had 
more conventional organising principles. The conceptions of European memory that these five 
institutions put forward will be analysed in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the concept of European memory has come to play a central role in the East-
West memory divide or the “European memory wars”25 which have been allegedly raging since 
the Eastern enlargement of 2004. The memory wars are supposed to stand for the heated debate 
between the “East” and the “West,” between the countries on the opposing sides of the former 
Iron Curtain, about what the appropriate memory for Europe should be. At the heart of this 
conflict is the question about the extent to which the Holocaust and other historical atrocities, 
such as Stalinist terror and communist oppression, can be mentioned on the same page. In the 
mid-2000s, when the commemoration of the Holocaust achieved transnational status with the UN 
General Assembly decision mentioned above, many believed that the Holocaust could become a 
common memory for Europe. This was opposed by some, mostly Eastern European conservative, 
politicians and intellectuals on the grounds that an exclusive emphasis on the Holocaust would 
not do justice to the victims of other totalitarian regimes. While very few of them questioned the 
“uniqueness” of the Holocaust openly by declaring Nazism and communism “equally criminal,”26 
they did argue that paying too much attention to the victims of the Holocaust comes at the expense 
of the victims of other totalitarian regimes; this means that the latter are effectively treated as 
second-class victims. I show that the Group and the Platform are important fora in shaping and 
                                                          
24 European Parliament Directorate-General for Communication, “Building a House of European History” 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013), 31. 
25 Dan Stone, Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 285. 
26 Sandra Kalniete quoted in Stefan Troebst, “Halecki Revisited: Europe’s Conflicting Cultures of Remembrance,” in 
A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance, ed. Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010), 60. 
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promoting this anti-communist agenda. This reasoning is opposed by many different groups, and 
most vehemently by the Western European far-left, who believe that it illegitimately relativizes the 
Holocaust and falsifies history by equating communist regimes with Nazism. At the extreme, 
intellectuals from the East accuse the West of ideological colonisation27 and Western intellectuals 
accuse the East of promoting their own victimhood narratives instead of acknowledging their 
complicity in the Holocaust.28 European memory has become the key concept of these memory 
wars where the debate is about what historical events the consensual memory for Europe should 
consist of and how these events should be treated with respect to each other. 
Methodology 
The second “descriptive” question about how European memory is done relies on the 
analysis of openly accessible texts produced in the two arenas identified as influential in the debate 
about the concept, namely academia and European institutions. By the latter, I mean the work of 
the EP and the four EU-related initiatives mentioned in the previous section which are active in 
the debate about European memory. 
The first step is to identify different conceptions of European memory, their relationship 
and their relative strength to each other within these fora. Then I analyse the most prevalent 
approaches to the idea of European memory in turn and determine different aspects of each 
conception. I pay particular attention the following aspects: 
 the conceptualisation of the terms “Europe,” “memory” and “European memory”; 
 the ethical values embedded in a certain conception; 
 the goals that the idea of European memory should achieve; 
 the means by which it should achieve these goals; 
 the importance of historical debates in the conception; 
 the focus of the historical debates that are deemed important by the conception. 
Once these aspects of a certain approach to the idea of European memory have been 
identified, I critically evaluate the conception by looking at the internal contradictions between its 
different aspects and by confronting these aspects with my own theoretical arguments outlined in 
Part I. Given all the ambiguities and the subtle differences in the meaning of the term that have 
                                                          
27 Maria Mälksoo, “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective 
Memory of Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 656. 
28 Aline Sierp, History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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been discussed above, paying attention to the context in which the idea is invoked is crucial. For 
this reason, I find the critical discourse analysis of Ruth Wodak, based on the concept of context, 
particularly inspiring. The triangulatory approach produces interpretations by looking at the 
following levels: 
1. the immediate context (“text-internal co-text”)29 
2. intertextuality (“the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships ... between 
utterances, texts, genres and discourses”)30 
3. the context of the situation (“the extralinguistic social/sociological variables, the 
history and archaeology of an organization, and institutional frames of a specific 
context of situation”)31 
4. “the broader socio-political and historical contexts.”32 
The aim of interpreting different conceptions of European memory is to infer from each 
conception the six aspects of interest which forms the basis of critique. In the process of 
interpretation, it is also important to be sensitive to silences and omissions.33 This is especially 
important in the case of European memory as public debate about historical events is marked by 
taboos and silences, as what is commemorated is just as important as what is left unrepresented. 
Moreover, triangulation is not only necessary between the different contextual levels, but also 
between different types of sources of information. This means that the research is a continuous 
cross-referencing between and within primary and secondary sources. Lastly, I set the time frame 
of the analysis as broad as possible. This means that the observations are up-to-date as of the 
finalisation of the text, that is, the end of 2015. The only exception is the analysis of the 
membership of the Reconciliation of European Histories Group; I used the membership 
information form 31 May 2014 as many members lost their mandate after the EP elections of that 
year. 
  
                                                          
29 Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski, eds., Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 2. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Michael Meyer, “Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,” in Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), 29. 
33 Thomas Huckin, “Textual Silences and the Discourse of Homelessness,” Discourse and Society 13, no. 3 (2002): 347–
72; Thomas Huckin, “On Textual Silences, Large and Small,” in Traditions of Writing Research, ed. Charles Bazerman et 
al. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 419–31; Kieran O’Halloran, Critical Discourse Analysis and Language Cognition 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). 
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Contribution 
My work contributes to two scholarly debates. Part I is a general theoretical discussion 
about pluralist mythscapes, while Part II is a contextualisation of this theory in the contemporary 
European politics of the past. Part I aims to strengthen the ongoing “third wave” in memory 
studies that encourages self-reflection about the theoretical foundations of the field. It outlines a 
comprehensive pluralist account of identity-constitutive mythologies that builds on the idea of 
radical democracy which regards conflicting visions of the past not as an anomaly that needs to be 
overcome by rational consensus or as an asset that can be harvested in order to bolster the 
legitimacy of certain political bodies. This vision takes difference to be an inevitable condition of 
social life, and instead of trying to overcome conflict, it argues for its nature to be changed so that 
competitive antagonistic relationships can become more peaceful agonistic ones through dialogue 
and education. Part I intervenes in the general debates about the conceptualisation of and the 
social theory behind collective memory and myth, and about the ethical standing of constitutive 
mythologies. Chapter 2 contributes to the conceptual discussions within memory studies; it 
presents a comprehensive critique of the most important conceptualisations of collective memory 
and argues that the unreflective use of the term might obscure more than it reveals about the social 
world. For this reason, it proposes to restrict the use of the terms “memory” and “collective 
memory” to practices that are rooted in experience, and to use concepts such as myth and 
mythscape for talking about publicly represented identity-constitutive historical narratives. Chapter 
3 considers the most common social theoretical frameworks embedded in accounts of myth and 
memory, and outlines the backbone of a theory in which mythical structures and agents can be 
meaningfully thought of as co-constitutive. Finally, Chapter 4 considers the normative issues 
related to myths; it highlights the shortcomings of the prevailing duty-based moral philosophical 
approaches and explains what the mythscape might look like in an agonistic democracy based on 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue. 
Building on this theoretical basis, Part II opens up new perspectives within European 
studies. Its aim is to understand and critically evaluate how the idea of European memory has been 
conceptualised by different actors at the European level and to develop a novel, pluralist 
conception. Chapter 5 examines the scholarly discussion of the term; it first explores the more 
general theoretical frameworks with which academics have made sense of the concept, then looks 
at the role that academic research has played in the European memory wars. Chapter 6 sets the 
historical context of the empirical enquiry, examines the process through which the idea of 
European memory has gained importance, and identifies the major arenas in which it has been 
discussed. The aim here is not to point at a single “origin” of the concept but to delineate the 
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scope of empirical research by understanding who were involved in “doing” European memory. 
Chapter 7 analyses and criticises how the actors identified as important use the concept of 
European memory. The conclusion draws on all the previous chapters to determine what a 
pluralist European mythscape would look like, and to explain why it is needed. 
Personal Experiences and Motives 
As a conclusion of this introductory chapter, I feel that it is important to acquaint readers 
with my personal experiences and motivations that compelled me to work on European memory 
and that in many ways inform my general attitude to the subject matter. I would like to be open 
about the ideological-experiential baggage that I bring with myself to the discussion of the topic 
at hand especially because my critical and interpretivist scholarly approach implies that there is no 
such thing as a non-normative, value-free social scientific enquiry. If we accept this, attempting to 
keep a distinction between the supposedly subjective personal motivation and the supposedly 
objective academic enterprise, as followers of the positivist tradition do, becomes nonsensical. The 
personal motives of the researcher to undertake the scholarly enquiry and the framework of 
interpretation used by the researcher during the enquiry form a single, indivisible whole. Indeed, 
if “[t]heory is always for someone, and for some purpose,”34 it must also be by someone for some 
purpose. Knowing the second “someone” (the author) and its objectives is just as important as 
(and is intimately interconnected with) knowing who the theory is for and for what purpose. The 
fact that I was brought up in transitional Hungary plays a decisive role in structuring my personal 
motivation for engaging with, and my thinking about, memory in general and the idea of European 
memory in particular. It is my belief that telling the reader my little story would help in the 
understanding of my arguments and of the position that I speak from. The following is thus my 
own “personal myth” which I have no intention to portray as an account of what “actually 
happened.” Similarly to the political myths that will be discussed later in the dissertation, it is best 
to view it as a creative re-interpretation of the past (or rather, what I think about as part of the 
past) for the purposes of the present. 
Until 2006, until the age of nineteen, I lived in Hungary in a small village, Szada, some 
twenty-five kilometres from Budapest. In the last eight years, I commuted to the capital every 
workday to attend secondary school and I practically only went back to my village to sleep. This 
arrangement meant that most of my formative teenage years were actually spent in Budapest, but 
it also meant that my attachment to either the capital or the village was only ever partial. While the 
possibility of being part of social life in the capital always seemed ever so close and ever so far at 
                                                          
34 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 128. 
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the same time, I felt more and more alienated from, but also unavoidably embedded in, my little 
prison of a village. The paradox of the relative proximity and remoteness of both worlds, in both 
literal and metaphorical senses, was and still is a defining experience for me. 
The contrast between the rural environment and the capital could have hardly been 
starker, especially with respect to identity-constitutive mythologies. To put it simply, the central 
historical narrative of the liberal-cosmopolitan intelligentsia of Budapest seemed to be the 
Holocaust with particular emphasis on the active involvement of the Hungarian state and of 
different parts of the society. On the other hand, the “trauma” of the Trianon Peace Treaty, as a 
result of which Hungary lost much of its territory after the First World War, was a crucial point of 
reference for the particularistic and nationalistic rural tendencies. Not surprisingly, the evaluation 
of the period that connects the two historical events, the regime of Miklós Horthy, is the most 
heated point of the debate (or rather, the dialogue of the deaf) between the two camps. 
This generalising distinction between urban-liberal and rural-nationalist camps is certainly 
an oversimplification. What I do state is that there is little doubt that this cleavage with respect to 
identity-constitutive mythologies does exist in the Hungarian society and I attempt to present here 
how my perceptions of this debate structured my interest in, and my way of thinking about, the 
wider issue addressed in the dissertation. 
Personally, I would like to see people in Hungary subscribe to a liberal-cosmopolitan 
interpretation of events, take a regretful approach towards the Holocaust and generally pay more 
attention to the shameful parts of the past than to glorious and heroic deeds. However, I am aware 
that this set of preferences is by no means the single historically or morally right one. In fact, they 
are largely influenced by my prior ideological preferences, by the more general assumptions about 
the social world and myself. If I had another way of looking at the world and myself in it, I would 
certainly view things differently. The point here is that the historical narrative that I take to be 
valid and important, my historical “belief,” is intimately interconnected with my other, more 
general ideological “bets.” 
After a certain time, after realising the contingency of all of this, instead of propagating 
my historical “belief,” I became much more interested in why this debate is not working well, why 
the two sides are deaf to each other’s arguments. The two camps mutually accuse each other of 
continuing the tradition of the perpetrators, of refusing to acknowledge the suffering of the other, 
and of trying to marginalise the memory of the other. I was particularly fascinated by how both 
sides could think about the other as emotional, irrational and ultimately the falsifier of history. The 
most extremist positions could be heard in everyday conversation. At one extreme, outright 
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irredentist and bordering anti-Semitic comments which portrayed the liberals of the capital as 
corrupted, “anti-Hungarian” (magyarellenes) and “traitors of the nation” (nemzetárulók) were never 
far from the nationalist-particularistic rural environment. At the other extreme, many of these very 
liberals, who were supposedly universalist-cosmopolitan and aware of their privileged status, 
seemed to feel nothing but contempt for the nationalists, as if they had fallen outside the scope of 
universalism for some reason. Expressions that stem from the discredited colonial thinking about 
the modern-backward dichotomy (such as primitive, savage, brute) are now rightfully taboo in the 
liberal vocabulary (probably the only exceptions when these adjectives are still acceptable are 
blatantly illiberal practices such as female genital mutilation). Strangely, these same expressions are 
used by liberals all too readily to describe “exclusionists.” Experiencing this general inability of 
liberalism to meaningfully engage with “exclusionary” views, its habit of labelling them irrational 
or worse, and its penchant for the “never tolerate intolerance” mantra was as important a 
motivation for me to seriously engage with the topic of memory as my complete disagreement 
with the nationalist-particularistic views. 
As I delved deeper and deeper into the field known as “memory studies,” I soon realised 
that the phenomenon of mutually exclusive views is not unique to the Hungarian case at all; for 
instance, the European memory wars exhibit very similar traits. In general, debates about the public 
representation of past events have a tendency to develop into a dialogue of the deaf; this is a 
situation where the participants do not only disagree sharply about what exactly should be 
represented, but they all pursue the same exclusionary logic that outright rejects the right to 
existence of the narratives of the other participants. As I will demonstrate in the theoretical 
chapters of Part I, at the heart of this exclusionary logic lie several assumptions about the existence 
of a singular historical and moral truth and about the possibility of knowing (or at least 
approximating) these truths with the human capacity of reason. Through the intellectual journey 
of this PhD, I have become convinced that far from bringing greater clarity to the debate and from 
offering a framework within which differences can be resolved or tolerated, these assumptions 
themselves are the very reason for the deadlock. Debates about the public representation of 
historical narratives all too often take place with the wrong assumptions and on the wrong level of 
abstraction. In this dissertation, my main goal is thus to question these deeply ingrained 
assumptions and to shift the focus of the debate from a fixation on historical details to more 
abstract and fundamental issues about the nature of historical knowledge and about the ethics of 
the public representation of historical events; in this debate taking place at a more abstract level, I 
aim to intervene by providing a political theory of myth that advocates an agonistic approach to 
identity-constitutive historical narratives instead of the currently dominant antagonistic tendencies. 
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The objective is to overcome the competitive relationships, where the participants regard each 
other as enemies who they need to destroy, and to make way for a more peaceful dialogue, where 
the participants see each other as adversaries who they need to engage with and understand. 
 
  
 
  
PART I 
Pluralist Approach to Myth 
There are, it may be, so many kinds of voices in the world, and none of 
them is without signification. Therefore if I know not the meaning of the 
voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh 
shall be a barbarian unto me. 
King James Bible, 1 Corinthians 14:10-11 
...there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. 
William Shakespeare 
Hamlet 
This is not freedom, but a question of how to work the trap that one is 
inevitably in. 
Judith Butler 
The Body You Want (1992) 
 
  
  
 23 
2 
The Misleading Metaphor of Memory 
Memory is a notoriously ambiguous concept. Any decent account of memory starts with 
a lengthy and complicated attempt at cutting a path through the conceptual jungle. Scholarly 
discussions in which memory remotely plays a role range from neuroscience through history and 
social studies to philosophy. However, as the “type” of memory relevant for the analysis of the 
idea of European memory is that of collective memory, I will concentrate on how this (still all too 
vague) notion has emerged and evolved in academia and, through a critique of the concept, 
propose clarifications and limitations on its use.35 The following is not a comprehensive overview 
of the vast collective memory literature. It instead relies on a number of important selected 
theoretical accounts which allow us to understand general patterns in the literature even in this 
necessarily truncated and simplified version. Many of the issues with the concept of collective 
memory that I will raise have been voiced before and fortunately memory studies seem to be more 
and more responsive to these criticisms. Some have even argued that a third, more theoretically 
and methodologically conscious, wave in memory studies is in the making. While it remains to be 
seen whether this wave will be successful, in the following three chapters I aim to contribute to 
this development with specifying a comprehensive pluralist approach to myth. 
In this chapter, I first provide an overview of the literature on the concept of collective 
memory. I argue that no matter how carefully we define the term, the strong organicist 
connotations of the word “memory” mean that the concept of collective memory often obscures 
more about the social world than it reveals. For this reason, I argue that the use of the term 
“memory” should be restricted to the limitations of the individual mind, while other terms, such 
as collective remembrance and myth, should take its place in the social realm. I conclude by 
                                                          
35 For comprehensive reviews of the literature on collective memory, see Barbie Zelizer, “Reading the Past against the 
Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12, no. 2 (1995): 214–39; Jeffrey K. Olick 
and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic 
Practices,” Annual Review of Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 105–40; Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics 
of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007); Jeffrey K Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and 
Daniel Levy, eds., The Collective Memory Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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highlighting the relationship between myth and identity, and by extending my conceptual 
framework to the transnational level of analysis. 
Understanding Collective Memory 
The term “memory” originally meant the individual cognitive capacity of registering and 
recalling. For the ancients, ars memoriae, the art of memory, stood for the highly valued principles 
and techniques that could help improve the ability of memorising and recalling learnt things. This 
is now viewed as only one type of memory. Today psychologists distinguish between implicit 
memory (that is unconscious and unintentional), and explicit or declarative memory (that is 
conscious and intentional). “[P]rocedural memory, what is learned as bodily skill and habit,”36 is a 
form of implicit memory that allows people to conduct their basic everyday activities (such as 
riding a bike) without thinking. Explicit memory can be subdivided into episodic memory (the 
memory of past events that happened to a person) and semantic memory (“general knowledge and 
facts [that are learned] about the world”).37 
The term “collective memory” was coined by Maurice Halbwachs. Dissatisfied with the 
individualistic treatment of memory in Freudian psychology of trauma and in Henri Bergson’s 
philosophy of consciousness, Halbwachs emphasised the importance of the social in memory 
processes. He claimed that the “idea of an individual memory, absolutely separate from social 
memory, is an abstraction almost devoid of meaning.”38 For Halbwachs, collective memory meant 
the representations of the past that are shared collectively by members of a group who arrive at 
these representations through everyday communication. Collective memory is therefore socially 
mediated and rooted in communication with other group members who “conceive their unity and 
particularity through a common image of their past.”39 Halbwachs was a student of Émile 
Durkheim and relied heavily on his structuralist sociological framework. The end of the nineteenth 
century is often thought about as the first wave of the “memory boom” and Peter Burke suggested 
that the construction of national unity through traditions, rituals and monuments that was 
characteristic of this era had a direct impact on Durkheim’s (and through him, on Halbwachs’s) 
thinking. The “sociology of Emile Durkheim, with its emphasis on community, consensus and 
cohesion, itself bears the stamp”40 of this period. In the light of this, it is not surprising that 
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Halbwachs put so much emphasis on social unity; his belief that a “society can live only if there is 
a sufficient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it” seems to be as 
much prescriptive as descriptive.41 Additionally, the language according to which a society is 
conceived as an actor that “does” things, it remembers and forgets, is rooted in his works and is 
still dominant in memory studies. In his words, a “society tends to erase from its memory all that 
might separate individuals, or that might distance groups from each other ... rearranges its 
recollections in such a way to adjust them to the variable conditions of its equilibrium.”42 The 
unreflective use of this figurative language, and the fact that Halbwachs neglected to specify how 
individuals internalise collective memories, opened the way towards problematic jumps between 
the individual and the social levels of analysis. 
According to the mainstream narrative within memory studies, the second memory boom 
originated in the US in the 1980s and supposedly reached its peak in the mid-1990s.43 Some 
scholars, such as Jeffrey Olick, dispute whether the obsession with memory has ever waned or left 
us in the last few decades. The prominent academics studying this second memory wave were 
influenced by Halbwachs’s work but also tried to refine his propositions and to rectify the 
problems mentioned above. An important conceptual innovation was introduced by Jan Assmann 
who tried to address a major shortcoming in Halbwachs’s framework by distinguishing between 
communicative and cultural memory. Communicative memory for Assmann was what Halbwachs 
theorised about and analysed under the title of collective memory, the “varieties of collective 
memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications ... [and] constitute the field of oral 
history.”44 As such informal memories pass from generation to generation, these representations 
of the past have a limited lifespan, usually three to four generations or eighty to a hundred years. 
Assmann realised that “once we remove ourselves from the area of everyday communication and 
enter into the area of objectivized culture, almost everything changes.”45 Halbwachs neglected the 
realm of organised communication, but the “transition is so fundamental that one must ask 
whether the metaphor of memory remains in any way applicable.”46 Assmann suggested that it 
does; as “a close connection to groups and their identity exists which is similar to that found in 
the case of everyday memory... In this sense, objectivized culture has the structure of memory.”47 
Detached from the everyday, cultural memory is transcendental in character and thus its time 
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horizon is different from that of collective memory. Cultural memory “has its fixed point; its 
horizon does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, 
whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional 
communication (recitation, practice, observance).”48 
Similarly to Assmann, Richard Ned Lebow contrasted Halbwachs’s idea of collective 
memory with a form of memory that resides in the realm of organised communication. However, 
for Lebow, the latter is institutional memory that “describes efforts by political elites, their 
supporters and their opponents to construct meanings of the past and propagate them more widely 
or impose them on other members of society.”49 It is clear from this definition that Lebow departed 
significantly from Assmann’s concept of cultural memory. Institutional memory is constructed and 
propagated (or imposed) by the agents of the memory discourse, who are clearly identified as 
political elites, and thus institutional memory has no transcendental character. 
Olick also realised that Halbwachs’s original theoretical treatment of collective memory 
conflates “two distinct, and not obviously complementary, sorts of phenomena” and that this 
stems from the insufficient attention Halbwachs paid to the transition from the individual to the 
social. On the one hand, his collective memory concept can denote individual, albeit socially 
framed, memories; collected memory, in Olick’s understanding, is the aggregate of the individual 
memories of the members of a group. On the other hand, Halbwachs’s collective memory notion 
can mean collective representations of past events; collective memory, in this narrower sense, 
belongs to the objective (or at least, intersubjective) cultural realm. According to Olick, the 
problem is that “collective memory” is all too often used indiscriminately to refer to both types of 
phenomenon while these two forms of memory “seem to be of radically distinct ontological 
orders” and to presuppose “two radically different concepts of culture.”50 Building on the seminal 
work of Almond and Verba,51 the collected memory tradition posits that political culture can be 
understood as “a subjective category of meanings contained in people’s minds.”52 In contrast, 
interpretivist scholarship views political culture to be “the patterns of publicly available symbols 
objectified in society”53 which means that collective memory has a certain autonomy of its own (it 
is not reducible to its individual members). Olick thought that paying attention to these two 
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mutually incompatible understandings of “memory” would be a necessary step towards greater 
conceptual clarity in the field. 
These conceptual innovations have been highly influential and scholarly contributions to 
memory studies have indeed become more conscious about the limitations of the term “collective 
memory” and more cautious with its use. While in the late 1990s Winter and Sivan lamented that 
many still “use the term ‘memory’ as if it were unproblematic”54 and argued for “a more rigorous 
and tightly argued set of propositions about what exactly memory is,”55 recently Erll and Feindt et 
al. have even argued that it makes sense to talk about a third wave in memory studies that is more 
self-reflexive about its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings.56 Despite these efforts, the 
language that portrays societies as capable of having “memories” and of “remembering” or 
“forgetting” historical experiences, on the one hand, and as being composed of memory 
“producers” and “consumers,” on the other, is still prevalent in scholarly and lay discussions. I 
label the former language organicist and the latter instrumentalist. In the following, I will explain 
why these figurative forms of speech are misleading and how we might overcome this problem. 
Collective Memory as a Misleading Metaphor 
The most common criticism of Halbwachs’s idea of collective memory in particular, and 
the underlying Durkheimian understanding of society in general, is that they are based on a 
naturalistic and organicist thinking that treats societies as organic wholes, as organisms in the 
biological sense. They view social processes as analogous to individual ones, with the only 
difference being that they take place on a different scale. 
There are two consequences of this sociological assumption. One is anthropomorphism. 
Collectives are endowed with attributes and properties which are usually thought of as belonging 
to human beings. Societies and groups, in this organicist thinking, “are said to remember, to forget, 
and to repress the past; but this is done without any awareness that such language is at best 
metaphorical and at worst misleading about the phenomenon under study.”57 Wulf Kansteiner 
thought that the problem with this is primarily methodological; he was concerned that, due to the 
simplified analogy between individual and collective memory processes, “the threshold between 
the individual and the collective is often crossed without any adjustments in method.”58 Some 
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collective memory research indeed relies too much on individualistic psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry; it extrapolates from the individual so that it can explain the social. Jeffrey Alexander 
showed the inadequacy of this type of scholarship with respect to the idea of social trauma which 
will be explained later in this chapter.59 
The other consequence of the organicist assumption about collectivities is that they are 
regarded as cohesive wholes, their cultural sphere is seen as monolithic and too much emphasis is 
put on unity and consensus. Considering the nation-state dreams of the late nineteenth century, 
Durkheim’s social theory and Halbwachs’s idea of collective memory are understandable. On the 
one hand, it is empirically dubious that such a high level of social cohesion is indeed how Society 
(with a capital S) works; on the other hand, it is ethically questionable that this organicist 
assumption effectively reinforces the belief in the primordial nature of national communities to 
the detriment of other, less privileged, social groups. While both Durkheim and Halbwachs 
underplayed the possibility of differences of opinion and conflicts of interest within communities, 
the small but significant differences between their ways of thinking should not be overlooked. 
Coser remarked that where “Durkheim speaks of ‘Society’ with a capital S, Halbwachs speaks of 
‘groups’—a more cautious usage”;60 according to Olick, this suggests that Halbwachs was more 
aware of the possible plurality of memories that can underpin social differentiation.61 
In this organicist framework, not only is “the community” treated as a given, but its 
memories are also regarded as social facts, as something objectively “out there.” Olick referred to 
this view as the “misleading substantialism of an outdated social science.”62 He believed that the 
more contemporary term “mnemonic practices” is better suited to describe the “fluid process” 
that the construction and reproduction of representations of past events really are. Bell is right to 
point out that this process “relies heavily on institutional mediation, political manipulation, and 
active agency,”63 all important factors that are completely neglected in the organicist understanding 
of collective memory. Most problematically, understanding “collective memories” as immovable 
Durkheimian social structures that mould individual identities leaves no room for agency, for the 
possibility of creative and self-reflexive action by social actors. At the other extreme, Marxist 
scholars, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, overemphasise the role of agency by 
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assuming that political elites have nearly perfect control over the representations of the past.64 I 
label this approach instrumentalist because it thinks about historical representations as the means 
by which those in power can legitimate and consolidate their authority. This tension between 
structure-oriented organicism and agent-oriented instrumentalism are at the heart of social 
theoretical debates which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
As noted in the previous section, more recent conceptualisations of collective memory 
have attempted to address these problems with Halbwachs’s original framework, most notably the 
unjustified (and unjustifiable) leaps from the individual to the social (and back). Assmann, Lebow 
and Olick tried to resolve the issues by conceptual innovation; they hoped that distinguishing 
between individual memory processes, everyday small-scale conversation (communicative or 
collective memory) and organised communication (cultural or institutional memory), between 
collected and collective memory, would lead to more clarity in memory studies. These 
developments are certainly welcome, but unfortunately the organicist language is still predominant 
in memory studies. I argue that the reason for this is that the notion of “memory,” irrespective of 
the adjective with which we use it, is too intimately connected with the individual mental capacity 
of remembering and organicist thinking. Above all, the application of the term “memory” in the 
social realm is a misleading metaphor. Assmann has recognised that this transition from the 
individual to the social is “so fundamental that one must ask whether the metaphor of memory 
remains in any way applicable.”65 He and others who have tried to save the concept of collective 
memory have reasoned that the metaphor does remain applicable. While admitting that the term 
itself “structures (that is, both enables and constrains) our conceptual and empirical work,”66 Olick 
upheld that it makes sense to understand collective memory as “merely a broad, sensitizing 
umbrella, and not a precise operational definition. For upon closer examination, collective memory 
really refers to a wide variety of mnemonic products and practices, often quite different from one 
another.”67 Indeed, calling public representations of past events “memories” already prejudices our 
thinking in a number of ways and we need to consider what, if anything, is to be gained from 
submerging a wide range of social processes in the term “collective memory.” I am of the opinion 
that, even if we pay attention to use it carefully, the concept of collective memory has so strong 
organicist connotations that it obscures more than it reveals about the social world. 
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For the advocates of a third wave in memory studies, collective memory has come to be 
seen not as a thing that is actually out there in the real world, but as an “operative metaphor,”68 as 
a heuristic tool with which we make sense of social phenomena. If we are indeed so pragmatic 
with respect to concept formation, if we define concepts in a way that they become useful for 
making sense of the world, why are we still clinging to the concept of memory? If we can do away 
with concepts such as cultural trauma for their highly problematic jumps between individual and 
social levels,69 why cannot we do the same with “collective memory”? I agree with Reinhart 
Koselleck that only individuals should be understood to “have” memories and applying the 
concept outside the realm of the individual mind is a misleading metaphor that should be rejected.70 
It is misleading mostly because it obscures our vision to the problem of agency, that is, to the 
question about who does the remembering. Even Halbwachs admitted that “[w]hile the collective 
memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals 
as group members who remember.”71 If this is so, how can individuals “remember” events that 
have happened far away from their lives in terms of space and/or time? They might remember 
hearing about these events or learning about them, but surely they do not remember them as lived 
experiences. To say that we remember the Holocaust is a metaphorical figure of speech that is 
highly misleading. None of us remembers the First World War simply because we were not alive 
at that time. I agree with Samuel Hynes that for the “images and stories in our heads that constitute 
our versions of other men’s wars we must find some other term. And there is a perfectly good one 
at hand: what we do, when we summon up our common notions of what the First World War was 
like, ... we evoke our shared myth of the war.”72 
For the above reasons, the terms memory and remembering should not be subject to the 
misleading metaphorical usage according to which collectives can remember and individuals 
remember events that they have never experienced. This misleading language has been all too often 
used unreflectively so that memory has come to “represent a whole host of different social 
practices, cognitive processes and representational strategies and what gets submerged, flattened 
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out, is the nuance, texture and often-contradictory forces and tensions of history and politics.”73 
Following Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan,74 Duncan Bell advocated a social agency approach 
that recognises that memory is an individual capacity and is rooted in experience. Importantly, Bell 
did not claim that “the mind is a hermetically-sealed entity, untouched by the social context in 
which it is situated”; on the contrary, “[m]emory relies to a large degree on pre-constituted 
discursive elements, images, vocabularies.”75 Memory is “the socially-framed property of individual 
minds ... an individualistic psychological phenomenon in so far as it is a phenomenon that only 
individuals can possess properly.”76 Memory should not be understood as a substance that “can 
transcend the individual consciousness and enter into the public realm, outside time” and that is 
“transferable (as memory) to those who have not experienced the events that an individual recalls, 
which means that it cannot be passed down from generation to generation.”77 In this framework, 
the only social practice that can be considered “truly” mnemonic is collective remembrance, when 
individuals who have experienced the same particular event, who have lived through the same 
particular time come together and discuss their experiences. Collective remembrance is thus 
limited by time and space and can only take place within the lifetime of those experiencing a 
particular event. Shared representations of past events, for which the metaphor of “collective 
memory” stands, remain very important, of course; however, they “should not be regarded as truly 
mnemonic. Instead, they should be conceived of as mythical.”78 It is crucial to note that “truly 
mnemonic,” in this sense, does not mean that memories rooted in experience are “real” memories 
and shared representation of past events are “unreal.” Nothing can be further from my argument 
than a conceptualisation of memory that follows the logic of a correspondence theory of truth, 
that aims to delineate the single right “thing” out there in the world that memory really is. On the 
contrary, I make a case for a pragmatist conceptualisation influenced by Richard Rorty that 
recognises that metaphor is an essential tool with which we make sense of the world, we connect 
two hitherto unrelated referents, we can render the unknown familiar; but it also recognises that 
not all metaphors are the same, that they influence our thinking differently, that the effects of 
some metaphors on our thinking are more constraining than enabling, that some metaphors are 
particularly misleading while others are less so. What I argue for is not that the concept of memory 
is a metaphor, but that it is highly misleading to use the same term for what is rooted in the 
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experience of agents and what is the socially shared representation of past events. The latter in my 
framework should thus not be understood to be mnemonic. 
Naturally, not everyone shares the view that the language of memory not rooted in 
experience can only be misleadingly metaphorical. According to Eviatar Zerubavel, “the ability to 
experience events that had happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before 
we joined them as if they were part of our own past ... is an indispensable part of our social 
identity.”79 I disagree with this position. When one is aware of committing the mistake of talking 
about remembering something that had happened before they were born, the issue might be no 
more serious than sloppy language, a metaphor that opens the possibility for all sorts of 
misunderstandings. Confusing learnt and lived experiences unknowingly, however, is in fact a 
deeply disturbing psychiatric condition. In his treatment of psychosis, James Glass elaborated on 
the case of Ruth, the daughter of a Holocaust survivor.80 Following behavioural patterns learnt 
from his father, Ruth talked about the horrors of the concentration camp as if she had really been 
there, as if she had really experienced the suffering as a prisoner. Is this the type of 
“sociobiographical memory” that Zerubavel had in mind when he claimed that “what we 
‘remember’ includes more than just what we have personally experienced”?81 The examples he 
enumerated (the sense of suffering of many African Americans whose ancestors were slaves or the 
sense of guilt many Germans feel about the Holocaust) are certainly very close. The question is, 
of course, whether the people Zerubavel talked about truly lose their sense of self in recalling 
slavery or the Holocaust, whether they truly believe that they were there as he claimed. I find this 
a highly dubious proposition. The idea of an “existential fusion of our own personal biography 
with the history of the groups or communities to which we belong”82 is confusing. 
The real world effects of research based on these underlying assumptions of the idea of 
“sociobiographical memory” are also ethically questionable. “It too often assumes that which it is 
supposed to explain”83 which leads us to the performativity critique of the organicist understanding 
of collective memory. By treating “mnemonic communities” and their memories as given and 
viewing social responses to past events as organic and natural, research conducted in this vein 
reinforces and naturalises contingent social arrangements and it legitimates the “bogus naturalism 
of memory makers.”84 Many works in memory studies attempt to describe how “societies 
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remember,” how commemorative practices change over time, while they fail to question the very 
social forces that bring these “memories” about. Assuming a false “observer” position, they 
disregard the way their assumptions and terminology reinforce the very social structures and power 
positions that their work is supposed to explain. As Bell noted, the “existence of a ‘collective 
memory’ should not be the starting point of investigation or ethical stipulation. Rather, in 
attempting to grapple with ethical questions about the uses of the past it is vital to analyze the 
dynamics of popular historical consciousness and the ways in which particular ‘collective 
memories’ come to be formed and reproduced, the social and political roles they perform (whether 
intentionally or not), and the modes of inclusion and exclusion they sanction.”85 
Finally, the last critique of the organicist collective memory literature concerns research 
focus, namely the preoccupation of works on “memory” with nationalism and national identity. 
Representations of the past are certainly important for most (if not all) nationalisms, but memories 
and myths are not reducible to nationalist movements. Students of collective memory often focus 
exclusively on myths important for national identity and seem to forget that other political 
ideologies and other types of communities require the same type of founding narratives to serve 
as the symbolic basis for their cohesion. The disproportionate scholarly attention that has been 
paid to nationalist founding narratives, while often ironically subscribing to the assumption that 
their importance is diminishing, has resulted in a skewed understanding of the mythological 
landscape. A related problem is that works in memory studies usually take the form of national 
case studies and cross-country comparisons. The fact that this is the most common level of analysis 
in the social sciences is not a good enough reason for always unreflectively focusing on narrow 
national discourses. Again, this preoccupation is not simply methodologically problematic, but it 
also reinforces the assumption that it is naturally within national mnemonic communities that 
“memories” emerge and remembering takes place. The scholarly practice of talking about unitary 
“national memories” stems from this type of thinking which does not take into account the 
diversity and the plurality of the representations of past events within societies and social groups. 
In the last decade, this fixation on “national memories” has been challenged by the rise of the 
concept of transnational memory which will be explained later in this chapter. 
Memory and Myth 
All the problems associated with the concept of collective memory which were discussed 
in the previous section suggest that, at the very least, it should be employed with prudence. I even 
propose that we should altogether refrain from a language that is “at best metaphorical and at 
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worst misleading”86 in favour of other, more precisely defined and less misleading terms. On the 
face of it, this is merely a semantic issue. Words, however, never merely describe the world around 
us; they have real effects, they enable and constrain (in one word, structure) our thinking. The term 
collective memory is problematic in many ways: it suggests that groups possess the psychological 
ability to remember and to forget and that individuals can remember events that they have not 
experienced; “the very term substantializes what is in fact a fluid process.”87 
Notwithstanding these problems, for some scholars it is not obvious that the concept of 
collective memory should be abandoned as they believe that it still has some distinct advantages. 
According to Burke, the dilemma is that if “we use terms like ‘social memory’ we do risk reifying 
concepts. On the other hand, if we refuse to use such terms, we are in danger of failing to notice 
the different ways in which the ideas of individuals are influenced by the groups to which they 
belong.”88 Burke did not explain, however, why he thought that memory is the best term to remind 
us of this influence. We should thus restrict the phenomenon of memory and the capacity to 
remember to individuals and to the events that they personally experience. Collective 
remembrance should be considered to be the only mnemonic practice that can be conducted in 
groups and other public representations of past events should be considered mythical. Myths, in 
this sense, are “highly simplified narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected 
events, people, and places, real or imaginary. They are easily intelligible, transmissible, and help 
constitute or bolster particular visions of self, society, and world.”89 Myths are publicly represented 
identity-constitutive historical narratives. Naturally, the term myth has its own problematic 
connotations, but these can be much more easily remedied than the misleading metaphor of 
memory. First, myth needs to be carefully differentiated from the way it is used in everyday 
conversation where it is usually understood to stand for a false belief, an untrue story; myth can 
be based on false or unsupported historical claims, but not necessarily. Moreover, this 
understanding is different from that associated with the instrumentalist approach which views 
myths as centrally imposed on people in order to legitimate certain social and political 
arrangements. Lastly, myth is often employed in anthropological accounts to refer to uncontested 
and incontestable narratives that ground the origins of a community. However, this definition 
unnecessarily narrows down our understanding of constitutive mythologies as it is primarily 
applicable in more traditional communities. In modern societies, identity-constitutive myths often, 
but not always and not exclusively, tell a tale about the origins of a group; the sacred is still very 
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much present, but its transgression is usually sanctioned quite differently than in traditional 
communities. A more detailed theoretical justification for this conceptualisation will be provided 
in the next chapter, and a more nuanced categorisation of myths will be given in the following 
chapters. 
The proponents of the concept of myth have not been able to turn the tide in memory 
studies so far and many scholars even deny that myth constitutes a conceptual innovation at all. 
Many dismiss it as an “old-fashioned concept”90 and an “older term.”91 Older, however, does not 
necessarily mean less useful. Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam called the concept of memory “an act of 
intrusion ... jostling aside older yet still effective working terms, and unavoidably obliterating fine 
distinctions.”92 Similarly, Rousso noted that “the concept of memory has been extensively 
interpreted to the extent that it now seems to define any kind of link between past and present.”93 
The broad understanding of myth explained above has a number of advantages over the concept 
of memory when it comes to the description of not truly mnemonic practices, to the collective 
representations of past events. Unlike the terms “collective memory” and “national memory,” 
myth does not give us the impression that there is a single, unconditionally accepted historical 
narrative in a group; instead, it constantly reminds us of the possibility of contestation and the 
importance of the underlying power dynamics. In Bell’s terminology, the dominant or governing 
myth in a society “coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths.”94 The “totality of 
myths within any given collective … the discursive space in which the various myths of the 
collective are forged and challenged”95 can be called the “mythscape.” The acknowledgement of 
the contested nature of the representations of past events is also possible within the collective 
memory framework, of course. Michel Foucault introduced the term “counter-memory,”96 Yael 
Zerubavel talked in terms of master commemorative narratives and counter-memories,97 while 
John Bodnar used the phrase “vernacular memories.”98 These “memories with adjectives,” 
                                                          
90 Claudio Fogu and Wulf Kansteiner, “The Politics of Memory and the Poetics of History,” in The Politics of Memory 
in Postwar Europe, ed. Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006), 285. 
91 Olick, “Collective Memory,” 334. 
92 Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, “Collective Memory—What Is It?,” History and Memory 8, no. 1 (1996): 30. 
93 Henry Rousso, “The History of Memory: Brief Reflections on an Overloaded Field,” in Clashes in European Memory: 
The Case of Communist Repression and the Holocaust, ed. Muriel Blaive, Christian Gerbel, and Thomas Lindenberger 
(Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2011), 232. 
94 Bell, “Mythscapes,” 74. 
95 Bell, “Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory,” 151. 
96 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1980). 
97 Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995). 
98 John E. Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991). 
 36 
however, are still inadequate to resolve the problems associated with the misleading term that 
memory is. The advantage of reserving the capacity to remember to truly mnemonic practices is 
that we have a means to describe a situation when personal memory (that is, a socially framed 
narrative based on direct personal experiences with respect to an event) can be in opposition to 
the governing myth in a group or society. Instead of viewing memory as an instrument of cohesion 
in a community, personal memory can be an important element of resistance to mainstream 
representations of the past. 
There are some ways Bell’s social agency approach to myth can be fleshed out. First, we 
could consider the situation in which no myth is obviously dominant in a certain public discourse; 
it is perfectly possible to conceive of a duopoly or oligopoly of myths in which two or more 
identity-constitutive narratives of roughly equal strength dominate the mythscape. It is probably 
true that mythscapes with two or more competing nationalist myths are rare simply because in 
such a case it would make more sense to talk about two distinct national communities and two 
mythscapes; we need to bear in mind, however, that unresolved nationalist struggles for mythical 
dominance in entities that are considered nations are not as uncommon as they might appear at 
first99 and that nationalist stories are not the only, and sometimes not even the most important, 
myths that define contemporary communities. For these reasons, we need to allow for the 
possibility of mythical duopoly and oligopoly as well. 
Second, Bell mainly focused on the social level in order to challenge the totalising 
conception of “national memory,” but his emphasis on plurality and contestation could also be 
extended to the subnational and the transnational levels. Let us start with internal group dynamics. 
There is no reason to believe that myths, which battle with each other at the social level, are 
uncontested within the group to which they belong. Most probably, the same dynamic processes 
of contestation and struggles for dominance take place within groups and sub-groups as at the 
higher, social level on which Bell focused. This does not mean that myths are necessarily challenged 
at every level. If no shared beliefs and no agreement on any fundamental issues existed, the 
contestation of myths could be regressed to such an extent that each individual would have his/her 
own, private myth. Assuming the presence of a certain degree of consensus along with contestation 
is thus also necessary to arrive at an adequate social theoretical background for constitutive 
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mythologies. Bell’s conceptual framework could also be extended to the transnational level which 
will be done in the last section of this chapter. 
Last, some clarification is in order concerning group membership. People should not be 
assumed to belong to one group or another. More realistically, every person belongs to several 
groups and the intensity of the ties by which he or she is bound to them is different for each group 
and can vary over time. We can also say that an individual is influenced and in turn influences a 
multitude of mythical social structures. This intuition should also be incorporated in the social 
theoretical account of myth that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Memory, Identity and Nationalism 
Why does memory matter? A good deal of the collective memory literature sought to 
explain or understand the periodic upsurges of interest in memory and the persistent or ephemeral 
nature of this obsession. Answering this question would supposedly help us better understand 
whether and why memory is important for social life and why it is more relevant in certain 
historical contexts than in others. Halbwachs himself connected collective memory to group unity 
and self-understanding. Since then, with the rise of “identity talk,” the notion that individual and 
group identities inevitably rely on memory has become a sort of received wisdom. The proposition 
that “shared experiences and memories ... provide distinctive identities to individuals and 
communities”100 is often presented as a fait accompli which does not require any further explanation. 
The reasoning behind this, if provided, is usually very simplistic. The individual is constituted by 
his or her past experiences. Common sense tells us that what I was defines who I am. In 
psychology, the autobiographical memories of an individual, which are a combination of episodic 
and semantic memories, “constrain what the self is, has been, and can be in the future.”101 The way 
I see it, this type of thinking might work well for individual identity, but it is subject to the same 
caveat as Halbwachs’s collective memory; it generalises too readily from individual to social 
processes. Some thinkers suggested that the reliance of identity on memories and myths might be 
more contingent than necessary102 and that there is nothing natural about self-identification based 
on militancy (that is, defining the self with reference to the Other) and memory.103 In my view, 
certain scepticism about the taken-for-granted identity-memory nexus is definitely a step in the 
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right direction, but it is true that it would be difficult to name group identities which do not rely 
on some sort of mythical foundations. 
Many works explained historical variations in the public interest in memory within the 
identity-memory framework and placed the memory obsession(s) in grander historical narratives. 
Allan Megill asserted that “[w]e might postulate a rule: when identity becomes uncertain, memory 
rises in value.”104 Pierre Nora claimed that “memory is constantly on our lips because it no longer 
exists.”105 In his view, over time memory and the sacred have been expelled from society together 
with the nation as the foundation of identity; the recent “memory boom,” the struggle to uphold 
the traces of memory we have left, is no more than a substitute for real, lived memories. As 
humanity has moved from premodern times through modernity to postmodernity, we have 
gradually moved from a natural relationship with the past to artificial types of memory (such as 
distance-memory, duty-memory and archive-memory). Nora warned us that lieux de mémoire had 
replaced milieux. Another narrative has been suggested by Olick who proposed that we are 
undergoing a profound memory crisis similar to the one that occurred at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The difference is that whereas at that time the primary role of the memory frenzy was to 
strengthen nationalist sentiments, in our times the politics of regret has become the new grounds 
for legitimation. The term “politics of regret” originally meant “a variety of practices with which 
many contemporary societies confront toxic legacies of the past” in Olick’s understanding.106 I 
have the impression that even he did not use the term consistently as in his writings it sometimes 
referred to all the institutions of transitional justice, sometimes only to state apology, and at other 
times to the “memory boom” in general. For my purposes, it is understood more narrowly as the 
process through which the public representation of certain problematic past events comes to be 
dominated by apologetic voices which usually acknowledge the role of the state or of wider society 
in certain atrocities and thus take some degree of responsibility for them. Olick claimed that, with 
the gradual decline of the nation state, legitimacy is no longer sought in referring to heroic golden 
ages, but in remembering the criminal past. Olick’s perspective thus “places memory and regret 
properly at the center of its sociological account of modernity.”107 
Whatever the explanation for the memory boom might be, it is certain that regretful 
approaches to the past, and consequently victimhood narratives, are increasing in importance. The 
emergence of these types of myth is often explained by cultural trauma theory. What Alexander 
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called common-sense or “lay” trauma theory thinks that certain events are inherently traumatic; 
the power to shatter emerges from the nature of the event itself and the traumatisation of the 
individual, its feeling of being shattered, is a natural and immediate reaction to such an event. In 
this sense, social reactions to shattering events are seen as “natural” either because people are 
fundamentally good by nature, are shocked by bad experiences and aim to rationally solve the 
problem (Enlightenment version) or because they are unconsciously motivated by deep-rooted 
emotions and fears, and naturally react to disturbing experiences by repressing them 
(psychoanalytic version). In contrast, Alexander argued that there is nothing “natural” about such 
social reactions as no event is inherently traumatic. 
Trauma is a socially mediated attribution. The attribution may be made in real time, as an event unfolds; 
it may also be made before the event occurs, as an adumbration, or after the event has concluded, as a 
post hoc reconstruction. Sometimes, in fact, events that are deeply traumatizing may not actually have 
occurred at all; such imagined events, however, can be as traumatizing as events that have actually 
occurred.108 
Saying that trauma is socially constructed does not mean the trivialisation, the 
“relativization” or the rejection of victimhood claims. It is clear that any form of suffering and 
victimisation is terrible and deplorable. What this statement does mean is that the trauma (the 
victimhood identity) is not an automatic and immediate reaction to the shattering experience (the 
act of victimisation). 
[W]hile victimisation is a harmful and occasionally violent act perpetrated upon a person or group, 
victimhood is a socially constructed identity, built—but not necessarily contingent—upon any particular 
perspective on that harm. Victimhood depends on a choice, however limited in its options, to use the 
experience of harm as the basis for identity, subject to the expectations of a political culture and its 
power relations.109 
The social construction of the victimhood identity does not mean that it is an “invented 
tradition.” It may or may not have experiential basis, but admittedly it might be easier to construct 
a victimhood identity when the act of victimisation actually occurred. For instance, a central theme 
of Part II will be the European memory wars within which victimhood narratives that emphasise 
the suffering of Eastern European peoples under communism play an important role. Even 
though most of these myths are based on actual acts of victimisation, it does not follow that the 
experience was automatically converted to individual trauma which then naturally arose from the 
personal to the collective level. Victimhood identities need to be constructed and there is nothing 
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natural (or unnatural) about this process. There is nothing inherently good or bad about the social 
construction of these identities (in Eastern Europe and beyond), but it is a mistake to think that 
the supposed “iron laws” of human nature have anything to do with them. Therefore, talking 
about trauma on the social level is as organicist as talking about collective memories and it should 
also be rejected as a misleading metaphor. 
Transnational Memory 
Finally, let us relax the assumption about hypothetical closed societies and examine the 
place of the concept of collective memory in a globalising world. The so-called “transitional turn” 
is starting to affect memory studies which have so far been preoccupied with national lieux de 
mémoire. As Aleida Assmann put it, this turn is fostering “a rethinking and reconfiguring of national 
memories in the context of transnational connectedness”110 and it is leading to the emergence of 
the field of “transnational memory.” However, the metaphor of memory becomes especially 
burdensome when it is meant to stand for representations of the past that transcend national 
boundaries. In the literal sense, transnational memory is clearly nonsensical. How are we to 
remember something that is not only temporally, but also spatially far detached from us? How are 
we to remember something that happened on the other side of the world? In the more figurative 
sense, memories on the transnational level have been subject to a number of conceptualisations; 
the terms “cosmopolitan memory,”111 “transcultural memory”112 and “travelling memory”113 have 
emerged in the last decade. On the one hand, these conceptualisations usually agree that memories 
on the transnational level are the result of new technologies, increased migration and larger 
interconnectedness. On the other hand, they depict these new “memories with adjectives” as 
generally positive phenomena in that they contribute to the understanding and the appreciation of 
different historical experiences and, in the case of the Holocaust, they can serve as a common 
platform for action in the interest of human rights. While the fact that memory studies is moving 
away from narrow-minded national frameworks is certainly a welcome and long overdue 
development, works on transcultural memory remain characterised by a lack of attention to agency. 
As Feindt et al. noted, citing solely new technologies as the driving forces behind the globalising 
trend risks downplaying the importance of human action and ultimately leaves little room for 
agency. 
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Michael Rothberg presented a more nuanced picture. In developing his concept of 
“multidirectional memory,”114 a term itself borrowed from network theory, he argued that the 
cross-referencing between memories that transcends national, ethnic, temporal and other types of 
boundaries is not a particularly new phenomenon, but one that has received relatively little 
attention so far. No memory regime has ever developed in isolation; general trends and common 
reference points have often spilled over boundaries and new communication technologies are not 
at all necessary for this productive “borrowing.” Moreover, and more importantly, Rothberg 
recognised that far from being unequivocally beneficial, this process can often produce social 
tensions and can even lead to violence. His main examples are the Holocaust and the colonialism 
discourses; he argued that these often produce mutually exclusionary accounts of victimhood that 
are pitted against each other in the public discourse, but this is not at all necessary to be the case. 
In emerging as what Levy and Sznaider called a “cosmopolitan memory,” the memory of the 
Holocaust has become a cornerstone of human rights activism, but it has also come into conflict 
with other, more local victimhood narratives. Especially in the case of the crimes of colonialism, 
some feel that the Holocaust memory crowds out their narrative of victimhood from the public 
space. This feeling of marginalisation is certainly not mitigated by the fact that the official 
Holocaust narrative is often coupled with claims of uniqueness and exclusivity. Rothberg found 
that the roots of the problem lie in the competitive logic that assumes that “the public sphere in 
which collective memories are articulated is a scarce resource and that the interaction of different 
collective memories within that sphere takes the form of a zero-sum struggle for preeminence.”115 
He called for a “shift in the conceptualization of memory from competition to 
multidirectionality”116 because “far from blocking other historical memories from view in a 
competitive struggle for recognition, the emergence of Holocaust memory on a global scale has 
contributed to the articulation of other histories”117 by providing a template for them. Importantly, 
while he maintained that “understanding memory as multidirectional is ultimately preferable to 
models of competition, exclusivity, and exceptionality,” Rothberg was self-reflexive enough to 
explore the crucial cases in which “memory’s multidirectionality functions in the interests of 
violence or exclusion instead of solidarity.”118 
  
                                                          
114 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009). 
115 Ibid., 3. 
116 Ibid., 18. 
117 Ibid., 6. 
118 Ibid., 11–12. 
 42 
Rothberg’s conceptual framework has been influential in the study of transnational 
memories. He is right in saying that the way we think about myths already influences the dynamics 
of our mythscapes. If the proponents of different victimhood narratives did not regard each other 
as rivals, but as allies, the interactions in that mythscape would be significantly different. It must 
be noted, however, that I do not mean to say by this that just because victimhood myths relate to 
each other differently, the public attention that each of them receive would necessarily and 
magically increase (for more discussion on this problem, see Chapter 4). Exactly because the way 
people think about the dynamics between public representations of the past is so important for 
Rothberg’s theory, he should give special consideration to whether the concept of multidirectional 
memory is indeed the most suitable for his purposes. Indeed, I argue that the term “memory” is 
inadequate in this context as it reinforces the competitive logic that Rothberg sought to undermine. 
In the common-sense understanding, memory is certainly competitive; there are countless 
impulses craving for our attention because we as individuals can only internalise and remember a 
limited amount of information. More figuratively, the “remembering” is not done by an individual 
but by societies or groups through the “division of mnemonic labor”;119 even so, the metaphor of 
collective memory implies that a society or a group as a whole has a work to do and, as with any 
type of work, there is only a restricted amount of resources to do the “mnemonic labor.” 
Therefore, framing public representations of the past in terms of collective “remembering” 
necessarily contributes to the development of a “competition of victims.”120 For a properly 
multidirectional understanding of transnational representational practices, Rothberg should 
consciously reject framing his argument in terms of the misleading metaphor of memory. 
I have already explained how Bell’s conceptual framework can be understood on 
subnational levels. Similarly, it can also be extended to the transnational scene. It makes sense to 
talk about transnational myths and transnational mythscapes as certain representations, tropes and 
representational strategies can become relevant outside national boundaries. New technologies 
certainly provide the means by which such myths can spread more easily, but agents remain crucial 
in the re-enactment of mythical structures. Once we extend Bell’s framework to transnational and 
subnational levels, it is perfectly possible for a myth to be in a dominant position on one level and 
in a subaltern position on another. By this, I do not mean to suggest that these levels are 
hermetically sealed from each other and actually “exist” out there in the world. In fact, it makes 
sense to think about these levels as analytical systems of myth. Olick differentiated between the 
global, regional, national, local, familial, individual analytical systems which are “not merely nested 
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like Matryoshka dolls, one inside the other, but ... the flows and effects of memory can leap 
between different orders, from system to system, in a wide variety of ways.”121 
In this chapter, I have explored the issues with the term “collective memory” and 
proposed an alternative conceptual framework. The distinction between myth, collective 
remembrance and memory is useful because it reminds us of the importance of agency. In the 
following chapter, I will explain why it is crucial to pay attention to the problem of agency and 
how we should think about the relationship between mythical structures and social agents. This 
will effectively provide a social theoretical basis for the pluralist approach to identity-constitutive 
representations of the past and will also inform the discussion about ethics in Chapter 4. 
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3 
Reflexivist Social Theory of Myth 
In the previous chapter, I contrasted organicist and instrumentalist approaches to 
collective memory based on what they think about the extent to which agents and structures 
determine each other. If we understand these labels as ideal types rather than the positions of 
actual scholars, we can say that organicism assumes that social structures “mould” agents, while 
instrumentalism posits that (at least certain) agents have complete control over their structures. I 
do not suggest that actual conceptualisations of collective memory clearly subscribe to one or the 
other of these extremes, but it is certainly the case that the Durkheimian-Halbwachsian framework 
overemphasises the importance of structural constraints, while the instrumentalist thinking 
assumes too much control of agents over their social world. In the following, I will explain a social 
theoretical framework that transcends this dichotomic thinking and sees social structures and 
agents as co-constitutive. This, in turn, will be the basis for a reflexivist social theoretical 
framework of myth. 
I label this approach reflexivist for two reasons. According to the underlying social 
theoretical considerations, agents are believed to be capable of creativity, innovation and at least 
partial self-reflexivity; this means that to a certain extent they can critically reflect on their situation 
and on the social structures that shape them and are in turn shaped by them. Similarly, academics 
are also characterised by this limited reflexivity and their task is taken to be the use of their own 
self-reflexive capabilities with the aim of triggering self-reflection in their audience. The reflexivist 
understanding of myth is useful because it allows academics to be more effective at this task. 
In this chapter, I will first briefly review the history of the concept of myth and of the 
agent-structure dilemma in the social sciences, and I will argue for a conception in which agents 
and structures are considered as co-constitutive rather than as dichotomous categories. I will then 
show how these social theoretical frameworks are currently present in the study of myth and 
collective memory, and will develop a reflexivist social theoretical approach to myth. 
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A Brief History of the Concept of Myth 
In the previous chapter, I stated that my understanding of myth differs significantly from 
its everyday usage which views myth as an unjustified and false belief that stands in opposition to 
the rational and the true. This differentiation between mythos and logos, the irrational-false and the 
rational-true, the “really made-up” and the “really real”122 seems now to be self-evident, but the 
history of the concept of myth shows that this dichotomic thinking has evolved through a long 
and contingent process. In ancient Greece, the two terms were used interchangeably until the fifth 
century. At least until Plato, the term “myth” did not have any pejorative meaning or associations 
with falsity. Chiara Bottici demonstrated that the plurality of truths that ancient mythology 
provided came to be decisively denounced as deceptive with the rise of monotheistic religions, 
especially Christianity.123 It was when logos began to be widely associated with the ultimate truth, 
the Word of a unique God, that the polytheistic mythical culture was condemned as untruthful 
and dangerous. The concept of myth took on further negative connotations during the 
Enlightenment when it was rejected “not just as untruth, but also as imaginary and thus unreal”; 
by this time, the distinction between mythos and logos became so strongly held that even “Romantic 
approaches to myth, with their call for a rehabilitation of myth understood as the vehicle for a 
divine revelation, simply invert[ed] the axiological value of the dichotomy of myth versus reason 
upon which Enlightenment itself rests, instead of radically questioning it.”124 
Despite these contemporary negative connotations of myth, a number of different 
understandings of literary and political myths have emerged which do not regard them anymore 
as untrue. Instead, they define them in terms of their claim to represent the truth,125 of how they 
are believed to be true,126 or of their backward127 or progressive128 nature. Some have even 
understood the concept of myth so broadly that for them it effectively stands for all political 
symbols; Roland Barthes, for instance, conceptualised myth as a second-order semiological 
system.129 I agree with Bottici and Benoît Challand that the use of the term should be more 
restrictive; we should understand myths as symbolic, but not all symbols should be understood as 
mythical.130 I understand the term “myth” to stand for publicly represented identity-constitutive 
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historical narratives. Consequently, they may or may not make historical truth claims, and they 
may or may not be historically accurate. Not any symbol, not any narrative and not any historical 
narrative is necessarily a myth. This conceptualisation is thus based on the assumption that not all 
statements need to claim to represent the singular and absolute truth in order to be constitutive of 
an individual’s or a social group’s identity. The search for meaning might be justifiably seen as a 
“human constant,” but as the historical contingency of the development of the mythos–logos 
dichotomy shows, the desire to ground meaning in the exclusive and unique truth is definitely not. 
For this reason, identity-constitutive myths which do not make historical truth claims are 
conceivable. My argument is not that this conceptualisation is better at describing the features of 
corresponding real world phenomena, but that it is a potentially more useful way of “hooking onto 
the world” than other understandings of myth (or the notion of collective memory, for that 
matter). In the following, I will explain the social theoretical framework behind this understanding 
of myth and provide reasons why it is a particularly useful way of making sense of the social world. 
The Agent-Structure Debate 
The agent-structure debate has been going on within, and sometimes across, various 
disciplines in the last forty years. In sociology, the concept of social structure was overwhelmingly 
viewed for a long time as a moulding form that shapes individuals and governs human behaviour. 
By positing that society cannot be understood as a mere aggregate of its individual members, this 
approach subscribes to a methodological holism that views the whole as more than the sum of its 
parts. The causal determinism of social structure came to be challenged within its home discipline 
in the 1970s. Norbert Elias, one of the first thinkers who tried to relax the agent-structure 
dichotomy, was well ahead of his time. The Civilizing Process was originally published in 1939 but 
received very little attention until it appeared in English in 1969.131 Elias used the metaphor of a 
dance to explain the relationship between figurations (structures) and actors; a dance can only 
occur if the participants know the conventions of the dance, but it cannot take place independently 
of the actors. Pierre Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus in the Outline of a Theory of Practice, 
first published in French in 1972. He was among the first to attempt to reconcile semiotic and 
material conceptions of structure. In his understanding, habitus is a product of a complex 
relationship between mental structures and the world of objects. Anthony Giddens intervened in 
the emerging agent-structure debate with his Central Problems in Social Theory, published in 1979; he 
famously argued that “the notions of action and structure presuppose one another.”132 He coined 
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the term structuration to break with the static connotations of the word structure. Instead of the 
dichotomic thinking about agent and structure, his theory of structuration opted for “the duality 
of structure, ... the mutual dependence of structure and agency” which means that “the structural 
properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute 
those systems... The identification of structure with constraint is also rejected: structure is both 
enabling and constraining.”133 For this reason, Giddens projects agents that are enabled and 
knowledgeable, who are capable of acting in innovative ways and thus often affect the structure 
that enabled their action in the first place. 
Sewell, “a theoretically self-conscious social historian”134 in his own depiction, drew 
insights from important debates in a number of disciplines when he developed his own 
conceptualisation of structure and culture. He was at the centre of important changes within his 
own discipline, when political history gave more and more ground to social history, and later to 
cultural history. He actively participated in the agent-structure debate within sociology and also 
paid close attention to a similar controversy, when many anthropologists (such as James Clifford 
and George Marcus) turned against the prevailing understanding of culture, the discipline’s central 
concept, in the 1980s. I will present Sewell’s account of structure in detail and base my further 
argument upon it because I find Sewell’s theory the most successful at building on the pioneering 
work of Bourdieu and Giddens but also effectively addressing the shortcomings of their theories. 
Sewell set out the following goals to address three problems he identified with the notion of 
structure that is prevalent in the social sciences: “(1) to recognize the agency of social actors, (2) 
to build the possibility of change into the concept of structure, (3) to overcome the divide between 
semiotic and materialist visions of structure.”135 
With respect to Giddens, Sewell accepted his notion of the duality of structure as 
“congenial” because it expresses well “how historical agents’ thoughts, motives, and intentions are 
constituted by the cultures and social institutions into which they are born, how these cultures and 
institutions are reproduced by the structurally shaped and constrained actions of those agents, but 
also how, in certain circumstances, the agents can (or are forced to) improvise or innovate in 
structurally shaped ways that significantly reconfigure the very structures that constituted them.”136 
However, Sewell, among many others, took issue with the vagueness of Giddens’s definition of 
structure (described at one point as “[r]ules and resources, recursively implicated in the 
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reproduction of social systems”).137 Sewell actually preferred the term schema to rules because the 
latter “tends to imply something like formally stated prescriptions” whereas the semiotic side of 
structures should be understood as “informal and not always conscious schemas, metaphors, or 
assumptions presupposed by such formal statements.” For him, fixed and codified rules should 
be seen as resources, as “actual rather than virtual.” Schemas, on the other hand, are virtual as 
“they cannot be reduced to their existence in any particular practice or any particular location... 
They can be generalized—that is, transposed or extended—to new situations when the 
opportunity arises.”138 Sewell was even more dissatisfied with the description of resources in 
Giddens’s theory. He felt that Giddens had wanted to distance himself from Lévy-Strauss’s purely 
rule-based understanding of structure in order to be able to account for power and social 
domination, but “tacking an undertheorized notion of resources onto an essentially rule-based 
notion of structure succeed[ed] merely in confusing things.”139 Sewell clarified the concept of 
resources in the following way. 
Resources are of two types, human and nonhuman. Nonhuman resources are objects, animate or 
inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that can be used to enhance or maintain power; human 
resources are physical strength, dexterity, knowledge, and emotional commitments that can be used to 
enhance or maintain power, including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, and 
propagating either human or nonhuman resources. Both types of resources are media of power and are 
unevenly distributed. But however unequally resources may be distributed, some measure of both 
human and nonhuman resources are controlled by all members of society, no matter how destitute and 
oppressed. Indeed, part of what it means to conceive of human beings as agents is to conceive of them 
as empowered by access to resources of one kind or another.140 
Based on this, Sewell claimed that structures have a dual character not just in the sense 
that they create agents and are in turn constituted by agents, but in the sense that they are 
“composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and of resources, which are actual. If 
structures are dual in this sense, then it must be true that schemas are the effects of resources, just 
as resources are the effects of schemas.”141 This dual conception is especially important in order 
to overcome “both the material determinism of traditional Marxism and the ideal determinism of 
traditional French structuralism.”142 
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This might give the impression that “schemas and resources simply reproduce each other 
without change indefinitely”143 so Sewell finally showed how his own framework can effectively 
account for change; for this, he compared his understanding of structure to Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus. Sewell believed that Bourdieu also arrived at the conclusion that structures are of a dual 
nature as habitus is a product of the mutually reinforcing interaction between mental structures 
and the world of objects (schemas and resources in Sewell’s understanding), a process which in 
turn constitutes autonomous and knowledgeable human subjects. 
Yet Bourdieu’s habitus retains precisely the agent-proof quality that the concept of the duality of 
structure is supposed to overcome. In Bourdieu’s habitus, schemas and resources so powerfully 
reproduce one another that even the most cunning or improvisational actions undertaken by agents 
necessarily reproduce the structure... Although Bourdieu avoids either a traditional French structuralist 
ideal determinism or a traditional Marxist material determinism, he does so only by erecting a combined 
determinism that makes significant transformations seem impossible... Bourdieu’s own theory has fallen 
victim to an impossibly objectified and overtotalized conception of society.144 
According to Sewell, Bourdieu was right to insist on the reproductive nature of schemas 
and resources, but his concept of habitus is so unified and totalising that it cannot account for 
transformation that is not introduced form outside the society, but generated by internal forces. 
Sewell thus proposed the adoption of a “far more multiple, contingent and fractured conception 
of society”145 and structure, and specified five sources of internally induced change. First, the 
multiplicity of structures can produce change as this implies that “the knowledgeable social actors 
whose practices constitute a society are far more versatile than Bourdieu’s account of a universally 
homologous habitus would imply: social actors are capable of applying a wide range of different 
and even incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources.”146 Second, 
what can also account for the transformation of structures is the transposable quality of schemas 
which means that “they can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside 
the context in which they are initially learned.”147 The transposability of schemas also implies that 
“the resource consequences of the enactment of cultural schemas is [sic] never entirely 
predictable”;148 consequently, the unpredictability of resource accumulation is the third source of 
structural change. Furthermore, as any “array of resources is capable of being interpreted in varying 
ways and, therefore, of empowering different actors and teaching different schemas,”149 the 
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polysemy of resources can also lead to structural transformation. Lastly, since structures intersect 
and overlap in both dimensions (schemas and resources), a certain array of resources can be 
“claimed by different actors embedded in different structural complexes” and certain “schemas 
can be borrowed or appropriated from one structural complex to another”;150 therefore, the 
intersection of structures is the fifth source of change. 
Finally, Sewell clarified what room is left for agency in his framework. “To be an agent 
means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is 
enmeshed... Agency is implied by the existence of structures... Agency arises from the actor’s 
knowledge of schemas, which means the ability to apply them to new contexts ... agency arises 
from the actor’s control of resources, which means the capacity to reinterpret or mobilize an array 
of resources in terms of schemas other than those that constituted that array.”151 Sewell argued 
that every human being is inherently capable of agency. However, this is a highly generalised 
capacity, which means that there are huge variations in the specific, culturally and historically 
determined, forms that agency takes. For this reason, we need to keep in mind that “agency differs 
in both kind and extent ... both between and within societies”; that structures “empower agents 
differentially”; that structures, “and the human agencies they endow, are laden with differences of 
power.”152 
Reflexivist Social Theory of Myth 
In the following, based on Sewell’s theory, I will outline a reflexivist social theoretical 
framework of identity-constitutive mythologies and will contrast it to the ideal typical organicist 
and instrumentalist positions. An important theoretical innovation in Sewell’s theory is that he 
considered social structures in the plural. This is in accordance with the conceptual preferences 
expressed in the previous chapter that emphasise the plurality of myths. In contrast, scholarly 
approaches that think about the social structure in the singular tend to downplay such differences. 
Organicism and instrumentalism assume that mythologies are singular and all-encompassing. The 
singularity of mythology in this sense means that only one mythical system is considered within a 
society; this myth guarantees social coherence and dominates the entire discursive space which 
means that it is all-encompassing. Organicism thinks about myths by stressing their uncontested 
nature and their social standing above rational debate. Instrumentalism, on the other hand, views 
myths as produced by the members of the elite for self-interested and cynical reasons as part of 
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the ideology projected by the ruling class. Contrary to the two previous approaches, the reflexivist 
account emphasises the plurality of myths and their necessarily contested nature. It claims that 
social structures should be considered as multiple and cultures as only loosely coherent. In the 
reflexivist framework, myths are plural and only aspire for discursive domination, while mythical 
monopoly is practically inconceivable. Note that contestation in this case does not necessarily 
imply, but may certainly involve, the scrutiny of the historical accuracy of mythical stories. 
Contestation here denotes the discussion and the dialogical relationship between competing 
interpretations of past events. This stems from the intuition that agents are capable and willing to 
challenge, as well as accept, mythical structures. 
A fundamental difference between these three approaches is the assumptions that they 
make about human beings, that is, about how humans are and about how humans should be, 
which are intimately connected with the type of society that they would like to see. No matter how 
much more positivist-minded practitioners within these research traditions would like to think to 
the contrary, all of these frameworks are as much prescriptive as descriptive and they all have 
ethical positions deeply embedded in them. The underlying ethical idea behind the organicist view 
of human beings is that conforming to social norms and expectations can establish a sense of 
responsibility, continuity and security, that civility is the cornerstone of peaceful social existence. 
Instrumentalism explicitly condemns mythical structures because they are under the control of the 
ruling elite and keep the masses in a state of false consciousness. The reflexivist social theoretical 
framework, which posits a co-constitutive relationship between agents and structures, is no less 
value-laden than those theories which consider these forces in a binary and more deterministic 
way. It thinks that autonomous human action is not just a possibility, but a prerequisite of social 
life. The ideal here is the innovative, creative and self-reflexive individual who, in their ambivalent 
enabling and constraining relationship with structures, does not simply reproduce structural 
processes but is also able and willing to attempt to influence them. 
There are substantial differences between these approaches with respect to what they 
think about how myths are sustained in a society, how much autonomy structures and agents have 
and what the intentions of the actors are. For organicism, an overarching mythical system that 
provides certainty and continuity for the members of a community is a necessity in social life. In 
order to compensate for the fragility of existence and reason, people need markers of certainty to 
carry on with their daily lives. Therefore, myths exist outside the realm of rational comprehension, 
they transcend the individual. In the instrumentalist framework, on the other hand, myths are 
sustained by the cynical, strategic and consciously manipulative actions of a self-interested elite. 
For them, culture is only an instrument of coercion, a tool used and discarded at will that has no 
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influence on its bearer. Most actual scholarly works oscillate between these two positions and allow 
for both “types” of reproduction of mythical structures. This is understandable given that, on the 
one hand, few would think that myths just “emerge” and “develop” naturally so that ultimately 
affective and emotional human beings, who do need and do believe these myths, can make sense 
of their worlds; on the other hand, most would find it simplistic to say that structures can simply 
be imposed from above by cynical manipulators. It indeed appears to be a simple solution to this 
dilemma to allow for the possibility of both explanations. We should bear in mind, however, that 
these are not distinct “pathways” to the reproduction of myths, both of which are possible in real 
life, but fundamentally incompatible ways of seeing the social world and individuals. Furthermore, 
even a “little bit of both” approach, which would posit that any given myth is sustained by a 
mixture of the social forces that transcendentalist and instrumentalist envision, is unsatisfactory 
because of the mutually incompatible assumptions of the two positions. For this reason, I argue 
that instead of trying to synthesise these two opposing explanations, we should explain the way 
myths are sustained in a community upon completely different theoretical grounds. In order to do 
this, we need to separate two related but distinct issues: the question about the motivation of social 
action and the problem of agency. For the reflexivist social theory, whether individuals act out of 
conviction and belief and/or for selfish or selfless reasons is irrelevant. The reason for action 
might be an important factor for ethical considerations, of course, but I argue that in order to 
develop a clearer understanding of how myths are sustained in a society or group, we need to move 
away from the preoccupation with individual motivation. What goes on inside individuals’ minds 
is not just futile to theorise about in the abstract, but it is also practically impossible to determine 
in any particular case. For these reasons, making assumptions about the extent to which people 
believe in the myth that they promote as a matter of principle and to which they promote mythical 
stories for strategic reasons provides only shaky grounds for a theory of myth. Once freed from 
the burden of trying to explain individual motivation, we can turn to the problem of agency, to the 
question about the extent to which people can act autonomously and to which they can reproduce 
and/or transform social structures. 
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A problem with the organicist-instrumentalist opposition in this matter is that both 
models essentially allow for only one type of human motivation. But belief and strategy need not 
exclude one another. In fact, it is more plausible that some people both firmly believe in a myth 
and use it strategically to advance their political goals. The desire to teach others what they believe 
to be true and the decision to popularise an ideology which may further their political career can 
easily have equal weights in their motivations. The opposition between unconditional belief by 
emotional individuals and strategic action by calculating actors thus misses the point. It is safe to 
say that motivations are always plural, meaning that the reasons for each person to uphold a myth 
may be more emotional than strategic, more driven by self-interest than belief, or both/neither of 
them may be relevant. Harald Wydra arrived at the same conclusion when he stated that “[p]eople 
and politicians often appear as utilitarian, shrewd, and cynical but also idealist, altruistic, and deeply 
emotional.”153 Similarly, Bell did not think “that elites are somehow immune to the pull of the 
myths they help to perpetuate, for they are often shaped by them also.”154 
Given the inherent plurality and ambiguity of intentions, however, is it necessary or even 
possible to base a theory of myth upon these grounds? Understanding individual motivation 
behind myths has been important for many thinkers. Wydra claimed that the task “is to understand 
the modalities of how actions or ideas are internally appropriated by the dominated and the led, 
by the interpreters and the people who experience social change, how they are lived through.”155 
Joanna Overing agreed that like “good Collingwood historians, our chore is to get into other 
people’s heads in order to perceive the universe as they understand it.”156 But this is a very difficult 
to task. Even if the researcher only deals with a single person or with members of a small group, 
it can be impossible to determine what the motivations for sustaining certain myths really are. The 
reason for this is not simply the methodological issue about knowing someone’s mind and about 
the conscious misrepresentation of intentions; attempts to discover the “true” motivations are 
doomed to fail not least because the justifications that people provide for their actions to 
themselves are inconsistent and shifting over time. When considering mythologies at the social 
level, however, an analysis aimed at revealing whether an immense number of people internalise, 
enact and transform myths for emotional or for strategic reasons would be most certainly futile. 
Moreover, knowing why myths are invoked by an individual tells us little about how they are 
sustained at the social level. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, I argue that a reflexivist theory of myth would treat 
the problem of agency separate from that of motivation and would use a co-constitutive structure-
agent conception outlined in the previous section so as to understand how mythical social 
structures are sustained. In Sewell’s theory, social structures shape, constrain and enable agents 
who in turn constantly reproduce, sustain and challenge existing structures. Here, the reason for 
social action is not relevant for understanding its social effects. Agents do not exist outside the 
structures that enable and constrain them, but they nevertheless retain a degree of autonomy and 
their actions are as important for maintaining social structures as these structures are important 
for them. It is certainly true that the “horizon of affect and meaning ... is one toward which the 
actor can never be fully instrumental or reflexive.”157 We must nevertheless realise that a lot of 
room needs to be left for human creativity. What is more, reflexivity and innovation are not mere 
theoretical possibilities for which we should allow, but are just as important for sustaining social 
structures as conformity and the, often unconscious, acceptance of social norms and shared 
categories of thought. 
Therefore, when it comes to the question of agency, the reflexivist position would 
necessarily depart from the organicist and instrumentalist theories without seeking to synthesise 
them. Both ideal typical accounts project an image of the cultural sphere as a homogenous and 
coherent system where the ruling mythology is unconditionally incorporated by the masses. In the 
organicist framework, individuals have no autonomy at all; mythologies inevitably develop and 
emerge and are consequently reproduced almost automatically in everyday life. In instrumentalist 
theories, the elite have full control over the mythscape; the historic bloc propagates its ideology in 
order to retain its hegemonic status and its members are mostly in control of the consequences of 
their actions. However, as Marshall Sahlins noted,158 the use of a symbol always puts that symbol 
at risk; due to the uncertainty with regard to the consequences of practice, each use of a symbol 
potentially inflects and transforms its meanings. This is not to reject the possibility of manipulative 
intentions or to suggest that these efforts are in fact futile; they most likely have an impact on 
discourse which is favourable to the actor in question. This argument does suggest, nevertheless, 
that developments in the cultural field are ultimately beyond the full control of agents and that the 
almost automatic reproduction of structures that organicism envisions is unrealistic. The effect of 
the enactment of myths is always uncertain and a reflexivist approach to myth should 
accommodate this uncertainty. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the unpredictability of the outcome of the 
enactment of cultural schemas is only one source of structural change. The fact that mythical 
structures are multiple and intersect also implies the possibility of change, and so do the polysemy 
and the transposability of resources. Who actually make these changes in the mythscape happen, 
however, are social agents who are empowered by structures and are also constrained by them. 
Agents are assumed to be creative in the sense that they can apply schemas learned in one context 
to new and unexpected situations, and that they have control over a variety of resources which 
they combine and use in a variety of innovative ways. They belong to different social groups in 
different ways which means that they are enabled and constrained by different mythical structures 
in different ways. Importantly, agents are endowed with the capacity to self-reflect which means 
that, to a limited extent, they can critically reflect on their own social structures and, in limited 
ways, they can aspire to change these structures if they find them unacceptable. However, there 
are many differences between agents; they are empowered by structures in different ways which 
leads to great differences in power. Consequently, the elite has a special role in reproducing and 
changing social structures; “due to the nature of power relations within societies, elites will have a 
major role in the perpetuation of particular mythologies.”159 However, this privileged role certainly 
does not mean complete or exclusive control over the mythscape; the elite cannot completely 
control the mythscape and it is not only the elite that influences the mythscape (and in most cases 
the elite is certainly not a homogenous social group with unified interests and goals). The 
instrumentalist logic that separates “memory producers” and “consumers” is in fact doubly 
problematic. It is not only empirically questionable, but it also reinforces power differences and 
the differential access to resources by effectively portraying the non-elite as passive dupes who 
uncritically receive mythical content. 
Finally, different theoretical accounts see the social function of myths differently. For 
organicism, myths are a necessary condition for normal social life; without them, social harmony 
and peace are not even conceivable. As shared images of the past and markers of certainty, they 
provide cohesion for a community and allow people to understand the world around them. 
Instrumentalist accounts agree that myths are a cohesive force, but they argue that this cohesion 
is not in the interests of those who are bound together this way. They are misled and suffer from 
false consciousness as they internalise values and interests that are contrary to their own. 
Therefore, the social cohesion provided by myths is in fact coercive. The ultimate function of 
mythologies is then to enforce conformity to the demands of the ruling elite, and to mask and 
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mystify the interests of those in power. Here, myths are not only socially unnecessary, but they are 
a social anomaly. Given its emphasis on the plurality of myths and on a mythscape characterised 
by both consensus and contestation, the reflexivist approach holds that myths can help consolidate 
a given social or group order, but they are also important in challenging these. Myths are double-
edged swords: they simultaneously bind with some people and alienate from others, legitimate an 
authority and undermine others, enable and constrain social action. Because of the ambivalent 
nature of myths, the reflexivist social theory cannot make simple statements about the desirability 
or the undesirability of particular myths based on their social functions. To make normative 
judgements about myths and mythscapes, a more detailed ethical account is required which will be 
given in the next chapter. 
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4 
Pluralist Ethics of Myth 
In this chapter, I build on the conceptual and social theoretical basis of the previous 
chapters in order to develop a pluralist ethical framework. In his “ethics of myth,” Bell already 
outlined what a mythscape might look like in an agonistic democracy.160 The theorisation that 
follows is inspired by this attempt in numerous ways, and it is also meant to modify it and to flesh 
it out (together with the previous chapters) into a comprehensive pluralist approach to myth. This 
ethical framework relies on radical democratic theory (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, William 
Connolly),161 the concept of dialogue of Mikhail Bakhtin,162 pragmatist philosophy (John Dewey, 
Richard Rorty) and the historiography of Hayden White to develop an ethical approach to myths 
that I call “pluralist.” There have already been attempts in memory studies to develop an ethical 
framework based on the idea of radical democratic pluralism. Importantly, this account is certainly 
inspired by, but also distinct from, the idea of agonistic memory put forward by Anna Bull and 
Hans Hansen.163 They used the ideas of radical democratic pluralism and dialogue in order to 
determine a new, agonistic mode of remembering that is distinct from what they called 
“antagonistic” and “cosmopolitan” types of memory (what I will call traditional and regretful types 
of myth, respectively). My intention here is not to give an account of how and what we should 
remember, but to determine how we should organise our mythscapes and how we should think 
about myths in general. What I develop is not a pluralist mode of remembering, but a pluralist 
mythscape within which widely different modes of remembering are encouraged to recognise each 
other as adversaries rather than enemies, and to fruitfully engage with each other in dialogue. I 
argue that it is not memory that should be agonistic, but the mythscape within which different 
memories can be engaged in a dialogical relationship. This is why Bull and Hansen’s remark, that 
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“Bell did not discuss what traits might characterize this new type of memory,”164 misses the point. 
Similarly to me, Bell did not want to outline a “new type of memory,” but a new type of mythscape. 
The chapter begins with a critique of the duty-based ethical approach to memory which 
is currently the dominant way of looking at the normative issues associated with the public 
representation of past events. In particular, I examine the core assumption of this approach that 
stipulates that, at least in the case of mass atrocities, a certain morally right and historically accurate 
reading of the past that is beyond dispute is available. Based on pragmatist arguments, I argue that 
historical knowledge is necessarily partial (that is, in principle and in practice incomplete and laden 
with value judgements), and I develop an innovative typology of myths. Depending on how the 
myths themselves claim to represent the past, I distinguish between myths-as-truth, myths-as-
interpretation and myths-as-fiction. I then explore the pragmatist philosophical approach to the 
discipline of history and the radical democratic critique of liberal democratic theories. In the 
second part of the chapter, I use these observations to develop a pluralist ethical approach to 
myths. I explain the role that the state and education should play in an agonistic democracy. I 
demonstrate how an acknowledgement-based mythscape differs from, and is less problematic 
than, a recognition-based one. I emphasise the importance of critical education, which I 
understand to be the teaching of the tools that are necessary to evaluate different myths and the 
general propagation of a critical attitude to publicly represented historical narratives, and 
sentimental education, the “emotional manipulation” of the citizens in order to promote empathy. 
These educational approaches rely on the notion about the self-reflexive capacities of social agents 
for which I have argued in the previous chapter. Finally, I present some real world examples which 
are meant to support the empirical claims embedded in this ethical framework. 
For the purposes of this ethical account, I differentiate between four major approaches 
to the source of ethics, between four ways of thinking about the basis upon which to make 
distinctions between good and bad. First, consequentialist or result-based ethical approaches judge 
the rightness of an action based on the consequences of that action. The essence of utilitarianism, 
probably the most well-known approach that mostly relies on consequentialist logic, is best 
captured by Jeremy Bentham’s famous “fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number that is the measure of right and wrong.”165 It posits that social action should be assessed based 
on the amount of utility or happiness (or some other measure of well-being) that they bring to 
most people in a community. Second, deontological or duty-based ethical approaches are built 
upon the idea that actions in themselves, irrespective of their consequences or their social contexts, 
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can be said to be morally right or wrong. Deontological ethics starts with positing first principles 
based upon which it derives a set of abstract ethical criteria and then uses it to evaluate the morality 
of (social or individual) actions. Immanuel Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative, the moral 
duty (to act or not to act in a certain way) that needs to be honoured unconditionally in all 
circumstances, relies heavily on this logic. Third, contextualist ethical approaches aim to historicise 
ethical questions instead of appealing to universal moral standards. They situate social actions in 
the historical context in which they happen and evaluate them with reference to the ethical 
considerations prevalent in that particular context and to the relevant conditions of possibility. 
Fourth, pragmatist ethics is similarly sceptical of the belief in timeless and universal moral 
absolutes, and holds that subscribing to a particular normative framework (be it consequentialist, 
deontological or else) and acting on its ideas as if they were true can be compatible with thinking 
that these ethical approaches might not express the universal moral truth, with thinking that these 
ideas might be supplanted in the future if acting on them does not produce the desired results, 
with thinking that societies should have the means by which they can move beyond these ideas. 
For this reason, pragmatism hopes to complement rather than to replace other normative 
approaches. It argues that we should ethically differentiate between values and ideas on the basis 
of the practical consequences of acting on them if they were assumed to be true, not on the basis 
of which normative approach they originate in and the extent to which they conform to some 
universal moral truth. 
It must be noted that these ethical approaches are not isolated from each other and actual 
ethical accounts in fact rely on a number of these. In practice, it makes more sense to talk about 
accounts that mainly follow a consequentialist/deontological/other logic than about purely 
consequentialist and purely deontological ethical frameworks. In the following, I present an ethical 
account of myth that primarily relies on pragmatist and contextualist ideas and is meant to 
complement and go beyond the deontological logic dominant in the field. 
Duty-Based Ethics of Myth 
Duty-based ethical frameworks are currently the dominant approach with respect to the 
ethics of the representation of the past. Works in this vein mainly follow a deontological logic and 
aim to establish that there is a social and/or individual moral duty to commemorate certain parts 
of the past. Based on the nature of the historical events in question, we can distinguish between 
two types of theories. Some argue that members of a group have a moral duty to commemorate 
the historical events that are important for the collective (exemplified here by the “ethics of 
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memory” account of Avishai Margalit),166 while others concentrate specifically on the moral 
requirement to commemorate mass atrocities that were committed by, or in the name of, a 
community (represented here by the “duty to remember” approaches of Linda Radzik and Nenad 
Dimitrijevic).167 
Margalit argued that members of a group have an obligation to remember fateful events 
in the life of the collective because of their group membership and because these memories are 
constitutive of the identity of the community. Margalit made it clear that this only implied that the 
group needs to make sure that the remembering takes place, not that every (or any particular) 
group member is required to do the remembering. Modern societies usually employ a “division of 
mnemonic labor”168 and entrust public institutions with fulfilling this mnemonic obligation. 
By contrast, Radzik and Dimitrijevic based their argument on the collective responsibility 
tradition of Larry May169 and contended that all members are morally compelled to remember in 
communities where human rights violations have been committed on a massive scale. Radzik based 
her theory on the “reasonable fear of the victims.” She reasoned that a social group which has 
been the target and the victim of serious violations of human rights may have good reason to fear 
the people in whose name the crimes have been committed. In turn, the “reasonable fear of the 
victims” obliges members of the society to address this problem “because fear is a morally 
significant harm.”170 Moreover, Radzik claimed that “even non-perpetrating members of the 
wrongdoing group will be objects of reasonable fear, even they have duties to respond.”171 Moral 
responsibility in this sense does not imply causal connection to the committed crimes. Using the 
definition developed by Manuel Velasquez, the backward-looking meaning of the term is indeed 
“used to indicate that an action or its consequences are attributable to a certain agent,”172 but here 
responsibility is understood in the forward-looking sense, denoting duty or obligation, something 
that an agent is required to do. 
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Dimitrijevic, on the other hand, built his account on group identity and personal identity. 
He argued that “provided certain conditions are met, all members of a non-voluntary group in whose 
name mass crime is committed ... are duty-bound to respond ... responsible ... accountable in a 
non-vicarious manner. The basis of their responsibility is the crime-specific relationship between 
group identity and personal identity.”173 In outlining the conditions of his statement, he used 
Radzik’s notion of collective crime defined as a wrong that is “committed in the name of a group 
by a significant number of its members, and the victims are chosen on the basis of their belonging 
to a different group.”174 According to this approach, each and every member belonging to the 
group in whose name collective crimes have been committed has a duty to respond to these crimes, 
and their response should adhere to three moral requirements: the recognition of moral 
responsibility in the backward-looking sense mentioned above and the acknowledgement of the 
suffering of the victims, reflection on past wrongs, and appropriate action (disassociation from the 
criminal actions and demonstration of the willingness to return to normalcy). 
Notwithstanding their differences, the ethics of memory and the duty to remember 
branches of duty-based ethical theorising have a number of assumptions in common. Most 
importantly, they both believe that social action should be “applied ethics,” that it should be the 
practical application of universal moral laws derived in hypothetical scenarios. For this reason, as 
Olick pointed out, the duty-based discussion is often completely abstract and ahistorical, rests on 
an assumption of “unilinear and teleological model of social and moral development”175 and 
refrains from cultural contextualisation in the fear that it would open the way for relativizing moral 
values.176 Far from embracing what he called “moral relativism,” Olick essentially agreed with the 
values and the goals of the duty-based approach but took issue with the way it proposed to achieve 
these goals. True to their Kantian foundations, duty-based discussions of political regret hold that 
moral duties need to be honoured irrespective of historical conditions. In the spirit of the formula 
“ought implies can,” these approaches pay little attention to the limits of political action in 
particular historical contexts and to the wider social repercussions of the measures aimed at 
achieving the ends dictated by categorical imperatives. Based on Weber, Olick identified this logic 
with the ethic of conviction and thought that ethical discussions of political regret should instead 
follow the ethic of responsibility: become more practical and contextualised, and pay more 
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attention to historical conditions of possibility. The two approaches essentially aim to achieve the 
same goals, but disagree sharply about the way these goals should be achieved. 
Olick was right that any account dealing with the ethical questions related to the public 
representation of past events should pay close attention to the historical context and the conditions 
of possibility. What is less clear, however, is why he said that he essentially agreed with the 
arguments of “duty to respond” accounts with respect to the morally right social outcomes when 
he so convincingly challenged the very assumptions upon which those arguments were built. One 
of these is the attempt to separate moral considerations from politics. It all begins with language. 
When referring to what Olick called the “politics of regret,” the “duty to respond” framework 
prefers to use expressions such as “a society fulfils its duty to remember” or “a nation honours 
the memory of the victims.” By referring to the acts of political regret as “politics,” Olick 
intentionally chose to break with this apparently apolitical form of speech that implies that public 
apology and the assumption of responsibility for past crimes are morally desirable in all 
circumstances and that all the other social responses to past atrocities (for instance, denial or 
silence) are morally wanting and are the results of dirty political meddling. Naturally, the adoption 
of the term “politics of regret” did not render categories “neutral” in any sense; this 
conceptualisation simply conveys a different preconception, one which holds that political 
struggles and power games have an important part to play in all public representations of past 
events. 
Similarly, Bell claimed that the main problem with Margalit’s ethics of memory account 
“stems directly from his explicit attempt to disconnect the ethics of memory from the politics of 
memory.”177 In fact, the attempts to depoliticise social remembrance and to specify how past 
events should ideally be commemorated are two sides of the same coin. But aspiring for apolitical 
“remembering” on the social level is naive. In practice, the politics of memory and the ethics of 
memory “are interwoven, and they cannot—or at least should not—be separated in this 
manner.”178 Once the arguments of moral theories are used to evaluate specific cases, are invoked 
in political debates or are considered to be implemented in practice, they inevitably become politics 
rather than a purely moral theory. The duty-based ethical approach should recognise and 
consciously evaluate the political dimension of its work. At the moment, however, duty-based 
theories of remembering are only concerned with achieving morally desirable goals derived from 
abstract, idealised situations and do not take into account the potential political use and the likely 
social implications of their assumptions and arguments. This is not simply politically naive, but 
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also politically irresponsible and potentially dangerous. For instance, if a politician blindly follows 
an ethic of conviction with respect to memory in a delicate negotiated transitional context, he/she 
might significantly slow down the transitional process or might even jeopardise its negotiated, 
bloodless nature. Or consider an academic who is only narrowly interested in achieving the public 
acknowledgement of certain past atrocities. Without considering the larger political context, 
he/she might be inadvertently producing ammunition for political groups which the academic 
would otherwise never support, and these political groups appropriating his/her arguments and 
acting on them can easily change the political landscape of the polity in ways that the academic 
never intended. I would like to emphasise that my aim here is not to propose a “rule” that the 
opening of the archives of the secret police immediately after the political transition destabilises 
the democratic process, or that acknowledging past wrongs always weakens moderate parties. The 
outcome of these actions depends on the specificities of each situation and this is exactly why we 
need an ethical framework that is more sensitive to the socio-political context than duty-based 
accounts. 
Another issue is that duty-based approaches routinely take for granted that, prior to and 
independent of theorisation, a community exists within which commemoration does or should 
take place (what I will call the “mnemonic community assumption”) and that a historical narrative 
exists that the members of this community do or should commemorate. There are two forms of 
the latter assumption: either it is posited that the memory is already important for the community 
(“collective memory assumption”) or it is claimed that there is an authoritative reading of the past 
that should become important for the community (“historical truth assumption”). Both the ethics 
of memory and the duty to respond accounts make the mnemonic community assumption while 
they often differ with respect to the nature of the historical narrative that is to be remembered; the 
collective memory assumption is typical of ethics of memory accounts whereas the historical truth 
assumption is typical of duty to respond theories. 
By assuming away the existence of a cohesive community and its collective memory, 
ethics of memory accounts actually follow the organicist logic whose shortcomings were discussed 
extensively in the previous two chapters. Essentializing communities and their memories is 
problematic because neither of them are naturally occurring phenomena that exist “out there”; 
instead of being eternal and static over time, they are the fragile and ever-changing products of 
historical contingencies. Bell noted that Margalit’s ethics of memory, by not explaining “how 
understandings of the past emerge and are reproduced ... presents a static rather than a dynamic 
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account of politics, and this serves to naturalize the prevailing constellation of power.”179 
Theorising about the ethics of the representation of the past has real political effects. Therefore, 
the mnemonic community and the collective memory assumptions are not only highly 
questionable empirical claims about the social world, but also directly contradict the attempt of 
duty-based approaches to decouple the ethics of memory from the politics of memory. 
The Notion of Historical Truth 
With respect to the representation of past atrocities, the duty to respond view (mostly 
implicitly) makes four claims: an ontological, an epistemological, an empirical and an ethical claim. 
The ontological claim is that an objectively true reading of the past exists “out there”; the 
epistemological claim is that historians can approximate this truth through the rigorous and 
systematic study of evidence; the empirical claim is that this historical truth can be presented to 
the wider public as it is or in a form that does not significantly alter its “true” nature; finally, the 
final ethical claim is that the historical truth should guide public representations of the past. In the 
following, I will only concentrate on the epistemological claim which is so fundamental that its 
convincing critique could bring the whole theoretical edifice into question. 
The historical truth assumption is indispensable for duty to respond accounts. In order 
to assign responsibility for past atrocities, these approaches need to posit that an authoritative 
reading of the past exists, that “in all mass crimes one particular set of facts and one particular 
evaluative stance are beyond dispute.”180 Assessing this assumption properly would require 
engagement with centuries (if not millennia) of historical theory. Without trying to intervene in 
this debate, I will rely on the works of Arthur Danto and Hayden White to criticise this assumption. 
For my purposes, it is sufficient to say that today very few historians still believe that it is possible 
to “show what really happened,” as the influential nineteenth-century historian Leopold van Ranke 
claimed. In fact, there is rarely perfect agreement between historians for good reasons. Even if a 
“set of facts” (or, I would rather say, a set of factual statements) was particularly well-supported 
by historical evidence, it would still not be sufficient for faithfully reconstructing the past “as it 
was,” for forming an authoritative reading of the past that can be the basis of commemoration. 
The first part of the historical truth assumption, that a certain set of facts can be beyond 
dispute, is highly questionable for at least two reasons. First, events of the past cannot be fully 
reconstructed by historians simply because the information about them is always only partially 
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available. Following Arthur Danto,181 Arash Abizadeh noted that “historical narratives are always 
in practice incomplete because ... the historical records on which they are based are incomplete.”182 
A historical account is also practically incomplete because students of history have neither the time 
to acquaint themselves with all the available evidence nor the space to convey all the available 
information to their audience. Second, and more importantly, any historical narrative is “essentially 
and so in principle incomplete”183 because what is included in it has been filtered by the story-teller’s 
own (implicit or explicit) “criteria of relevance,” by his or her pre-existing “ideological baggage.” 
We are part of the social world that we study and there is no objective, detached observer position. 
Our categories of thought and mental frames render what we experience intelligible and 
meaningful, which means that there is no way of looking at the world without preconceptions. As 
every historical narrative is practically and essentially incomplete, a set of, however well-supported, 
factual statements is not nearly enough to arrive at the undisputed account of the past that should 
be remembered according to duty to remember approaches. 
The second part of the assumption, that a certain “evaluative stance” is beyond dispute, 
is also debatable. The criteria of significance do not only filter what is included in the narrative, 
but also influence how this narrative is presented. The very language in which factual statements 
are expressed is necessarily ambiguous and value-laden, and the way they are woven together into 
a narrative necessarily relies on certain literary elements. As White put it, “there is a fictive element 
in all historical narrative.”184 “Narratives do not consist only of factual statements (singular 
existential propositions) and arguments; they consist as well of poetic and rhetorical elements by 
which what would otherwise be a list of facts is transformed into a story.”185 This literary element, 
this mode of presentation, does not directly follow from the factual statements themselves; “any 
given set of real events can be emplotted in a number of ways... no given set or sequence of real 
events is intrinsically tragic, comic, farcical, and so on, but can be constructed as such only by the 
imposition of the structure of a given story type on the events.”186 Factual statements do not “speak 
for themselves,” they do not “lend” themselves to any particular “evaluative stance.” For this 
reason, a multiplicity of narratives about certain events can all be historically accurate but can differ 
widely with respect to the interpretive “spin” of their story. Again, what should actually be 
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remembered is far from as obvious and indisputable as duty to remember accounts would have us 
believe. 
I would add a third criticism, namely that even factual statements cannot be treated as 
given and self-evident. With respect to the question of facts, I slightly differ from Danto and White 
because their theories are mostly concerned with how objectively derived facts are subjectively 
selected, organised and narrated by the historian. But surely it is untenable to assume that the 
historian’s “baggage” only plays a role in the selection, arrangement and emplotment of historical 
“facts” but not in the construction of these factual statements in the first place. It would thus make 
more sense to say that the way factual statements are expressed also heavily relies on the 
preconceptions of the historian. There are certainly statements about past events that have been 
supported by an abundance of evidence so that we can believe in them with a very high level of 
confidence. I would nevertheless be reluctant to call them facts because they are neither 
incontestable nor objective. They are theoretically contestable in the sense that every historical 
statement can hypothetically be brought into question by emerging new evidence. They are not 
objective because they are neither value-free nor unambiguous, for the simple reason that the very 
language used to express them is laden with values and open to multiple interpretations. 
Finally, based on the anti-foundationalist philosophy of Rorty, I would go even further 
and argue that there is no objectively given system of criteria based on which the historical accuracy 
of factual statements can be assessed. The rules of evidence, which are so central to the discipline 
of history, have not “emerged” naturally, they have not been “found” in nature. The historical 
discipline’s shared standards for checking the historical accuracy of factual statements—as 
consensual, refined and taken for granted as they might be—have been developed by historians 
themselves over the centuries. I agree with Keith Jenkins that, as in the case of any discipline, it 
was historians who created the object of their study, the associated “questions” and “problems” 
of history, the data that were deemed relevant for answering these questions, and the methods 
with which these data could be assessed and interpreted. “For the past itself does not have 
‘problems’, only historians have those: ‘historical problems’ are the problems which historians 
themselves both ‘create’ and ‘solve’.”187 This means that the discipline of history might be able to 
determine the extent to which a factual statement is accurate according to its own evaluative 
criteria, but these rules of evidence are by no means universal and absolute; it is in fact perfectly 
possible that the proponents of some identity-constitutive mythologies do not share these 
standards. This argument rests on the anti-foundationalist claim that “there are not—and nor have 
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there ever been—any ‘real’ foundations of the kind alleged to underpin the experiment of the 
modern… we live amidst social formations which have no legitimising ontological or 
epistemological or ethical grounds for our beliefs or actions beyond the status of an ultimately self-
referencing (rhetorical) conversation.”188 The discipline of history is one self-referencing 
conversation among many; it is a very sophisticated conversation and one whose underlying rules 
I personally happen to accept, but I also accept that these rules are not the only possible ones by 
which people could play. 
To sum up, the historical truth assumption has been criticised for four reasons. It has 
been argued that any historical narrative is practically and essentially incomplete; that the fictive or 
rhetorical element is an indispensable part of any narrative; that the factual statements upon which 
narratives are based are also subject to the inherent ambiguity and normativity of language in which 
they are expressed; and that the standards according to which these factual statements are judged 
are not objective and universal, but are specific to that particular self-referencing conversation that 
we call the discipline of history. Therefore, I think it is justified to call all historical accounts partial 
in both senses of the word: they are (practically and essentially) incomplete and “biased.” 
For these reasons, when we are debating narratives, we are not simply arguing over 
historical accuracy, that is, their conformity to evidence. I find it useful to think about debate as if 
it took place on (at least) two levels simultaneously: at a conceptual-ethical-methodological-
epistemological level where we discuss the appropriateness of the framework of interpretation and 
the standards for the evaluation of historical accuracy, and at an empirical level where we argue 
about how well the given narrative conforms to available and credible pieces of evidence. The 
multiplicity of possible interpretive frameworks and evaluative standards means that there is a 
multiplicity of plausible narratives, each of them considered valid within its own interpretive and 
evaluative framework. However, it does not imply that “anything goes,” that any narrative is as 
good (valid, plausible) as another. To say that there is no single, absolute standard of evaluation 
does not mean that there are no standards of evaluation at all; it does not mean that historians do 
not strive to construct narratives that are “truthful” as long as we understand “truthfulness” as 
conformity to evidence according to the standards of the historical discipline. It certainly makes 
sense to talk about more and less accurate historical narratives, and about narratives that directly 
contradict evidence (provided that we come to share a certain set of criteria for the evaluation of 
accuracy). However, the above does mean that the narratives cannot be “truthful” in the sense that 
they are not glimpses or approximations of a singular Truth that exists somewhere out there; it 
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does mean that aspiring for knowing the historical Truth with a capital T is no more than wishful 
thinking. 
It is important to note that this critique of the historical truth assumption of duty-based 
approaches to the representation of past events does not mean the rejection of the institutions of 
transitional justice in general. Legal processes, such as the punishment of the perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity and the compensation of victims for their suffering, can still be important and 
justified in different historical contexts. However, it does not follow from this that the public 
representation of historical events should be forced to conform to these legal decisions. 
Demonstrating the occurrence of a criminal act “beyond reasonable doubt” is sufficient for these 
legal measures, but this is not near enough for an authoritative account of the past. Showing the 
accuracy of a certain factual statement “beyond reasonable doubt” is a long way from establishing 
a full-fledged historical narrative of a past event that is beyond dispute. 
A Typology of Myths 
Based on my arguments so far, I propose a typology of myths that is inspired by 
Abizadeh’s classification, but it also significantly departs from it. Abizadeh made the crucial 
analytical distinction between “myth as imaginative narrative story and myth as a narrative 
purporting to make historical truth claims.”189 He referred to the former, myths that do not claim 
to be the historical truth, as myths-as-story; these are “understood by the collectivity’s members 
in literary terms” and their importance lies in “the inspiration for human action, in their ethical 
message, or in the very act of reading a set of stories in common with others.”190 On the other 
hand, “some identity-constituting myths are understood as a set of historical truth claims by the 
actors who bear the identity”; in the case of myths-as-history, “the historical narrative undergirds 
a collective identity only insofar as it is understood to be making truth claims.”191 Within this 
category, Abizadeh further distinguished between myths-as-lie (historically false), myths-as-
embellishment (relying on an interpretive spin) and myths-as-omission (relying on the selective 
representation of facts). As he acknowledged that any account of the past is practically and 
essentially incomplete but wanted to save the notion of historical veracity, Abizadeh needed to 
carefully draw a fine line between myths-as-omission and “true and appropriate” historical 
narratives. 
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Having expressed my misgivings about the notion of a true narrative earlier, I propose a 
different classification. If historical research at its best can only provide us with good 
interpretations of past events (that is, good by the standards of their own framework of 
interpretation), then no historical narrative can honestly claim to represent the Truth about history. 
If a narrative does not claim to represent the singular historical Truth, it would need to be classified 
as a “story” in Abizadeh’s terminology. The problem is that this would amount to a radical 
rejection of any boundary (however porous) between history and literature as it would group all 
narratives (the completely fictional along with the one relying on, admittedly partial, historical 
evidence) under the same heading. Even if there is no clear-cut disciplinary boundary between 
history and literature,192 I think that it is worth differentiating between myths that strive for some 
degree of historical accuracy within a certain interpretive framework (myths-as-interpretation) and 
those that do not (myths-as-fiction). The spectrum between these two ideal typical categories 
constitutes the myths that do not claim to represent the historical truth (myths-as-story in 
Abizadeh’s understanding). On the other hand, I label the myths that do claim to be the singular 
historical Truth as myths-as-truth which encompass not only what are myths-as-history for 
Abizadeh, but also any publicly represented historical narrative that purports to be “true and 
appropriate.” As there are only partial accounts of the past, myths-as-truth are by definition 
dishonest about their mythical status. To sum up, the mythical status of a publicly represented 
identity-constitutive historical narrative can be threefold: myth-as-truth, myth-as-interpretation 
and myth-as-fiction. Naturally, this categorisation can be transposed to historical narratives that 
are not identity-constitutive and/or represented publicly, but these are not relevant for the 
problems discussed here. 
Myths and the Discipline of History  
Given the epistemological critique of the historical truth assumption presented earlier, 
we need to rethink the distinction and the relationship between publicly represented identity-
constitutive narratives and the historical discipline. The rigid separation of the two has a long 
tradition in academia where certain historians depicted their discipline as an objective, rigorous 
and impartial scholarly enterprise in search of the authoritative account of past events (the 
historical truth) that can be clearly distinguished from the subjective, emotional and socially 
constructed world of collective memory. This dichotomy implies that collective memory is an 
intellectually inferior and often socially dangerous way of looking at the past. From this point of 
view, history should guide memory and prevent it from being overtaken by untrue, and potentially 
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dangerous, stories. As Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder expressed, “[w]ithout history, memory is 
open to abuse. But if history comes first, then memory has a template and a guide against which 
it can work and be assessed.”193 Similarly, in his defence of the notion of historical facts, Timothy 
Garton Ash identified “the memory hole” with “falsification, airbrushing, rewriting history.”194 
The past is required to be publicly represented with scrupulous historical accuracy because, as 
Nora claimed, “memory divides and history alone unites. Historians are the best situated ... to say 
to all ... what the past authorizes and what it does not permit.”195 
The separation of history and memory in this manner has been challenged in different 
ways. Some thinkers denied the possibility of historical truth and blurred the line between history 
and memory completely. Peter Burke understood history as a kind of social memory but upheld 
its contribution to understanding the past. He embraced a certain historical relativism which did 
not mean that “any account of the past is just as good (reliable, plausible, perceptive...) as any 
other... The point is that we have access to the past (like the present) only via the categories and 
schemata ... of our own culture.”196 The Popular Memory Group also blurred the line between 
history and memory by claiming that “history has a particular place in a much larger process ... ‘the 
social production of memory.’ In this collective production everyone participates, though 
unequally. Everyone, in this sense, is a historian.”197 
Others took an intermediate position which recognised history and the public 
representation of the past as two distinct but necessarily interconnected and overlapping domains. 
Assmann agreed with the ontological-epistemological claim that the discipline of history, in its 
search of truth, is an intellectually superior way to knowledge, but was sceptical about whether it 
can or should guide public representations of the past. “History turns into myth as soon as it is 
remembered, narrated, used, that is, woven into the fabric of the present.”198 This does not 
undermine history as an academic undertaking because the “mythical qualities of history have 
nothing to do with its truth values,”199 but it does mean that the work of historians, their ever 
closer approximation of historical truth, cannot be represented in the public sphere in a direct and 
undistorted way. Therefore, Assmann upheld the possibility of knowing (or at least approximating) 
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the historical truth (what I called the epistemological claim of the historical truth assumption), but 
he did not agree with the empirical claim that this authoritative reading can be publicly presented 
as it is (or at least without significant changes). 
Even if one accepts the claim that all of our historical narratives are necessarily partial, I 
agree with Bell that history and myth can be considered distinct in at least two ways. Firstly, 
academic history is too complicated and too detailed to be suitable for mass consumption in its 
original, unabridged and undistorted form. “At least when pursued systematically, history is too 
meticulous, too intricate and too complex to be assimilated easily into national mythology,” or 
indeed into any kind of identity-constitutive representation of past events, as these are “based on 
generalization and deliberate simplification and packaged into easily comprehended and 
reproducible narratives.”200 Secondly, contrary to the air of certainty projected by most 
mythologies, historical scholarship at its best exercises a high degree of self-reflexivity and 
constantly reminds itself and its audience of the uncertainty and the fallibility of the knowledge 
that it produces. To say that there are multiple possible ways of representing the past does not 
mean that no distinctions can be made between different narratives. As Barthes argued, some 
representations are less mystifying than others in that “they overtly call attention to their own 
processes of production, clearly flag their own assumptions, and indicate explicitly and repeatedly 
the constituted rather than the found nature of their referent, ‘the historicised past’.”201 Critical 
history openly go against the long-standing assumption that “[o]ne of the basic purposes of 
historiography is to legitimize authority.”202 
Critical historians are—or at least should be—selfreflexive, aware of the partiality, weak foundations, 
and fallibility of their enterprise, as opposed to the intrinsic simplicity and univocality of mythology. 
While always aware of the dangers of nationalist glorification and accommodation, this mode of 
historical sensibility stresses the contingency, opacity, and plurality of the past. It can be counterposed 
to “mythistory,” the form of history writing that seeks meaning in the ebb and flow of time, searching 
for glory, heroism, and ultimately transcendence.203 
By this point, many readers are surely wondering about how the Holocaust fits into this 
pragmatist picture. If the foundations of knowledge are questioned to such a degree, how can we 
still respond to fascists and Holocaust deniers? This is certainly a valid concern. Indeed, the 
Holocaust has been routinely invoked as “the limit case of historiographical theory,”204 as the 
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ultimate and most difficult test of epistemologically “relativist” accounts of historical knowledge. 
Dewey and Rorty have both been repeatedly asked how their “fuzzy” philosophy can provide good 
reasons not to be fascists, and the usual complaint against the historiography of White is that it 
cannot satisfactorily counter Holocaust deniers. To this challenge, White responded that it can be 
shown that Holocaust deniers are wrong simply because they fail to follow basic rules of 
evidence.205 Unless they openly disavow these standards of historical research, which even 
Holocaust deniers rarely do, the rules of evidence can be applied to assess the validity of their 
statements. Where White departs from more traditional historians is in realising that just because 
a framework of interpretation is ethically inappropriate does not automatically imply that narratives 
within that framework are necessarily historically inaccurate. White outlined two such historically 
accurate narratives of the Holocaust with ethically dubious frameworks of interpretation. One is a 
neo-Nazi version which recognises the genocide of the Jews but praises it as a rightful and heroic 
act that was necessary for the survival of the German race. The other is a Zionist narrative in which 
the brutality of the mass murder is dissolved in a grand narrative about the suffering and the 
martyrdom of the Jewish people. White found the interpretive framework of both narratives 
ethically wanting (without trying to imply that the two are equally bad), but he thought that they 
can nevertheless be historically accurate within those frameworks. Kansteiner added that many of 
the representations of the Holocaust in popular culture also fit this description. “By celebrating 
Holocaust survivors, rescuers, and liberators, the vast genre of popular films and documentaries 
about the ‘Final Solution’ thrive on the challenge of casting the seemingly gloomy topic of Nazi 
genocide into optimistic, uplifting narratives of great entertainment and monetary value.”206 
Probably the worst offender in this respect is Schindler’s List. The film strives to be as authentic as 
possible, but its interpretive framework renders it what I consider, following Imre Kertész, the 
finest example of the kitsch representations of the Holocaust. 
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But I also regard as kitsch any representation of the Holocaust that fails to imply the wide-ranging ethical 
consequences of Auschwitz, and from which the PERSON in capital letters (and with it the idea of the 
Human as such) emerges from the camps healthy and unharmed... I regard as kitsch any representation 
of the Holocaust that is incapable of understanding or unwilling to understand the organic connection 
between our own deformed mode of life (whether in the private sphere or on the level of “civilization” 
as such) and the very possibility of the Holocaust.207 
When it comes to how pragmatic philosophy can respond to the ethically inappropriate 
frameworks, Rorty argued that the “frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the 
pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a fascist is perfectly justified. But 
neither can that person give you a reason to be a fascist.”208 Rorty nevertheless rejected the charge 
of relativism which “is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is 
as good as every other. No one holds this view… So the real issue is not between people who 
think one view as good as another and people who do not. It is between those who think our 
culture, or purpose, or intuitions cannot be supported except conversationally, and people who 
still hope for other sorts of support.”209 
Pragmatists are routinely accused of irresponsibly deconstructing the thin layer that keeps 
us from falling into the abyss of nihilism. But Rorty argued that these critics are “tricked by Plato” 
into believing that the role of philosophy is to concentrate on convincing “the rather rare figure 
of the psychopath”—such as Thrasymachus, Callicles and Hitler—and into believing that unless 
our knowledge has “real” foundations, we cannot convincingly respond to them. However, just 
because we pragmatists do not believe in the Platonic assumption that there are common grounds 
to which these “rational egotists” “must assent simply by virtue of being rational, language-using 
animals” does not mean that we have nothing to say to them and that we believe that their belief 
in their rational egotism is just as good as our belief in our universal humanity.210 
We are said to leave the general public defenseless against the witch doctor, the defender of creationism, 
or anyone else… What we in fact infer is that there is no way to beat totalitarians in argument by 
appealing to shared common premises, and no point in pretending that a common human nature makes 
the totalitarians unconsciously hold such premises.211 
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In fact, the belief in the absolute truth and in the objective way of determining it is rather 
convenient for the totalitarian projects as well. 
Anti-pragmatists fool themselves when they think that by insisting, and claiming to demonstrate, that 
moral truths are “objective”—are true independent of human needs, interests, history—they have 
provided us with weapons against the bad guys. For the fascists can, and often do, reply that they entirely 
agree that moral truth is objective, eternal and universal [and it also happens to be fascist]… Dewey 
made much of the fact that traditional notions of “objectivity” and “universality” were useful to the bad 
guys, and he had a point.212 
Rorty thus turned the tables on anti-pragmatists by arguing that their emphasis on 
objective and universal truth can easily be part of the problem rather than the solution, that in fact 
it is the notion of ultimate truth that makes us vulnerable to fascists, not the rejection of this belief. 
In the wrong hands, this supposed “superweapon” of philosophy can easily be the greatest threat 
to the idea of tolerance rather than its protector. 
To sum up, Rorty thought that the notion of ultimate truth is an ineffective weapon 
against extremists at best and a highly counterproductive one at worst. It is ineffective because it 
wrongly assumes that fascists and the like (consciously or unconsciously) share certain basic 
premises with us just because they are humans (and are thus endowed with the universal capacity 
of reason), and that we could convince them of our ultimate truth if only we made them realise in 
a rational debate that they hold these basic premises. Moreover, the weapon of objective truth can 
easily turn in our hands and be highly dangerous as these rational egotists might also find it useful 
to follow this logic and to ground their arguments by appealing to (a different) unquestionable 
truth. There might be good philosophical arguments for not believing in the notion of ultimate 
knowledge, but pragmatists like Rorty are more dissuaded from it because of the potentially 
harmful practical consequences of holding such a view. 
For these reasons, Rorty proposed a typically pragmatist solution. He thought that, at 
least since Plato, most philosophers have been searching (in vain) for firm groundings for their 
knowledge so that they can effectively respond to the challenge posed by the fictional rational 
egotist. Instead of fighting these futile battles and developing such double-edge weapons in the 
process, we should realise that philosophical arguments, and especially those that rely on views 
about ultimate knowledge, might not be the right weapons against such madmen.213 Rorty argued 
that the adequate response to this problem should have a less rationalistic and more conversational 
style, such as sentimental education, about which I will talk in detail later in this chapter. 
                                                          
212 Richard Rorty, “Just One More Species Doing Its Best,” London Review of Books 13, no. 14 (1991): 6. 
213 Rorty, “Just One More Species Doing Its Best.” 
 77 
What all this means for the discipline of history is that its practitioners would do well to 
acknowledge that historical accounts are constructed, not found; that they are practically and 
essentially incomplete; that they necessarily contain a fictive element; that the factual statements 
underpinning these readings of the past are fallible, ambiguous, and laden with values; and that the 
rules of evidence are the chosen standards for the evaluation of historical research, not naturally 
given. This acknowledgement does not change the way historians do research, the standards for the 
evaluation of their work or the validity of existing historical accounts. As such, it does not make 
the discipline vulnerable to “anything goers” and Holocaust deniers whose claims will still be 
considered false by the standards of the discipline. In fact, there is strength in admitting the 
contingency of “philosophical bets” and the uncertainty of knowledge, and in realising that 
appealing to the notion of objective truth may not be the best strategy. It might not be the best 
strategy not just because there are some good philosophical arguments against it, but also because 
it is unlikely to convince the “anything goers” and Holocaust deniers who may also use this notion 
to their advantage. In the resultant dead end of perpetual antagonism, each side appeals to some 
absolute truth and fundamentally rejects the possibility of holding the view of the other. In the 
following, I will explain a social approach to myths that is built on this realisation; it outlines a 
potentially better strategy of dealing with extreme and intolerant views and specifically aims to 
overcome this lasting animosity. 
Dialogue in a Radical Democracy 
In the previous section, I criticised duty-based ethical accounts for relying on untenable 
assumptions about historical truth and social cohesion. Although the pragmatist approach to 
historical and moral truth explained in the previous sections does have some practical 
repercussions for how the state and its citizens should treat different sorts of publicly projected 
narratives, it is in itself insufficient to provide a comprehensive ethical theory of myths. I will thus 
draw on radical democratic theory to provide inspiration for a pluralist ethics of myths. In this 
section, I briefly compare two strands of liberal democratic theory (LDT) and two strands of 
radical democratic theory (RDT) and argue for a pluralist conception that is compatible with the 
pragmatist ideas outlined above. Based on these two traditions, in the following sections I will 
explain the role of the state, of education and of citizens with respect to myths in a pluralist radical 
democratic setting. 
Different strands of liberal democratic theory imply different approaches to myths. 
Following Alan Finlayson, I distinguish between two broad categories of liberal democratic theory: 
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aggregationist and accommodationist.214 Both types of theory assume that politics should be based 
on the rational consent of sovereign individuals on whom the state should not impose a certain 
conception of the “good life,” but they differ with respect to how this should be achieved. Having 
faith in individual autonomy and rationality, aggregationist approaches hold that individuals can 
and should define their preferences, their own conception of the “good life,” and make rational 
decisions to satisfy these interests. These choices are therefore constitutive of their personality, 
and interfering with them in any way violates the basic humanity of these individuals (hence the 
claim to inviolable human rights). As a consequence of this, the ideal state in this strand of liberal 
democratic theory is a minimal one that guarantees basic rights and aggregates individual 
preferences without influencing them or adjudicating between them. The most just and efficient 
outcome thus arises as a sum of countless individual choices; the role of the state is to facilitate 
the aggregation of these decisions, but it remains neutral with respect to these choices and to the 
end result of their aggregation. This strong emphasis on state neutrality means that the four state 
actions with respect to myths (which are, as it will be explained later, projection, support, challenge 
and censorship) are generally not consistent with aggregationist accounts. According to this 
approach, it is not the role of the state to tell individuals what they should think or should not 
think, either directly or indirectly. Individuals are assumed to have the capacity and the exclusive 
right to determine their preferences towards myths; these choices are translated into publicly 
projected historical narratives through the media which operates completely free from the 
influence of the state and aggregates these individual preferences in accordance with the laws of 
the market. 
In contrast, accommodationist theories of liberal democracy disagree with the 
aggregationist model on the grounds that it is not liberal enough. Accommodationists also value 
individual choice and state neutrality, but they believe that the aggregationist vision of a completely 
passive state cannot effectively guarantee these normative commitments. Aggregationists believe 
that the state is neutral as long as it does not interfere with individual choices and with the process 
of their aggregation. The problem with this conception is that this method of guaranteeing 
individual autonomy and state neutrality effectively privileges certain ways of life over others and 
is thus self-defeating. The state’s pre-political commitment to withdraw from the process of the 
formation and aggregation of individual preferences does have real world implications, and it does 
not affect all individual normative commitments in the same way. Far from being normatively 
neutral, this state policy effectively prioritises a certain conception of the “good life” (the life of 
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individual rational choice) and legitimates a process of aggregating interests that is in practice far 
more advantageous to those whose preferences are already dominant in a society than to those in 
the minority. Accommodationists argue that given these pre-political ethical choices deeply 
embedded in the vision of the minimal state, such a state cannot properly be neutral and thus 
cannot properly be consented to by all citizens. Therefore, they argue for a more interventionist 
state that takes positive measures to ensure neutrality, that strives to “ensure that varied 
communities may flourish, and that fairness and justice are accorded to all the pre-political 
perspectives of the various communities within a polity” by actively seeking to “help establish and 
maintain an accommodation between them.”215 For instance, such a state can recognise multiple 
languages as official ones in order to ensure equal opportunities for linguistic minorities, or it can 
adapt legislation so as not to disproportionately affect certain religious groups (Finlayson mentions 
the exemptions from animal welfare laws granted to the producers of halal and kosher meat). 
Consequently, the accommodationist state actively intervenes in the mythscape in order to ensure 
that subaltern myths are given due attention. Given its ambition to remain neutral, it refrains from 
the outright projection and censorship of historical narratives, but it would use more indirect 
methods, such as support and challenge, to guarantee a fair representation of all elements of the 
mythscape. 
At the extreme, accommodationism argues that not only the state should be neutral 
towards ways of life, but it should also actively promote neutrality and tolerance as an ethical 
principle in wider society. This radical liberal vision is even more interventionist in the sense that 
it does not only aim to accommodate various individual preferences, but also to modify these 
preferences so as to accommodate them. Radical liberalism does not shy away from directly 
projecting myths that promote tolerance or from censoring myths that are blatantly intolerant. For 
radical liberals, the principle of state neutrality, which was originally understood to be the equal 
treatment of all citizens and conceptions of good life, has thus morphed into a vision of a state 
that actively pushes for neutrality and tolerance, even if this means attempting to change the beliefs 
and the conceptions of the good life held by citizens. 
“The paradox of such radical liberalism is very real… attempting simultaneously to advance the claim 
that the state must be neutral with regard to the best form of life, and a substantive notion (in the form 
of a commitment to tolerance and equality) of what that best form of life might in fact be—all the while 
advocating the deployment of state power to bring it about. Into this paradox have marched the forces 
of political reaction, where they have happily camped at great political profit to themselves.”216 
                                                          
215 Ibid., 16. 
216 Ibid., 17. 
 80 
The political right thrives on this paradox, agitating against such intrusive “social 
engineering” and “the tyranny of political correctness.” Even if it is obvious that these sound bites 
are nothing more than accusations levelled against straw men, the underlying problem of 
accommodationist accounts is real, and in any case neither of the two strands of liberal democratic 
thought is very tempting. With respect to identity-constitutive narratives, one of them would imply 
a free-for-all mythscape where the market, based on the needs of memory consumers and free 
from state intervention, determines which stories should be publicly represented and how. This 
“equal treatment for all” attitude effectively guarantees that some identity groups are ignored by 
the invisible hand and feel left out; these groups are usually already marginalised for one or more 
reasons, such as linguistic differences, socioeconomic status, religion and/or social prejudices. This 
means that aggregationist accounts imply a state that aims not to arbitrate between different 
conceptions of the past but paradoxically legitimates a process of aggregating individual 
preferences for historical narratives that is claimed to be value-free and in the interest of all, but in 
practice serves only the interests of some as it privileges the public representation of certain myths 
over others. The accommodationist strand of liberal democratic thought similarly envisages the 
protection of individual freedom of choice for particular readings of the past in a neutral state, but 
thinks that it is best served by the state actively managing the mythscape; in order to accommodate 
social differences, the nominally neutral state can justifiably preach tolerance as an ethical ideal, 
project and support narratives that have a tolerant message, challenge and even censor intolerant 
myths. This “equal respect for all” attitude thus leads to an irreconcilable tension between the ideal 
that the state should not prescribe any “good” way of life and the belief that it should try to make 
its citizens “better” (that is, more in accordance with its own ethical presumptions). Ultimately, 
both strands of liberal democratic thought “claim that the other has usurped sovereignty and 
sought to make the state into a vehicle for its own ideologically motivated project. And both sides 
are correct.”217 
It has long been the ambition of radical democratic theory to offer possible ways out of 
this stalemate. Radical democratic thought is highly fragmented, and many thinkers would not 
define themselves as radical democrats even though their works could be justifiably considered 
under this heading. I follow Aletta Norval in considering the common features of radical 
democratic theories to be a critical attitude to the liberal democratic tradition (mostly on the 
grounds that liberal democracy is not democratic enough), a commitment to certain key ideas of 
liberal thought (notably freedom and equality) and to the ambition to further democratise 
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liberalism (for instance, by extending and intensifying popular participation in democratic politics 
and by responding to the inequalities of power that can endanger the pursuit of liberal ideals). 
Radical democrats can thus be understood to aim to “deconstruct rather than reject the liberal 
tradition,”218 but few of its contributors would go as far as subscribing to a notion of “radical 
liberal democracy” proclaimed in the more recent writings of Chantal Mouffe.219 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between two strands within radical democratic 
theory: the critical theory strand and the post-structuralist strand. The critical theory strand is 
mainly based on the theoretical foundations of the Frankfurt School, and Jürgen Habermas’s work 
on public reason and deliberative democracy could be considered its most influential theory. The 
strand of radical democratic theory mainly inspired by the French post-structuralist tradition is 
most often associated with the theory of Laclau and Mouffe. Both of these branches of RDT could 
be understood to be Post-Marxist attempts to respond to the inadequacies of LDT. Post-Marxism 
is often used as a pejorative title for those “betraying” the orthodox Marxist cause, but in this sense 
it stands for approaches that draw on Marxist thought (especially on its emancipatory ambition), 
but are also critical of some of its basic assumptions (such as the base-superstructure distinction); 
and aim to present a balanced critique of LDT, recognising both its merits and shortcomings (as 
opposed to orthodox Marxism which has turned into a complete rejection of liberalism). 
These two strands of RDT agree that democratic politics should not be understood as a 
simple aggregation of interests that stem from pre-existing identities, but as the site where these 
very identities are formed and transformed, expressed and contested. Thinking about the social 
world in terms of constantly changing and internally fragmented identities, they reject assumptions 
about the individual or the community as homogenous and unitary, and instead emphasise the 
inevitability of social difference and contestation. What the two great branches of RDT markedly 
disagree about is how these inevitable social differences are to be dealt with. Critical theory radical 
democrats believe that social differences can and should be overcome by rational consensus. In 
the Habermasian deliberative democratic thinking, communication is “oriented to achieving, 
sustaining and reviewing consensus.”220 What is assumed to lead to the resolution of differences is 
deliberation according to normatively grounded procedures. This happens in an idealised speech 
situation where fully rational and equal citizens engage in argumentative speech, in a public sphere 
                                                          
218 Paul Barry Clarke, Joe Foweraker, and Aletta Norval, eds., “Radical Democracy,” in Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 726. 
219 Chantal Mouffe, “Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy,” in Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and the State, 
ed. David Trend (New York: Routledge, 1996), 20. 
220 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1984), 17. 
 82 
where differences in power and material interests are irrelevant and the best argument wins. Post-
structuralist radical democrats, on the other hand, do not regard social difference as an undesirable 
empirical fact that needs to be dealt with or simply as an ontological condition from which we 
cannot escape, but critically uphold dissensus as vital for democratic politics, as the means by 
which democracy can be extended and intensified. They argue for an ethical commitment to social 
difference which should not be accommodated, dissolved or resolved, but embraced. For post-
structuralist radical democrats, the result of the democratic revolution is that “the locus of power 
becomes an empty place [that] cannot be occupied,”221 and democratic politics is the never-ending 
political struggle to occupy this place of power. This attempt is ultimately futile, because the void 
left by the democratic revolution is essentially impossible to fill, but this is exactly the paradox that 
motivates and constantly revitalises democratic politics. Finally, contrary to the emphasis on reason 
and rational debate of the critical theory branch of RDT, the post-structuralist branch stresses the 
importance of power and emotions in politics. 
In the following, I will outline a post-structuralist radical democratic position based on 
the works of Laclau, Mouffe, and Connolly, and will combine it with Bakhtin’s conception of 
dialogue, which will form the theoretical basis of the pluralist ethics of myth. As mentioned before, 
an important starting point for radical democratic theories is the problem posed by the 
heterogeneity of views and identities in a society. Laclau and Mouffe take the plurality of 
perspectives to be a fact of social life but think that social difference and conflict do not have to 
be of antagonistic nature. Antagonism, the situation in which participants see each other as 
enemies to be eliminated, can be transformed into agonism, where participants regard each other 
as adversaries with whom they need to engage with. This way, contrary to the deliberative 
democratic view, social difference is not dissolved, but its nature is changed. 
The adversary is in a certain sense an enemy, but a legitimate enemy with whom there exists a common 
ground. Adversaries fight against each other, but they do not put into question the legitimacy of their 
respective positions... Conceived in such a way, liberal-democratic politics can be seen as a consistent 
and never fully achieved enterprise to diffuse the antagonistic potential present in human relations. By 
creating the conditions for possible conflicts to take the form of confrontations among adversaries 
(agonism), it attempts to avoid a frontal struggle between enemies (antagonism).222 
The task, according to Laclau and Mouffe, is to try to transform the nature of social 
conflict from antagonism to agonism, to change the relationships between social agents so that 
they become adversaries rather than enemies. Some theorists suggested that the way to achieve 
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this (necessarily “never fully achieved”) transformation is an open-ended dialogue between 
participants. As opposed to the consensus-oriented Habermasian process of deliberation, 
Bakhtinian dialogue does not have a teleological, fixed end point. The dialogue “is imbued with 
social and cultural differences and contradictions.” Far from being fully rational, the subjects of 
the dialogical framework are passionate and emotional, “situated in a concrete context of time and 
space, characterized by the co-existence of opposed and contradictory social forces and ideological 
dispositions.”223 
It is important to note that this conception of agonistic dialogue is much more 
sophisticated than a simple agreement to disagree. It does presuppose an agreement that allows 
for the possibility of unresolved conflict (that is, for the possibility of disagreement), but it goes a 
lot further than this. Radical tolerance “is not a form of tolerance that simply allows us to ‘put up 
with’ the existence of a multiplicity of forms of life and world-views. Rather it aims at mutual 
recognition and co-understanding in a manner that opens up each such form of life to a diversity 
of reciprocal influences and points of view.”224 
This mutual understanding does not mean consensus and the dissolution of conflicts, but 
it does not preclude their possibility either. If the participants mutually understand each other’s 
position, they gain access to something new and different which ideally leads to enrichment for all 
participants. As a result, they might or might not change their initial views and the direction of this 
change might or might not converge; what is important is that although some form of limited 
consensus is possible, it is by no means a necessary condition for mutually advantageous dialogue 
and for the transformation of the nature of conflicts from antagonism to agonism. 
There are several reasons why it makes sense to take difference rather than consensus as 
the enduring condition of democratic politics. First, as Sewell argued, cultures are only ever loosely 
coherent with multiple social structures. Second, identities are never fixed and stable, but are fluid 
and malleable, constantly reformulated in the light of new social developments. As Stuart Hall 
noted, in the process of identification, “[t]here is always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’—an over-
determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality.”225 Third, neither the democratic 
community (demos), nor its values, nor the interpretation of its values are fixed. Democracy is often 
assumed to be a particular form of government, a particular set of institutions, a particular way of 
legitimating the state, and to be constituted by a well-defined community of citizens with shared 
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democratic values. In contrast, RDT takes democracy to be a particular way of practising politics. 
It rejects the assumption about a pre-existing “people” with pre-existing liberal values whose 
interpretation is pre-determined, and holds that it is through democratic contestation itself that 
the demos is constituted and constantly reconstituted, its values renegotiated and the content of its 
values reinterpreted. This goes beyond the traditional narrative that sees liberalism as a continuous 
extension of liberal values to ever increasing circles of human (and even non-human) beings; the 
proponents of RDT regard the theory as a way to democratise liberalism by “expanding the 
democratic possibilities for the key terms of liberalism, rendering them more inclusive, dynamic 
and more concrete.”226 This means that even if there was a relatively well-defined community 
whose members agreed to honour the core liberal values of equality of liberty, the necessarily 
multiple and conflicting ways that these values can be interpreted implies that they can never be 
fully realised.227 Democracy, therefore, is a truly elusive, never completely fulfilled condition, or as 
Jacques Derrida put it, democracy is always something “to come” (démocratie à venir). 
Treating democracy as an elusive condition that is constituted and kept alive by 
disagreement and continuous political contestation, radical democrats of the poststructuralist 
tradition do not simply agree that pluralism is an inevitable fact of social life. They also share a 
normative commitment to pluralism, although they differ with respect to the form of this 
commitment. For instance, while Mouffe applauded pluralism unconditionally, Connolly adopted 
a more cautious approach.228 He distinguished between pluralism and pluralisation, the 
acknowledgement of the fact of already existing differences and the drive towards new ones. For 
Connolly, the appreciation of pluralism needs to be complemented by a critical responsiveness 
towards pluralisation, and democracy consists in mediating the tension between the two.229 This 
distinction will be important later for my pluralist ethics of myth in discussing the responsibility of 
the state with respect to historical narratives. 
The pluralist (poststructuralist) version of radical democratic theory and the notion of 
dialogue are central to my ethics of myth which can be called radically pluralist or simply pluralist 
because of this influence. “Dialogue, besides being the necessary condition of comprehension, is 
also an ethical ideal.”230 It is something to aspire to, not something that naturally is. Consequently, 
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its effectiveness in overcoming antagonism depends largely on how it is “done.” In the following 
chapters, I will explain why a pluralist approach and dialogue are crucial for my ethical framework 
of myths, how the state, the education system and individual citizens should approach myths in a 
pluralist framework, and how they can contribute to improving dialogue about them. 
Pluralist Ethics of Myth 
Contrary to duty-based approaches, theorisation for a pluralist ethics of myth does not 
start with an abstract situation in order to determine how the past should ideally be remembered, 
to determine how consensus and order could be achieved in place of disorder. The objective of 
this section is to determine how to “work the trap that one is inevitably in,”231 how to most 
effectively deal with the “suboptimal” situation232 in which we are inevitably trapped, in a social 
world characterised by disorder, difference and the lack of consensus. 
The starting point is therefore that what is happening on the ground in most European 
societies (and even on the transnational level) is that multiple and conflicting representations of 
the past compete with each other for dominance, and most of them employ a highly exclusionary 
rhetoric by making mutually incompatible claims to represent the singular historical Truth. And it 
is because of this situation that the idea of pluralist democracy and the pragmatic conception of 
truth discussed so far in this chapter are so relevant for our discussion of myths. If we take Rorty’s 
“liberal ironist” position that believes that “progress does not mean getting closer to the Truth, 
but getting closer to each other,” we realise that the biggest problem with this situation is not the 
lack of consensus, but the lack of mutual respect and understanding; the biggest problem here is 
not the truthfulness or falsity of any of the prevailing narratives, but the all too often antagonistic 
relationships between these narratives. This is not to say that concerns about historical accuracy 
and consensus-building attempts to reconcile conflicting narratives have no value. These activities 
can be worthwhile, but they are of secondary ethical importance next to the problem of mutually 
exclusionary thinking. In fact, if the evaluation of the historical accuracy of myths and the 
initiatives to reconcile them are founded upon the notions of absolute moral and historical truth 
(as they often are), then they can very well exacerbate antagonism and thus be part of the problem 
rather than the solution. The pragmatist critique of these notions says that our main worry should 
not be whether our publicly represented historical narratives conform to some abstract notion of 
truth that can be known by the universal capacity of reason (which has been shown above to be 
in practice and in principle impossible anyway), but whether we as human beings treat each other 
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with the respect and empathy that we deserve. This ambition is compatible with the pluralist radical 
democratic belief that, given that social conflict is inevitable, at least we need to aim for considering 
each other as worthy opponents, not as despicable enemies. The pluralist ethics of myth thus 
embraces the plurality of historical narratives, challenges exclusionary notions such as absolute 
moral and historical truth, and promotes dialogue between participants as a way to overcome 
antagonistic relationships and to further mutually enriching understanding between them. 
In Europe, there are two main ways very different myths struggle for dominance in an 
antagonistic way. On the one hand, the “three dignified roles for the national collective to 
assume”233 in the face of fateful events of the past—glory, heroism and victimhood—are being 
challenged by what Olick called the politics of regret. On the other hand, as will be explained later, 
the victimhood narratives energised by the rise of the politics of regret compete with each other. 
Strangely, some victimhood narratives are both challenged by the politics of regret and energised 
by it at the same time. The European memory wars, which will be extensively discussed in the next 
part of the dissertation, are the finest example of this apparent paradox. 
Olick suggested that, after the decline of the nation state, the recent wave of state 
apologies for crimes that they have committed in the past heralds the arrival of a new form of self-
legitimation, the politics of regret, which relies on the feeling of guilt, the demand for regret, and 
the exposition of shameful events instead of the glorification of the national past. Based on the 
theoretical justification provided by the duty-based accounts explained above and on the practical 
example of the German Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“dealing with the past” or “coming to terms with 
the past”), the politics of regret has been propagated by its adherents as an ethically superior way 
of relating to the past; as a more advanced and more mature way of looking at the past than the 
traditional myths of glory, heroism and victimhood; as a type of memory that can be the foundation 
of post-conventional identities that are more progressive and more enlightened than national ones. 
As I have already argued extensively elsewhere, the politics of regret should be seen as an 
identity-constitutive myth like any other and as such it should be approached as critically as any 
other myth.234 The reason for this is that, similarly to traditional myths, the politics of regret has 
the tendency to present itself as a myth-as-truth, as the narrative endowed with the single morally 
right code and the single historically right reading of the past. The politics of regret may be 
replacing stories of national glory as the basis of legitimacy, but it all too often follows the very 
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same discriminatory logic. This implies that most real world examples of political regret should 
not be considered as coping strategies superior to others just because the tone of their narratives 
is regretful. They are often just more myths-as-truth with ethically inappropriate exclusionary traits. 
The fact that their tone is regretful and self-flagellatory as opposed to the boastful and self-
congratulatory myths of glory is of only secondary ethical significance; what I take to be much 
more important is the extent to which they contribute to the reproduction of antagonistic 
relationships by claiming to represent the truth, by claiming exclusive right to represent certain 
parts of the past. 
At the heart of most traditional and regretful myths are the same assumptions about 
moral and historical truth. Far from providing clarity and authority to the struggle between myths, 
these assumptions fuel the antagonistic logic that makes the followers of these narratives say that 
the other myths have no right to be there. The Holocaust, the arch-narrative of the politics of 
regret, is supposed to be the founding narrative of a tolerant world, but many parts of this world 
tolerate no transgressions to their own founding myth. The criminalisation of Holocaust denial is 
the most obvious example, but some public figures did not have to go so far; many historians and 
politicians have been ostracised for deviating from the narrow scope of the socially acceptable 
interpretation of the Holocaust, for attempting to “relativize” this sacred event (see the examples 
given in the last section). Even though I do not agree with these revisionist accounts, I find the 
social outrage and ostracisation that they have sparked to be contrary to the tolerant mentality that 
is supposed to be founded on the memory of the Holocaust. If a community accepts a particular 
reading of the Holocaust as its foundation myth and then makes this narrative unquestionable, in 
what ways is this community different from countries in which stories of national glory are 
sacrosanct, protected and securitised? As Maria Mälksoo stated, “[a]ttempting to forge certain 
mnemonic consensus as a higher ideal of a cosmopolitan nature (such as Holocaust remembrance 
in the EU) is not necessarily a more benign version of securitizing historical memory than the 
parochial nationalist variants.”235 
It is important to note that I do not mean to suggest that the politics of regret is 
problematic in every form. A more modest regret which views itself as a myth-as-interpretation is 
perfectly possible and personally I would be happy if more people shared it than (hopefully equally 
modest) myths of glory. However, in their current militant form, most instantiations of the politics 
of regret are no better than any other myth-as-truth. The Vergangenheitsbewältigung is viewed as a 
“critical” and “self-reflexive” form of memory by its supporters, but I do not see how a process 
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whose end point is fixed to be a social consensus about regret and apology can be labelled as such. 
The type of self-reflection that I have outlined so far is always open-ended, always involves a lot 
of possible outcomes and is not even necessarily geared towards reaching an outcome or changing 
anything. Viewed in this light, the politics of regret is certainly self-critical (and sometimes even 
self-flagellatory), but it is certainly not self-reflexive. 
To sum up, so far ethics of memory have focused too much on the mode of emplotment 
of a narrative (whether it is self-congratulatory or self-flagellatory, traditional or regretful). I argue 
that it would make more sense to concentrate on an ethically much more significant issue, namely 
on how narratives are often exclusionary in the sense that they exclude the possibility of 
representing a certain part of the past in any other way (or at least in a way that is significantly 
different from theirs). The claim to represent or approximate the historical truth, instead of solving 
conflicts and settling debates, effectively contributes to the development and perpetuation of an 
antagonistic environment where the different sides are deaf to each other’s arguments because 
they fundamentally reject the possibility of holding the other’s views. Approaching this assumption 
more critically would be a major step towards a more agonistic environment where conflict is still 
very much present, but participants view each other as legitimate adversaries rather than enemies. 
The following three chapters will outline the practical implications of this assertion with respect 
to the behaviour of the state, the individual, and the organisation of education. 
Myths and the State 
For the purposes of this ethical framework, I distinguish between four types of state 
action: states can project, support, challenge or censor narratives. The direct projection of a 
narrative is the public representation of a certain past event by state organs and officials. This is 
often in line with the dominant narrative or set of narratives in a given society, but it does not need 
to be (and is usually not) a single, homogenous narrative that enjoys the consensus of every 
government official, let alone of every citizen. “National” representations of the past in the form 
of memorial days, monuments, songs and museums may enjoy vast popular support, but they are 
rarely (if ever) completely uncontested, and these very symbols are open to multiple competing 
interpretations. The national history curriculum, for instance, can be considered a set of state-
projected narratives; but it must also be noted that even if history textbooks often need to be 
approved by the state, there is usually a wide range of substantially different textbooks that school 
teachers can use. The ruling political party or parties tend to promote their own narrative, and after 
a change of government this state-projected version of the past can easily change. Additionally, 
different state organs and different levels of government often articulate different myths; local 
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authorities, for example, can be more likely to erect monuments with controversial historical 
interpretations, while official state monuments are generally more consensual. 
The state can also support a narrative which means its promotion by ways that are more 
indirect than outright projection. This practically means the “soft” or indirect promotion of a 
narrative by the political authority; instead of directly projecting the myth to its citizens, the state 
commends the narrative for its certain qualities. For instance, the state can recognise some myths 
as historically accurate and/or morally commendable, and can generally encourage their public 
representation (by supporting, financially or otherwise, the privately initiated cultural projects 
which make these historical statements, or by providing a platform for their representation). On 
the contrary, the state can also challenge some interpretations of the past by declaring them 
historically inaccurate and/or morally reprehensible, and generally discouraging its public 
representation (by withdrawing or withholding financial and other kinds of support from the 
projects that articulate these narratives, by distancing itself from them, or by operating a no-
platforming policy with respect to their advocates). Finally, states can censor some narratives by 
criminalising their public representation and by actively preventing them from reaching the public. 
In the following, I will outline what the pluralist ethics of myth thinks about these four types of 
state action. 
The radical democratic critique of liberalism takes issue with the principle of state 
neutrality mostly on the grounds that aggregationist and accommodationist liberal theories 
envision a state that proclaims itself to be neutral in the face of different conceptions of the “good 
life,” but in practice embodies and reinforces a very particular worldview. But it is also difficult to 
imagine how the state could be completely neutral in principle. It needs to be established on the 
basis of some norms and rules; it needs to communicate to its citizens in fulfilling its basic 
functions (such as education), communication requires the use of language, and language is 
inevitably laden with values. For these reasons, the emphasis should not be on how the state can 
be neutral. Given that the state is necessarily committed to some normative ideals, the emphasis 
should be on how it should act with respect to these values and how these values should be 
(re)constituted and (re)interpreted. 
The pluralist approach holds that if the state is inevitably caught up in some normative 
commitments, the least it should do is to be open about these values, be self-reflective about their 
contingent nature, and be open towards the reconstitution and reinterpretation of these values 
through democratic contestation. This means that the main problem with duty-based ethics of 
memory is not that they expect the state to project or support certain historical narratives, but that 
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the state is supposed to do this in a rather dogmatic way, as if those narratives expressed the 
indisputable moral and historical truth. In contrast, a pluralist framework envisages a state that, 
depending on the context, can promote the values and the historical content that is deemed 
desirable by duty-based ethical accounts, but the state should do this in a way that acknowledges 
the existence of these values and their contingency as well as the uncertainty of historical 
knowledge. 
The actual normative commitments of the state and their interpretations are subject to 
the ever-changing dynamics of democratic contestation, but in my ethical framework I express a 
hope that these will tend to be commitments to the liberal values of liberty and equality, and a trust 
in, and respect for, the results of academic research. That is, the state will hopefully regard the 
discipline of history and science in general as its main source of knowledge. However, the ideals 
of openness and self-reflectivity for which I argued above require the state to be open about these 
commitments and to acknowledge that this is not the only way to look at the past and the world. 
If the state does share these commitments, in general it can justifiably project and support historical 
narratives if the following criteria are satisfied: 
 the narratives are widely regarded in the discipline of history as highly accurate; 
 the ethical values embedded in these narratives conform to the liberal values to 
which the state subscribes; 
 the narratives themselves and the way they are projected or supported by the state 
are open about their contingent nature and fallibility (that is, by openly admitting 
that the standards of evaluation of the discipline of history are not absolute, that 
the mode of emplotment of the narrative is a somewhat arbitrary choice, and that 
historical narratives are practically and essentially incomplete anyway); 
 generally, the state pays particular attention to minority narratives that fit these 
criteria. 
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Depending on the context, there can be deviations from these general criteria, of course. 
In certain historical situations, projecting or supporting narratives that do not satisfy these criteria 
but whose projection has huge socially beneficial net effects might be justified. In times of social 
crisis or war, for instance, it might be ethically defensible to violate these criteria to a certain extent. 
If projecting or supporting a historically inaccurate narrative and/or projecting or supporting it in 
a somewhat dogmatic way might prevent internal armed conflict, international war, the collapse of 
the state or some other highly undesirable situation, then the state action of projection or support 
might be a necessary evil in order to avert some greater evil. In peacetime and in established 
democracies, however, there are rarely sufficient grounds for violating these criteria. 
This does not mean that the state is free to project and support myths as long as they 
conform to these criteria. Whenever the state promotes the constitutive narrative of a certain 
identity group, it effectively marginalises the myths of other social groups. Minority voices are 
inevitably the easiest targets of this marginalisation; even if they are not excluded from the 
mythscape in principle, they can be effectively ignored if the state aggressively propagates its own 
narrative. Whether created by benign neglect or deliberate exclusion, this institutionalised 
ignorance can even be considered a form of humiliation. In practice, “[t]he dominant ‘shared 
memories’ of all modern states are repositories of humiliation... There are no examples in modern 
history of non-discriminating, non-exclusionary national mythologies.”236 The pluralist state is 
therefore generally expected to refrain from employing its powers to aggressively propagate its 
own values and preferred myths, and to keep the projection and the support of myths to a 
minimum and to the contexts where it has good reasons to do so (for instance, in history textbooks 
and education which will be explored in detail in a later section). 
In fact, the central projection and support of historical narratives can sometimes run 
against other, probably more important, objectives of the state such as the reduction of antagonism 
and the encouragement of understanding. The projection or support of a historical narrative 
amount to a positive recognition as the state deems its interpretive framework ethically appropriate 
and/or its content historically accurate. The state must single out certain narratives for positive 
recognition as recognising all myths equally is clearly not a viable option. If the state recognised all 
myths with their different interpretive frameworks, it would mean that the state positively affirmed 
widely different and fundamentally incompatible ethical and onto-epistemological choices. This 
would only make sense if the state did not uphold the narrative itself (its interpretive framework 
and historical accuracy), but if it valued the fact that it is different from the others, that its 
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recognition would increase the overall diversity of the mythscape. The positive recognition of all 
myths is sensible if and only if the ever higher diversity of the mythscape was the state’s sole 
priority. I agree with Connolly that this type of pluralisation, the drive towards more differences 
for the sake of having more differences, can easily have adverse social consequences and should 
not be the guiding principle of the state. 
If diversity for the sake of diversity is not the goal of the state, by positively recognising 
certain narratives, the state singles out some as more valuable than others which inevitably 
contributes to the development of a hierarchy between narratives. Apart from the institutional 
ignorance and marginalisation of (mostly) minority narratives discussed above, this hierarchy has 
two other consequences. On the one hand, it leads to a competition for positive recognition among 
narratives. As positive recognition cannot be universal for the reasons mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, unrecognised narratives need to compete with each other for affirmation by the state. 
Victimhood narratives are particularly prone to this phenomenon and the “competition of 
victims”237 has become particularly acute with the spread of the politics of regret. As the number 
of official state apologies for past misdeeds rose, so did the number of calls for the recognition of 
victimhood. However, the groups with these victimhood identities more often than not took 
recognition and solidarity to be limited social resources, believing that the more victims are 
recognised, the less attention each victim receives. Pieter Lagrou lamented that we “always 
commemorate and recognize some [victims] at the expense of others... Such a process is inherent 
in the political struggle for public recognition, which is a scarce commodity.”238 Since its rise to 
transnational prominence, the commemoration of the Holocaust has been routinely accused of 
“crowding out” solidarity with other victims of the past and the present. 
On the other hand, the hierarchy between narratives means that there are established, 
widely recognised narratives that can serve as templates for similar myths that still seek recognition. 
The commemoration of the Holocaust has been defended on these grounds. With his concept of 
multidirectional memory explained in Chapter 2, Rothberg argued that the commemoration of 
victimhood is not a zero-sum game in which the solidarity gained by one victimhood narrative is 
a loss of another. According to him, instead of crowding out the commemoration of other victims, 
the globalisation of the Holocaust has provided a platform and a template based upon which 
victimhood narratives can be effectively articulated. 
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Crudely put, the essence of the debate is whether the multiplication and the recognition 
of victimhood narratives alter the partition or the size of the solidarity cake. The proponents of 
the competition view think that the more recognised narratives struggle for solidarity, the thinner 
the slices from the solidarity cake will be for each. The defenders of multidirectionality believe that 
the amount of social attention paid to victims (the size of the cake) is not an immovable constant; 
the more established and recognised some victimhood narratives become, the more public 
attention is devoted to past wrongs and the easier it is for unrecognised victimhood myths to get 
a slice of the growing solidarity cake. 
The problem with the debate about competition and multidirectionality is that at this 
point it could only be resolved with more empirical evidence, but it is extremely difficult (or even 
impossible) to determine the “net effect” of the multiplication of recognised victim stories, that is, 
the way they alter the partition and the size of the solidarity cake. If the cake is becoming bigger, 
but more people are having it, are the slices going to become bigger or smaller? The answer, as 
ever, is that it depends on the situation. But, as Jan-Werner Müller said, there is no way to ascertain 
empirical claims about whether empathy with past victims “will drive out other kinds of 
solidarity—or that it might, instead, make societies as a whole more sensitive to wrongs and 
instances of open or hidden violence in the present.”239 Similarly, it is not possible to demonstrate 
whether calls for empathy with past victims crowd each other out or provide a template for each 
other. Without such evidence, questions about the relative strength of the crowding-out effect and 
the template effect remain questions of faith and, as such, in principle unresolvable. What is clear 
is that the ambiguity of the effect of narrative hierarchy created by positive recognition reinforces 
the previous assertion that the state needs to be cautious about projecting or supporting myths. 
The pluralist state needs to carefully balance between the necessity and the social benefit of such 
actions, on the one hand, and their possible negative impact on the realisation of its primary 
objectives in this respect, that is, on its ability to reduce antagonism by creating an inclusive 
mythscape and encouraging dialogue. 
When it comes to censorship, the pluralist state rarely has sufficient grounds to prohibit 
the public representation of historical narratives. If we accept that there is no one morally and 
historically right reading of the past, it is difficult to see on what grounds historical narratives 
should not be allowed to be represented in the public space. Bell similarly argued that 
                                                          
239 Jan-Werner Müller, “On ‘European Memory’: Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks,” in A European Memory? 
Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance, ed. Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 
34. 
 94 
“[c]onceptions of the past should not be censored”240 and made an important analytical distinction 
between the content of historical narratives and the political programme which they are used to 
bolster. He thought that it is not the content of narratives that the state should make judgements 
about, but the policy programmes for whose legitimation these myths are used. “If such political 
programs do not accord with the minimal necessary conditions for fostering democracy—if, for 
example, they threaten violence—then they can justifiably be proscribed.”241 However, myths 
should not be excluded from the mythscape even if they are associated with these programmes. It 
must be noted that Bell acknowledged that an absolutely clear separation between the political 
agenda of a group and its supporting mythical account is not possible. In most cases, the policy 
preferences of a group and the ethical values embedded in the interpretive framework of its myth 
are intimately related. Bell nevertheless thought that the analytical separation of the policy 
programme and the content of a myth is important when the state is contemplating intervention. 
This promising separation between myths and policy programmes needs to be fleshed 
out. Most importantly, we need to be clearer about what Bell called the “content” of historical 
narratives. In my terminology, content stands for the two interconnected parts of the narrative: 
the historical statements and the interpretive framework. Consequently, the general prohibition of 
state intervention in the mythscape needs to be defended in the face of two scenarios. In the first 
case, we need to show that a narrative should not be censored if its interpretive framework is 
democratic, but it is used to legitimate an openly undemocratic policy programme. Consider, for 
instance, the situation in which two different identity groups employ the same narrative to support 
two different political agendas, one violent and another completely peaceful. In this case, it would 
surely be unfair to censor the narrative and thus penalise the group with the peaceful agenda. If 
the problem is with the policy programme that the myth is used to legitimate, the state should be 
concerned with the programme instead of the myth. The second scenario is trickier. Here, we need 
to show that even if a narrative’s interpretive framework contains elements that openly violate 
basic democratic principles (for instance, if an ethical value embedded in the myth is the 
persecution of certain ethnic groups), it should still not be censored. There are several reasons for 
this. First, these undemocratic elements are not articulated policy programmes; they do not directly 
and automatically lead to undemocratic political tendencies. In order to become guidelines for 
action, they need to be used by certain groups to support their (ethical or unethical) political 
agendas. The state, in turn, can justifiably act against these programmes instead of questionably 
excluding myths on the basis that they might be translated into a political agenda which might lead 
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to undemocratic actions. Second, it is all too often the suppression of certain readings of the past 
by legal means that renders undemocratic political tendencies more likely. As Bell noted, 
“mythologies do not simply disappear if they are ignored; indeed, such silencing can fuel 
resentment and hatred, catalyzing spirals of distrust.”242 As sanctioning a historical account by legal 
means usually exacerbates the feelings of exclusion, marginalisation and victimisation in the group 
that wishes to promote the narrative in question, such measures often prove to be 
counterproductive. For these reasons, as a general rule the pluralist state does not prohibit the 
representation of historical narratives because of their content or interpretive framework, and 
resorts to censorship only in extreme circumstances (internal conflict, war, etc.). The other method 
to take action against historical narratives, to challenge them, is “softer” than censorship and can 
sometimes be ethically defensible, but any potential social benefits arising from this challenge need 
to be weighed against how this action contributes to the development of narrative hierarchy and 
thus to resentment and antagonism. 
So far, I explained when the pluralist state may be justified to take the four possible 
actions towards a particular myth. Some of these actions and some forms of these actions were 
argued to be generally more acceptable than others, but the state was expected to be cautious and 
to take these actions only if it has good reason to. The rationale behind this caution is that any 
state action can have adverse side effects, that is, it can endanger the realisation of other norms 
and state objectives. In peacetime and in established democracies, one of the primary goals of the 
pluralist state is taken to be to embrace the inevitable social condition of dissensus so that 
differences can become agonistic in nature, to reduce the prevalence of antagonistic relationships 
in the society. Positive recognition (that is, projection and support), challenge and censorship can 
all have social repercussions that undermine the realisation of this aim. For this reason, the pluralist 
state can often do the most for the reduction of antagonism by taking actions with respect to the 
totality of myths, the mythscape, rather than particular historical narratives. The state can do the 
most for an agonistic society by organising a mythscape in a pluralist way, by creating a platform 
where all myths can confront each other and can engage with each other in dialogue. For this, it 
needs to take the following measures: 
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 the simultaneous acknowledgement and challenge of all myths 
 critical education (the education of critical tools for the evaluation of myths) 
 sentimental education (the “emotional manipulation” of citizens) 
The following two sections will consider these measures in detail. 
Pluralist Mythscape 
Instead of taking action against particular narratives, the state can usually do the most for 
the reduction of antagonism by organising a pluralist mythscape. A crucial measure in this vein is 
the simultaneous acknowledgement and challenge of all myths, an idea first proposed by Bell. On 
the one hand, he claimed that all myths deserve to be acknowledged at a public level irrespective 
of their content (that is, their historical accuracy and their choice of interpretive framework). 
Recognition and acknowledgement are very difficult concepts which is illustrated by Paul Ricoeur’s 
collection of twenty-three different understandings of recognition.243 For my purposes, it is 
sufficient to distinguish between the positive recognition of a narrative and its acknowledgement. 
Positive recognition means that the public representation of a narrative is affirmed as valuable and 
ethically good. This can happen for a variety of reasons; for instance, a narrative can be upheld 
because it is deemed historically true and accurate, because it teaches people a moral story, because 
its representation serves justice to victims or because it brings glory to the nation. In contrast, the 
acknowledgement of a narrative only entails the acceptance that the story has as much right to be 
publicly represented as any other. As Bell put it, acknowledgement 
is not synonymous with the sorts of Hegelian-inspired demands for “recognition” advanced in much 
recent political theory. Rather than positively affirming the distinctive qualities of other identities, it 
simply concedes the importance of identity-constitution for individual and collective identities and the 
rights of groups to make claims and present a public face based on this fact. This does not preclude 
positive endorsement, but it does not demand it. This signals, then, a type of “formal” rather than 
“substantive” recognition, in Patchen Markell’s terms, signifying equal inclusion in a process whereby 
identities are contested and remade rather than a claim about the necessity of affirmation.244 
The acknowledgement of a narrative therefore should not be understood as positive 
appraisal or recognition in the Hegelian sense; it does not mean that the narrative in question is 
ethically good, historically accurate or socially beneficial. What it does mean is that any account of 
the past deserves to be part of the public discourse, that its content and historical accuracy should 
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not be a basis for its marginalisation, exclusion or suppression. In fact, it does not say anything 
about the value of the narrative or that of its representation, about its historical veracity or moral 
worth. Without such evaluative criteria, the acknowledgement of all narratives is more likely to 
lead to a truly inclusive mythscape than the four state actions discussed in the previous section. 
Competition and conflict remain a central feature of an acknowledgement-based mythscape, but 
there is an important difference with regard to positive recognition. In the former, different 
narratives which are already accepted in the mythscape struggle for dominance; in the latter, they 
compete for inclusion in the mythscape of the privileged. The question about complementarity 
and competition, about whether different myths reinforce each other or crowd each other out, is 
not solved, but it becomes less relevant in the case of acknowledgement. As every narrative has 
the right to be included in the mythscape, the struggle between insiders and outsiders is turned 
into a dialogue within insiders; antagonistic relationships can be turned into agonistic ones. In this 
case, we can arrive at a mythscape where the acknowledgement of victimhood is truly not a zero-
sum game. 
Putting more emphasis on the acknowledgement of all myths than state actions towards 
particular myths means that the two problematic scenarios associated from the latter, namely 
narrative hierarchy and pluralisation, are less likely to occur. If all narratives deserve to be 
acknowledged and to be publicly represented irrespective of their content, historical accuracy or 
ethical stance, hierarchy is less of an issue; in the case of acknowledgement, there is little room for 
official differentiation between narratives based on some (necessarily contingent) set of criteria, 
and for the resulting (necessarily arbitrary) choices about the inclusion and exclusion of voices in 
the mythscape of the “recognised.” With respect to the second scenario, I follow Connelly in 
regarding plurality as an inevitable and even desirable social condition whose acknowledgement 
opens the possibility of mutually enriching dialogue between participants. However, pluralisation, 
the movement towards more diversity for the sake of diversity, can have adverse side-effects and 
usually carries more risks than opportunities. For this reason, the pluralist state envisioned here 
acknowledges the diversity of myths in society, but does not actively promote (or discourage, for 
that matter) ever higher levels of diversity. 
The acknowledgement of all myths, however, is not sufficient in itself for the 
development of a pluralist mythscape. The state also needs to provide a platform where all 
narratives (and especially minority views) can be effectively represented and can engage with each 
other in dialogue. This can be a virtual or actual social space, a “mythspace,” where organised 
identity groups can openly present their myths, can understand each other’s views and can thus 
come to see other as adversaries rather than enemies. In Europe, the obvious candidates for the 
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creation of such social spaces are museums. In the last few decades, the conceptions of museums 
have undergone significant changes from rather top-down institutions where traditional dominant 
nationalist narratives are projected to more inclusive and more self-reflective places. (At least) 
some of these places (at least partly) should be devoted to the creation of such inclusive 
mythspaces where visitors and organised identity groups are creators as much as receivers of 
content (see the discussion on the House of European History in Chapter 6 for more details). 
The arguments above imply that even historically inaccurate and (from a liberal point of 
view) ethically reprehensible narratives need to be acknowledged and allowed to represent 
themselves in mythscapes. Let us again take the extreme case of Holocaust denial as the “hard 
case” for these arguments. There are three reasons why even such narratives should be 
acknowledged and included in mythspaces in an agonistic democracy. First, the question should 
not be why these myths should be acknowledged and included, but why they should not be 
acknowledged and on what grounds they should be excluded. The reasons that might be given for 
the exclusion of these myths are that they are historically inaccurate, they do not subscribe to 
liberal ethics, they employ an inappropriate mode of emplotment, and/or that they portray 
themselves to be the truth. Whichever of these reasons are chosen, it would be difficult to 
construct robust criteria for exclusion around them. At what degree of historical inaccuracy or 
deviation from liberal values should a myth be excluded? And, more importantly, given that the 
pluralist state subscribes to liberal values and to the discipline of history, but also considers these 
choices contingent rather than rationally necessary, it does not have a good enough justification to 
exclude myths that do not subscribe to these choices. Similarly, if all myths-as-truth were deemed 
unacceptable for acknowledgement and inclusion in the mythspaces, then most contemporary 
myths would fail to meet this criterion which means that the creation of a mythspace, whose 
purpose would be to reduce antagonism between these myths, would not make sense. 
The most noteworthy objection to the acknowledgement and inclusion of narratives 
about Holocaust denial is that they can be offensive to some people and may even constitute hate 
speech. This is a strong argument and there is a vast literature about whether and how concerns 
about offensiveness and hate speech can impact on the right to freedom of expression.245 I would 
defend the acknowledgement and inclusion of extreme voices not on the mostly deontological 
grounds of free speech, but on more consequentialist grounds. As I argued earlier, the institutional 
ignorance and exclusion of extremist narratives does not make them vanish, but renders them 
more latent, more underground, more resentful, and ultimately more difficult to engage with and 
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even to notice. The experience of marginalisation in the adherents of these narratives is a fertile 
ground for the development of a sense of victimhood and further marginalisation which in the 
end perpetuates antagonistic relationships in society. Given this consequentialist argument about 
the usually negative social repercussions of excluding extremist views from the mythscape, the 
logical question is what, if anything, is to be gained from including these voices. 
This question leads us to the third reason why even extremist voices need to be 
acknowledged and included. The whole point of the mythspace is to encourage dialogue in order 
to contribute to the development of a pluralist mythscape and to the reduction of antagonism. The 
idea is that even the most wildly different viewpoints can talk to each other and can learn from 
each other if they come to see each other as adversaries rather than enemies. If the most 
antagonised voices were excluded and only those liberal people were included who are already nice 
and tolerant towards each other, the mythspace would surely serve no real purpose. If the main 
goal of the pluralist state is to reduce antagonism, then this engagement with extremist voices is 
necessary. It does not mean, of course, that the state can legally force people to be tolerant towards 
intolerance, to sit at the same table as Holocaust deniers. But the state should try to encourage 
these people to talk to each other, because the situation of antagonism will not be solved by mutual 
disgust and resentment. 
Even so, the acknowledgement and inclusion of blatantly inaccurate and illiberal myths 
is not unproblematic. I argued that the pluralist state should not promote myths-as-truth (or only 
in very few cases), nor should it censor accounts of the past even if they proclaim to be true and/or 
they are used by identity groups with openly undemocratic political programmes and/or their 
interpretive framework contains openly undemocratic elements. Clearly, myths-as-truth with 
undemocratic elements in their interpretive framework are especially problematic; the truth claims 
that such myths make do not only give a sense of authority to the narrative itself, but also naturalise 
and legitimate the undemocratic elements of its framework of interpretation. In general, myths 
with undemocratic interpretive frameworks are effective at supporting undemocratic political 
agendas if they proclaim themselves to be the only holder of the truth. If the state is expected to 
acknowledge all myths but not to project some authoritative version of the past that legitimates 
the prevailing social order, how is it supposed to approach the problem of myths-as-truth with 
undemocratic interpretive frameworks? There must be some kind of response to this problem on 
behalf of the pluralist state. Bell proposed that this needs to be the challenge of all myth, and that 
the most powerful tool in the hands of the state to this end is education. 
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Myths and Education 
In the primary and secondary schools of a pluralist democracy, the content of history 
education itself is not so different from conventional forms of teaching history in that it relies on 
the results of research in the discipline of history. This is a situation where the state can justifiably 
project narratives whose content is in line with its own ideological commitments, that is, with its 
liberal values and its trust in historical research. However, it needs to project them in a way that is 
different from more dogmatic forms of history education. First, as opposed to mythistory, the aim 
of this history education is not to strengthen national unity and legitimate the state (which is not 
to say that conventional history education is necessarily mythistorical, of course); instead, it 
subscribes to the critical history tradition in that it is suspicious of authority, pays particular 
attention to minority narratives and, most importantly, is open and self-reflective about the 
limitations of historical knowledge and its performativity in society. History education in a pluralist 
democracy thus does not present its assertions as the objective truth about the past, but as the 
current state of affairs in a particular (and particularly sophisticated) discourse called the discipline 
of history. Importantly, it even teaches about narratives that are deemed ethically reprehensible 
and historically inaccurate by the state. This is not teaching in the very traditional sense (that is, 
top-down transmission of content that is deemed to be the truth), but teaching that encourages 
discussion and self-reflection about controversial issues while clearly noting that the state does not 
recognise these narratives as ethically or historically appropriate. 
This approach to the teaching of history is complemented by two other forms of 
education about myths, one appealing to reason and the other to emotions. These are educational 
approaches which are meant to contribute to the effectiveness of dialogue and to the reduction of 
antagonism. The rationalistic tool, critical education, challenges all narratives by encouraging a 
critical attitude towards all publicly represented historical accounts, while the emotional tool, 
sentimental education, aims to foster tolerance and dialogue between different historical narratives 
by encouraging empathy between their supporters. 
Critical education constitutes a challenge of the totality of myths in that it encourages a 
critical attitude towards all myths. Most importantly, it encourages a critical attitude towards all 
exclusionary tendencies, and thus towards all myths that present themselves as the only possible 
true readings of the past. It challenges these exclusionary traits by adopting a critical approach 
towards the notion of absolute historical knowledge and teaching the tools with which myths can 
be assessed. The aim of this education is to encourage people to bring into question the 
assumptions about moral and historical truth which, as I have argued, sustain the present 
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antagonistic arrangements. This approach is not exclusionary as it acknowledges that all myths 
deserve to be represented, even those that claim incontestability, but at the same time it consciously 
tries to undermine the incontestability assumption that gives strength to myths-as-truth. The 
importance of critical education follows from the insight developed in the previous chapter, 
namely that individuals are not mere products and captives of social structures and identity-
constitutive mythologies, but, to some extent, are also capable of critically evaluating and 
challenging them. The latter is especially important as it is admittedly difficult to imagine a situation 
in which the state acts as a benevolent guardian over the mythscape and refrains from favouring 
certain narratives while marginalising others. The exclusionary tendencies of mythologies, 
however, could be successfully tamed if social agents were more aware of the uncertainty and the 
complexity of the past and were better equipped with the tools necessary to take a more critical 
stance towards narratives making truth claims. Academia and, perhaps even more importantly, 
primary and secondary education have a special responsibility in this process. While supporting 
the acknowledgement of the right to existence of all interpretations of the past, critical education 
needs to promote scepticism towards mythical truth claims, teach the tools with which myths of 
any kind can be critically evaluated, emphasise the uncertainty and fallibility of historical 
knowledge, and raise awareness of the exclusionary characteristics of the narratives that portray 
themselves as the truth. Above all, critical education challenges the exclusionary features of myths-
as-truth, their insistence on one particular reading of past events and their tendency to present 
themselves as natural, neutral, consensual, commonsensical. These truth claims render myths-as-
truth mutually exclusive and challenging them would take us much closer to a more agonistic 
mythscape. 
I propose that the other method to change mutually exclusive relationships could be what 
Richard Rorty called sentimental education. With respect to the global human rights regime, Rorty 
was dissatisfied with how “exclusionary” views, which did not subscribe to the human rights ideals, 
are treated. These groups are readily labelled irrational, bigoted, backward, barbaric, animalistic, 
infantile, subhuman or pseudohuman as opposed to us, the rational, modern, civilised, 
Enlightened, progressive, mature, true human beings who are on the right side of history. 
We Eurocentric intellectuals like to suggest that we, the paradigm humans, have overcome this primitive 
parochialism by using that paradigmatic human faculty, reason. So we say that failure to concur with us 
is due to “prejudice.”246 
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Thus, in the spirit of “never tolerate intolerance,” the paradigm humans ostracise the 
irrational, non-paradigmatic humans. 
[S]tudents who have been brought up in the shadow of the Holocaust, brought up believing that 
prejudice against racial and religious groups is a terrible thing, ... imagine themselves in the shoes of the 
despised and oppressed. Such students are already so nice that they are eager to define their identity in 
nonexclusionary terms. The only people they have trouble being nice to are the ones they consider 
irrational—the religious fundamentalist, the smirking rapist, or the swaggering skinhead.247 
This is not to say that the underlying assumption about humanity, the human rights 
regime or the education of the Holocaust are flawed. However, the rational-irrational distinction 
is. 
Producing generations of nice, tolerant, well-off, secure, other-respecting students of this sort in all parts 
of the world is just what is needed... The more youngsters like this we can raise, the stronger and more 
global our human rights culture will become. But it is not a good idea to encourage these students to 
label “irrational” the intolerant people they have trouble tolerating. For that Platonic-Kantian epithet 
suggests that, with only a little more effort, the good and rational part of these other people’s souls 
could have triumphed over the bad and irrational part. It suggests that we good people know something 
these bad people do not know, and that it is probably their own silly fault that they do not know it. All 
they have to do, after all, is to think a little harder, be a little more self-conscious, a little more rational.248 
Rorty argued that the “exclusionary” groups do have a rationality of their own; they just 
do not happen to buy into the basic universalist assumption that belonging to a larger group, to 
the biological species of humanity, trumps other kinds of group membership.  
But the bad people’s beliefs are not more or less “irrational” than the belief that race, religion, gender, 
and sexual preference are all morally irrelevant—that these are all trumped by membership in the 
biological species... It would be better to teach our students that these bad people are no less rational, 
no less clearheaded, no more prejudiced, than we good people who respect otherness. The bad people’s 
problem is that they were not so lucky in the circumstances of their upbringing as we were... we should 
treat them as deprived. Foundationalists think of these people as deprived of truth, of moral knowledge. 
But it would be better—more specific, more suggestive of possible remedies—to think of them as 
deprived of two more concrete things: security and sympathy.249 
Because the radically different assumptions about the social world of the liberals and the 
“intolerants” are not due to the existence and the lack of the faculty of reason, such deeply 
ingrained differences are unlikely to be moved by rationalistic tools such as critical education. Rorty 
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therefore suggested that education in this case should be based on sentiment rather than reason. 
The moral educator’s task is not to 
answer the rational egotist’s question “Why should I be moral?” but rather to answer the much more 
frequently posed question “Why should I care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person 
whose habits I find disgusting?” The traditional answer to the latter question is “Because kinship and 
custom are morally irrelevant, irrelevant to the obligations imposed by the recognition of membership 
in the same species.” This has never been very convincing, since it begs the question at issue: whether 
mere species membership is, in fact, a sufficient surrogate for closer kinship... A better sort of answer 
is the sort of long, sad, sentimental story which begins “Because this is what it is like to be in her 
situation—to be far from home, among strangers,” or “Because she might become your daughter-in-
law,” or “Because her mother would grieve for her.” Such stories, repeated and varied over the centuries, 
have induced us, the rich, safe, powerful, people, to tolerate, and even to cherish, powerless people—
people whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own moral identity, our 
sense of the limits of permissible human variation.250 
Analogously, in the case of (traditional or regretful) identity-constitutive narratives, the 
rational egotist’s question is “Why should I care about the historical lies of this stranger that 
dishonour the nation/the memory of the victims?” The traditional answer that critical education 
provides goes like this: “Because historical narratives are always partial and there is no authoritative 
account of any historical event, because just the fact that a narrative has a self-congratulatory or a 
self-flagellatory tone does not render it morally desirable or reprehensible.” This is unlikely to 
convince many believers of myths-as-truth. The long, sentimental answer, on the other hand, could 
be that “Because he has been endlessly repeating this story to himself in order to reduce his feelings 
of loneliness and insecurity,” or “Because he might become your son-in-law,” or “Because if you 
stigmatize him, he would feel even more lonely and insecure.” There is no guarantee that this kind 
of answer would be more effective, of course, but it is at least another, potentially less intellectually 
condescending, method in the educational repertoire. 
The paradox of liberal democratic theories indeed lies in their ability to tolerate almost 
every difference and their inability to meaningfully engage with the radically different. The language 
used by the proponents of political regret to describe the traditional approaches to the past is 
strikingly similar to how the paradigm humans talk about the “exclusionists.” Framing differences 
between the supporters of regretful and traditional memories in terms of dichotomies such as the 
mature and the immature, the rational and the irrational, the objective and the emotional, the 
enlightened and the backward, is in principle unjustified and in practice ineffective. It is in principle 
unjustified not only because it posits that a set of irrefutable evaluative criteria exists and can be 
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known, but also because it is built on a self-serving understanding of rationality from which 
radically dissenting voices are excluded by definitional fiat. However, just as Rorty argued that there 
is nothing fundamentally rational or irrational about believing in (or, for that matter, refusing to 
believe) in our shared humanity, I argue that there is nothing fundamentally rational or irrational 
about telling stories about one’s own past misdeeds, one’s heroism or one’s suffering. Particular 
stories can certainly differ with respect to how well they are supported by historical evidence, but 
in and of itself the preference for one “tone” or another has nothing to do with rationality. Myths 
of regret, glory, heroism and victimhood do not differ from each other because some of them are 
more rational or less political than others, but because they rely on markedly different ethical 
assumptions. As I noted earlier, I would personally be happy to see more people supporting a 
more regretful approach to their past, but I certainly do not delude myself into thinking that this 
behaviour would be more rational or morally superior according to some absolute standard. 
The name-calling strategy is also in practice ineffective. Treating those who do not follow 
the politics of regret as immature and irrational is likely to be counterproductive because it 
reinforces their feelings of marginalisation, insecurity and inferiority from which their need for 
stories about heroes and self-pity actually stem. Refusing to take them seriously out of some 
misplaced sense of moral superiority actually sends them the message that the supporters of the 
politics of regret are afraid to engage in debate because they do not have a compelling enough 
argument, because they are the irrational ones who try to resolve every confrontation by appealing 
to their abstract moral dogmas. Finally, external pressure and persecution, whether real or 
imagined, can further increase the appeal of opinion formers within the group that refuses to 
pursue the politics of regret as it gives them the opportunity to portray themselves as the bearers 
of forbidden knowledge and as the protectors of the honour of the community. 
For this reason, instead of arguing for negative, regretful, self-flagellatory as opposed to 
positive, uplifting, self-congratulatory narratives (or the other way around), I maintain that ethical 
judgements about myths should not be primarily made on the basis of their “tone,” but on the 
basis of their honesty about their mythical status. Myths that are open about the partialness of the 
historical knowledge that they present are thus taken to be more desirable than myths that claim 
to represent the ultimate moral and historical truth. The reason why discussion about past events 
is currently all too often characterised by antagonism is not that some immature people prefer 
comforting stories of glory to the painful acknowledgement of guilt; the reason is that when myths-
as-truth face each other off, the outcome cannot conceivably be non-antagonistic. I thus propose 
a dialogical and pluralist ethics of myth, with an emphasis on critical and sentimental education, 
within which such antagonistic relationships could hopefully be overcome. The goal is not to 
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convince each other, to arrive at a consensus, or to destroy the “Other’s” irrational views, but to 
come to see each other as adversaries that rightfully share a dialogical field. 
Transgressing Sacred Myths-As-Truth 
I finish this chapter with a short overview of real world examples that is meant to illustrate 
some of the points that have been made in this rather abstract theoretical discussion, and to 
support the empirical claims that underlie these arguments. Specifically, I aim to elaborate on my 
statements about the relationship between regretful and traditional myths. The observation that 
the politics of regret has been challenging and even replacing national narratives of glory, heroism 
and victimhood in many parts of Europe in the last fifty years is widely accepted. What is much 
more controversial is my emphasis on the similarities between regretful and traditional myths as 
the two are commonly presented as completely different from each other. In the following, I will 
clarify what I mean by this and will provide justifications for the claim. Importantly, this is not 
meant to be a section on the commemoration of the Holocaust, but given that political regret is 
so intimately connected to this historical event, it will inevitably take the centre stage in the 
discussion. 
There are four prominent criticisms that supporters of the politics of regret raise against 
traditional myths: they are presented as morally decrepit, historically false, exclusionist and 
political. If we translate this to my conceptual framework, this means that traditional myths are 
claimed to be built on ethically unacceptable interpretive frameworks, historically inaccurate (given 
their own framework of interpretation), loaded with claims about the moral and historical truth, 
and constitutive of a political identity. As I personally happen to agree with some ethical standards 
embedded in the politics of regret (at least with its preference for stories about suffering over 
stories about glory, for self-critical narratives over self-congratulatory ones, for universal ties 
between humans over particular ones), I agree with the first criticism. However, I am aware that 
these ethical standards are my personal preferences and not absolute ones which any rational 
human being would necessarily come to accept. As such, the effectiveness of the first criticism is 
contingent upon an agreement about basic ethical standards. 
I also agree with the proponents of regret that most real world examples of myths of 
glory, heroism and victimhood do fall prey to the second and the third criticism. Most actual 
nationalist narratives are indeed historically inaccurate even by the standards of their own 
framework of interpretation and they do portray themselves as the only morally and historically 
right readings of the past. Where I fundamentally differ from the advocates of political regret, 
however, is that I am convinced that these three important qualities of a narrative (its interpretive 
 106 
framework, its historical accuracy and its exclusionary nature) are independent of each other. This 
means that just because a myth is built on an interpretive framework that valorises a self-
congratulatory tone over a regretful one (or vice versa), it does not necessarily mean that this myth 
is historically inaccurate and/or exclusionist (or the contrary). In order to support this argument, 
I will show that 
a) traditional myths can in principle be historically accurate and/or non-exclusionist 
b) some regretful myths are in practice historically inaccurate and/or exclusionist 
The first, theoretical claim is relatively easy to justify given my previous arguments in this 
chapter. Following Hayden White, I asserted that even a myth with a morally reprehensible 
interpretive framework can be historically accurate. This means that even if we do not accept the 
ethical standards embedded in the interpretive framework of traditional myths, there is no reason 
to believe that all narratives whose themes are glory, heroism and victimhood are historically 
inaccurate. I would add now that they are not even necessarily exclusionary. Let us take the 
hypothetical Neo-Nazi version of the Holocaust that White has put forward. It can quite possibly 
be historically accurate as well as non-exclusionist in the sense that it might not make any historical 
or moral truth claims. It is perfectly conceivable that it does not portray itself to be the only morally 
and historically right narrative, as the only narrative that can justifiably be publicly represented 
about this particular historical event.251 Although I admit that it would be difficult to name any 
actual traditional myths that are historically accurate and non-exclusionary, I maintain that these 
qualities are independent from each other and traditional myths can in principle be so. It is important 
to note that my aim here is by no means to defend or promote traditional modes of dealing with 
past events. The point I make is simply that there is no deterministic connection between the 
theme of a narrative (glory, heroism, victimhood or even regret) and its historical accuracy and/or 
its exclusionary tendencies.252 
In order to justify this point further, I turn to the second, empirical claim which states 
that not only regretful myths can in principle be historically inaccurate and/or exclusionist, but 
they sometimes are so in practice. In supporting this proposition, the “hard case”253 would be real 
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world representations of the Holocaust. In the following, I will demonstrate that certain actual 
representations can be subjected to some or all of the four criticisms that the supporters of the 
politics of regret mount against traditional myths. 
Before addressing each of the four criticisms in turn, I will outline the historical context 
by giving a brief and necessarily sketchy overview of the history of the commemoration of the 
Holocaust in Europe. The genocide itself was widely known after the Second World War. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the war, public representations of the past in Germany were 
characterised by an institutionalised ignorance with respect to the Holocaust in particular, and the 
war in general, while the dominant myths in other European countries came to be centred around 
their heroic resistance to Nazism and the suffering that this had caused. As most people were more 
willing to accept stories that told their own victimhood and their own heroism, there was little 
room left for, and sometimes even hostility towards, Holocaust survivors and their testimonies. 
“After years of anti-Semitic propaganda, local populations everywhere were not only disposed to 
blame ‘Jews’ in the abstract for their own suffering but were distinctly sorry to see the return of 
men and women whose jobs, possessions and apartments they had purloined.”254 In Germany, 
things started changing in the 1960s when the genocide committed against the Jews received more 
attention as a result of a series of events such as the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961), 
the trials of Auschwitz guards in Frankfurt (1963-1965) and the student protests of 1968. The 
iconic moment of this Vergangenheitsbewältigung was German Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling in 
front of the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970. The following decade was a turning point in several 
respects. In Germany, after events like the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes (1972) and the 
broadcast of the American TV series Holocaust (1979), popular support for the need to “coming to 
terms with the past” reached unprecedented levels. The resistance myths prevalent in other 
Western European countries also came to be challenged by revisionist historians who exposed the 
extent of collaboration with German authorities. Despite this historical revisionism, the 
transformation of public representations was slow. In France, for instance, Robert Paxton’s 
seminal work on Vichy France was published in 1972,255 but the collaboration in the Holocaust 
was only officially recognised in 1995 after a series of trials. In other Western European countries 
(such as Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland), “coming to terms” with collaboration was 
similarly slow and in some sense it is still ongoing. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the view about the duty to remember the unique evil of 
the Holocaust became so dominant by the 1980s that historical revisionism worked in the opposite 
                                                          
254 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 804. 
255 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
 108 
direction than in other countries. In the Historikerstreit (historians’ dispute) of the late 1980s, the 
revisionist historians were a group of right-wing intellectuals led by Ernst Nolte who argued for 
regarding Nazism and the Holocaust in their historical context. They thought that Germany’s past 
should be “normalised” in the sense that it should be considered in the context of other mass 
crimes and other totalitarian regimes, notably the Gulag and Stalinism. Left-wing intellectuals, on 
the other hand, vehemently rejected the possibility of comparison. Led by Habermas, they claimed 
that Auschwitz was a singular and unique evil and any attempt to historicise it necessarily leads to 
the unacceptable relativization of Germany’s responsibility. 
Since this heated exchange, the debate about the comparability of Nazi and communist 
crimes and the uniqueness of the Holocaust soon spread to other countries; this process was no 
doubt accelerated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the West, the publication of Le livre 
noir du communisme (The Black Book of Communism) in 1997 triggered a similarly emotional debate in 
France.256 Stéphane Courtois even enlarged the uniqueness-comparability debate; he counted the 
number of deaths that can be attributed to communist regimes from all over the world and 
concluded that communism is responsible for far more deaths than any other ideology, including 
Nazism. Consequently, the “Communist Historikerstreit”257 also revolved around the question 
whether a blanket condemnation of communism as an ideology makes sense, whether it should be 
treated as a single unified phenomenon or as a set of diverse and internally contradictory 
phenomena. 
In the East, where the population of most countries suffered from and collaborated with 
both types of dictatorships, the “double genocide” theory, which “combines the totalitarian crimes 
of Hitler and Stalin into a single metanarrative of state violence,”258 has established itself as an 
influential framework of interpretation. It is the basis of popular victimhood myths which 
emphasise the suffering of these nations under both totalitarianisms. This is challenged by 
advocates of the politics of regret both internally by local cosmopolitan-liberals, and externally by 
Western governments and other actors. They demand that the people of Eastern European 
countries should pay more attention to the Holocaust and should acknowledge the collaboration 
of their states instead of promoting stories of their own victimhood. Supporters of the “double 
genocide” theory, on the other hand, believe that the crimes of communist regimes (or even those 
of every totalitarian regime) should be commemorated similarly (or even equally) to the crimes of 
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Nazism. Their demand that there should be no first- and second-class victims implicitly challenges 
the claim that the genocide of the Jews was uniquely evil. Since the Eastern enlargement of 2004, 
this debate has become more and more pronounced on the European scene and has been labelled 
the European memory wars. It will be analysed in detail in Part II. 
The Historikerstreit and its variants, the Communist Historikerstreit and the European 
memory wars, are characterised by strikingly similar patterns. The claim about the uniqueness of 
the Holocaust and the simultaneous call for the positive recognition of victimhood creates a 
hierarchy between publicly represented narratives (both within the recognised narratives and 
between the recognised and the unrecognised ones). This, in turn, triggers a competition between 
victimhood narratives which the participants aim to settle with what I call “number wars,” the 
debate about which totalitarian regime is responsible for more deaths committed in more 
gruesome ways for more monstrous reasons. This debate is utterly pointless in itself, but the bigger 
problem is that it is rendered completely antagonistic by the fact that most participants frame their 
arguments in terms of moral and historical truths. For instance, Heidemarie Uhl can claim that the 
“problematic levelling of the two forms of totalitarianism is at odds with current historical 
research”259 while Sandra Kalniete says at the same time that researchers “have shown that both 
totalitarian regimes—Nazism and Communism—were equally criminal.”260 In these debates, both 
sides aim to settle the argument about uniqueness and comparability with more empirical details, 
more historical discussion, more statistics. What they fail to see is that “the controversy is not an 
empirical, historical one,”261 that it is a matter of conscience rather than science.262 
After this historical overview of the commemoration of the Holocaust, I will give real 
world examples of political regret to which the four criticisms raised against traditional myths 
apply. The first criticism was that traditional representations of the past rely on ethically 
problematic interpretive frameworks. I stated that I mostly agree with this because I sympathise 
with some elements in the regretful framework, but I also made clear that this should be seen as a 
personal judgement and not one according to some absolute ethical standards. However, as I have 
mentioned above, there are some actual representations of political regret, and even of the 
Holocaust, which rely on frameworks of interpretation that I find morally unacceptable. The most 
obvious case in point is the kitsch representation (which is not to say that all current 
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representations of the Holocaust are kitsch, of course). In 2001, Kertész lamented on the 
commodification of Holocaust memory.263 Sadly, this seems to have necessarily led to its 
instrumentalization, to what Dan Stone called its “infantalisation,”264 to its reduction to a didactic 
and prescriptive morality tale in the service of various political goals of the present. While I admit 
that the Holocaust has been an invaluable point of reference for the development of the global 
human rights regime, it is a double-edged sword. In debates about humanitarian intervention, for 
instance, invoking the Holocaust has been used all too often as an unbeatable trump card in order 
to “reduce complexity and short-circuit critical reflection for the sake of creating what appears as 
‘instant legitimacy’.”265 The infantile and kitsch representations might also teach the wrong lesson. 
By making the Holocaust constitutive of national or European identity or by making it a pedagogical 
tool inculcating anti-racism or “citizenship,” many of the challenges of the Holocaust—to the idea of 
progress, to education, to the state, to national identity—are leached out of the story... the unpleasant 
and uncomfortable has been turned into the very thing with which we comfort ourselves: the fusion of 
kitsch and death characterised by a “rationalization that normalizes, smoothes, and neutralizes our vision 
of the past.”266 
The second criticism is about historical inaccuracy. I realise that talking about certain 
representations of the Holocaust in these terms can easily be misinterpreted, but I will try to walk 
on this thin ice. While representations of the Holocaust are certainly not historically false, some of 
them did contain statements which were later contradicted by emerging new evidence. The most 
relevant example might be the representation of the Sonderkommandos. These special units were 
composed of Jewish prisoners of extermination camps who were forced to help dispose of the 
corpses of the gas chamber victims. For a long time, the accounts of the concentration camps 
depicted the prisoners of the Sonderkommandos as “heartless and brutal”267 based on the testimonies 
of the camp survivors. They were said to have chased victims into the gas chambers with dogs and 
truncheons, and to have lived a princely life compared to the other prisoners. Most of the authors 
of these survivor testimonies, however, never met Sonderkommando prisoners because the latter 
lived separately from the other inmates. If the Sonderkommando did meet the others prisoners, they 
were on their way to the gas chambers and did not live to tell what happened. The first account 
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from someone who had direct contact with Sonderkommando members was published by Miklós 
Nyiszli in 1947 (the English translation appeared in 1960).268 Nyiszli was an inmate doctor who 
was part of the Sonderkommando but worked under the supervision of Josef Mengele. Although 
Nyiszli’s book was soon questioned for its numerous inconsistencies and inaccuracies, his portrayal 
of the Sonderkommando was taken up by Primo Levi in his influential The Drowned and the Saved.269 It 
was not until further evidence (such as the testimonies of several former Sonderkommando prisoners) 
began to emerge in the 1980s that these “wrong and defamatory”270 stereotypes could be 
challenged and a more accurate account of the Sonderkommandos could be obtained.271 
Finally, public representations of the Holocaust can be, and often are, political and 
exclusionist. Many of them are political because they constitute identities just as the majority of 
traditional narratives. At the core of the Historikerstreit was the normative debate about what the 
appropriate myth and type of myth are for the foundation of German identity. Naturally, the 
debate was also partly about the historical accuracy of particular statements (for instance, Nolte’s 
highly questionable argument about Nazi concentration camps being a defensive measure in 
reaction to the Gulag), but what was much more pronounced and what rendered the debate so 
emotional was the identity aspect. Nolte indeed attempted to “normalise” the Holocaust in the 
sense that he wanted to challenge its unique and special status so as to make Germany a “normal” 
nation, one that can be proud of the glorious parts of its past; he thus favoured a conventional 
basis of self-identification. Habermas, on the other hand, explicitly argued for a post-conventional 
political identity and constitutional patriotism based on universalistic values for which a regretful 
approach to the past was indispensable. 
The history of the commemoration of the Holocaust in Germany also provides ample 
examples when the politics of regret took on exclusionary characteristics, that is, when it made 
unquestionable statements about the moral and historical truth and brought into question the 
legitimacy of other positions. What first comes to mind, the German law of 1985 that criminalised 
Holocaust denial, is not the best example because it might not convince those who believe that all 
forms of Holocaust denial are necessarily forms of hate speech and should thus be proscribed by 
the state not only because they are morally and historically false, but because they threaten violence. 
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There are more convincing examples for exclusionary regret because at certain points in German 
history, one did not have to go near as far as Holocaust denial to be shunned and ostracised. In 
the Historikerstreit, regarding the Holocaust as a unique evil was presented by the left-wing 
intellectuals as the only morally and historically right reading of the past and deviating from this 
was a “temptation which no German would ever again have the right to indulge.”272 The right-
wing intellectuals were routinely labelled Nazi apologists and anti-Semites because the 
relativization of German responsibility was claimed to automatically follow from their attempts at 
contextualisation. Of course, they did make some dubious historical statements and the question 
of uniqueness-historicization can be debated endlessly, but their real crime was that they dared to 
challenge the unquestionable status of a particular reading of the Holocaust. Some paid for the 
alleged transgression of this sacred myth with much more than the right-wing intellectuals of the 
Historikerstreit. Philipp Jenninger was forced to resign from his position as the President of the 
Bundestag in 1988 after a badly delivered but ultimately harmless speech in which he attempted to 
explain the enthusiasm of ordinary Germans for National Socialist ideology in the 1930s. 
It must be noted that there are a number of more recent events which suggest that the 
exclusionary character of the official Holocaust narrative in Germany is not as strong as it used to 
be at its zenith in the mid-1980s. An important development since the early 2000s is that the 
narratives that emphasise German civilians’ own suffering during the war have been gradually 
attracting more and more attention, such as the destructive Allied bombing of German cities, the 
mass rape of German women by the soldiers of the Red Army after the liberation/occupation of 
Berlin, and the expulsion of millions of Germans from Eastern European countries after the war.273 
This “political tendency in Germany to move from the self-perception of a nation of perpetrators 
to that of a nation of victims”274 has caused alarm among the more uncompromising supporters 
of the politics of regret as they believe that paying too much attention to such victimhood 
narratives relativizes German responsibility, crowds out regretful narratives and ultimately opens 
the way for conventional nationalist sentiments. Nevertheless, the opposition to the rise of these 
myths of victimhood have been far less strong and exclusionist than that in the Historikerstreit. The 
fact that influential public figures in Germany can subscribe to hitherto unacceptable positions in 
the uniqueness-comparability debate without triggering a political outrage also suggests that the 
politics of regret has lost much of its exclusionary traits. Joachim Gauck, the current federal 
president, contributed a chapter to the German edition of The Black Book of Communism and signed 
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the Prague Declaration which states that “there are substantial similarities between Nazism and 
Communism in terms of their horrific and appalling character and their crimes against humanity,” 
and that Europe should “recognize Communism and Nazism as a common legacy.”275 Or former 
president of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering, for instance, could say that “both 
totalitarian systems are comparable and terrible”276 without any political consequences. Such 
statements were unthinkable thirty years ago which shows that the exclusionary tendencies of 
political regret in Germany are significantly less pronounced. 
To conclude, in this section I supported my argument about the similarities between 
regretful and traditional myths which goes against the received wisdom that they are diametrically 
opposed to each other. By showing that the different qualities of a narrative (its morality, accuracy, 
exclusionism and politicalness) are independent from each other, I demonstrated that the self-
flagellatory or self-congratulatory tone of a myth does not determine its historical accuracy or its 
exclusionary tendencies. I agree that actual public representations of the past do seem to follow a 
pattern according to which regretful myths are more accurate and less exclusionary than traditional 
myths. Even if this is the case, the simplistic dichotomy between “good” politics of regret and 
“bad” traditional myths has all too often exculpated the former from criticism and has fuelled the 
present antagonism between the advocates of the two types of narrative. I argue that we should 
primarily criticise myths for their inaccuracy and exclusionism, not because of their tone. The 
themes of myths about regret, glory, heroism and victimhood might be liked or not, but what is 
much more problematic and potentially destructive is their possible exclusionary character because 
this is the source of the prevailing antagonistic relationships. The role of critical and sentimental 
education is thus to challenge the possible exclusionary traits of both types of narrative, while 
dialogue is meant to bring the two opposing camps into a more peaceful, agonistic relationship 
with each other. In the following chapters, I examine the nature of this antagonism at the European 
level and I argue for trying to overcome it by the development of a pluralist European mythscape. 
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PART II 
Pluralist European Mythscape 
People are always shouting that they want to create a better future. It’s not 
true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is 
full of life, eager to irritate us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only 
reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. 
Milan Kundera 
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (1979) 
When you were young, you thought of the future, 
it meant all your dreams come true. 
But since then, you’ve been schooled; 
since then, you’ve been fooled. 
And however I sing it, the truth will stay bitter 
‘cause the future was sold to the highest bidder. 
András Upor 
Let the Song Work on You (2015) 
The future ain’t what it used to be. 
Yogi Berra 
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5 
Disciplinary Approaches to the Idea of European Memory 
In this chapter, I present the most prominent academic conceptualisations of European 
memory, demonstrate their shortcomings and conclude that we should think about the idea in a 
different way. In the first section, I critically evaluate the current state of the academic debate about 
the concept of European memory. I distinguish between four mainstream conceptions: the 
Eurosceptic-nationalist, the Europeanist-functionalist, the thick-cultural, and the thin-political. 
The former two camps agree that there is no need for symbolic foundations for the European 
integration project but disagree about the reasons; the latter two groups agree that Europe does 
require symbolic underpinnings but disagree about the form that these should take. Contrary to 
these openly engaged scholarly positions, a fifth approach refrains from making normative 
statements about what European memory should or should not be, and it takes a detached 
observer view with respect to the development of European transnational memory practices. After 
questioning each position in turn, I conclude that the two most prominent previous 
conceptualisations of European memory are characterised by problem-solving thinking and 
teleological assumptions and I argue for a more critical attitude towards the concept. In the second 
section, I explore the different strategies that academics employed to make sense of the European 
memory wars and the role that they played in its development. I differentiate between two 
diametrically opposed views, the “civilising Westerner” and the “Eastern freedom fighter,” and 
demonstrate their inadequacies. Finally, I consider previous scholarly attempts to find a 
compromise between these opposing camps, show why these attempts might not succeed in 
bridging this gap, and suggest a new, pluralist approach that has a better chance of overcoming 
this antagonism. 
Importantly, my objective here is to review and critically reflect on the scholarly 
discussion about the concept of European memory. I am not concerned with the vast literature 
on European identity, the symbolic legitimation of the idea of Europe and the mythical 
underpinnings of the European integration process. As I have explained in the Introduction, I 
focus narrowly on the concept of European memory and I am not interested in every social 
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phenomenon that is remotely connected to the representation of European history. While I 
expressed a preference in Chapter 2 for the term “myth” over “collective memory” to denote the 
public representations of identity-constitutive narratives, this terminology is a minority position in 
the literature. In fact, including phrases like “European myth” in the scope of my analysis would 
not enrich our understanding of the conceptualisations of European memory because the concept 
of myth is used in a variety of different and confusing ways. Probably the worst offender in this 
respect is the practice of using myth and symbol interchangeably, of treating the “mythical and 
symbolic underpinnings of the European integration process”277 together. This conceptual 
confusion plagued the special issue of the leading academic journal in European integration studies 
whose authors tended to identify any type of symbolic underpinning as mythical.278 This is not to 
say that there is or should be one right definition of symbol and myth. However, the works in this 
special issue were highly internally inconsistent as they relied on two different understandings of 
mythology, namely those of Roland Barthes and Duncan Bell (for the difference between the two, 
see Chapter 2). A narrow interest in the concept of European memory is therefore justified. 
Scholarly Approaches to the Idea of European Memory 
The use of the term “European memory” with a transnational connotation became 
noticeable in academia in the early 1990s. The articles of Jacques Le Goff and Gérard Namer 
written in French were among the earliest scholarly discussions that contemplated the possibility 
and the desirability of a European collective memory that can underpin the European integration 
process.279 The beginning of a systematic debate about the concept can be dated to the early 2000s 
when the politics of regret and the commemoration of the Holocaust became more prevalent and 
institutionally organised. 
With respect to the current state of the literature, I follow Bottici and Challand in 
distinguishing between four main scholarly positions with respect to the idea of European 
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memory.280 The Eurosceptic-nationalist camp tends to rely on an instrumentalist conception 
according to which European political elites employ various historical narratives to legitimate 
existing power arrangements, and criticises the “artificiality” of such legitimating stories as 
opposed to the alleged “authenticity” of national memories. Even some who are generally in favour 
of European integration question the need for these narratives by denying that there is a “symbolic 
deficit” problem in the first place. They argue that, unlike nation states, the EU is a purely 
“performance-based” polity; deriving its legitimacy from the necessity and the efficiency of its 
work, it does not require symbolic bases.281 Most Europeanists, however, support the idea of 
European memory but disagree about what it should mean. The majority of Euroenthusiasts have 
a thick, cultural conception of European memory and envisage a common core narrative or a 
reasonably harmonised set of narratives that can be the basis of self-identification with Europe. In 
order to achieve this, they attempt to reconcile differences between conflicting (mostly national) 
memories and understandings of history in Europe.282 Conversely, the thin, political understanding 
of the concept posits that the identity that European memory underpins can only be a purely 
political identity supported by a common political culture. The proponents of this European 
constitutional patriotism call for the Europe-wide harmonisation not of identity-constitutive 
historical narratives, but of the ethical values and social practices with which national communities 
can “come to terms with” and “work through their past.”283 Finally, I would complement the 
typology of Bottici and Challand by drawing attention to a fifth position (or non-position) with 
respect to the idea of European memory, notably the approach that is taken by academics who 
strive not to engage with the normative questions raised by the idea of European memory. They 
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avowedly “abandon all political-normative perspectives”284 and opt for the supposedly detached 
observation of the related political developments. Their aim is to describe and/or explain the 
relevant social processes without making value judgements about their desirability or 
undesirability. 
Bottici and Challand were dissatisfied with all these approaches. They criticised 
Eurosceptics on the grounds that the artificiality-authenticity distinction is untenable. Based on 
the works of Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson,285 they argued that national memories are as 
“invented” or “imagined” as narratives legitimating European integration. Bottici and Challand 
also distanced themselves from those who argued that the EU can and should be solely based on 
output-legitimacy. On the one hand, they questioned the assumption that the EU is highly efficient 
and truly irreplaceable in the attempts to deal with the effects of globalisation that individual nation 
states cannot address; on the other hand, they claimed that as every social action takes place within 
a framework of meaning, a polity without symbolic underpinnings is inconceivable. Furthermore, 
they questioned the practical feasibility of the thick conception of European memory and 
highlighted that symbolic integration is a multi-faceted process of which mythical integration is 
only one possible (and not necessarily the most effective) form. Finally, Bottici and Challand 
rejected the notion that cultural and political identities can be separated in the way that proponents 
of the thick conception believed. 
I agree with Bottici and Challand that the five mainstream scholarly approaches to 
European memory are all unsatisfactory, but I also find their criticism wanting in certain respects. 
In the following, I aim to reinforce and refine their critique. Their rejection of Eurosceptic 
arguments is warranted, but it must be more nuanced and should incorporate more recent 
developments in the field of nationalism studies in order to be convincing. Even though the works 
of Hobsbawm and Anderson were indeed revolutionary within nationalism studies in the 1980s, 
there were significant differences between these two thinkers (most notably, with respect to the 
matter of invention and imagination of national traditions) and they have not convinced everyone 
within nationalism studies about the origin of nations. Modernists and postmodernists, relying on 
Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s seminal works, respectively, view nations as the products of 
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modernity whereas ethno-symbolists, based on Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson,286 believe 
that they are rooted in cultural and ethnic ties that predate modernity. The leading schools agree, 
however, that nationalism as an ideology and national identity are relatively recent phenomena, 
emerging in the late eighteenth century, and that political elites had an important role in 
disseminating and propagating them. The majority opinion in nationalism studies thus suggests 
that European identity-constitutive historical narratives are no more or less artificial than those 
underlying national identities. This observation, however, should not imply that it is natural and 
acceptable for public institutions to promote historical narratives that legitimate them. It only 
means that centrally projected historical narratives are not more artificial and/or problematic at 
the European level than at the level of nation states. 
The criticism that Bottici and Challand mounted against European constitutional 
patriotism, that it posits an unrealistic separation between political and cultural identity, is quite 
weak especially in the light of the fact that they themselves argued for an (albeit mostly analytical) 
separation between political and cultural myths. There are significant problems with the thin 
conception of European memory, but we need a more elaborate critique if we are to learn from 
its failures. In the following paragraphs, I will challenge this position on three fronts: the underlying 
framework of Habermasian communicative action, the resulting idea of European and 
cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism, and Müller’s argument about a series of national politics 
of regret throughout Europe. Without the intention to give a comprehensive critique of 
Habermasian communicative action and constitutional patriotism, I will first outline my theoretical 
objections to these pillars of the thin conception of European memory and then expand on the 
practical issues with them. 
On the level of theory, the two main reasons for which I criticised the idea of 
communicative reason in the previous chapter were its reliance on an idealised speech situation 
where perfectly rational discussion can take place and for its teleological orientation towards 
consensus. On the one hand, this relies on the highly abstract notion of “an ideal-typical moral 
subject disembodied from real social relations,”287 unburdened with material interests and 
emotions. On the other hand, it assumes that rational consensus is always possible. This is a very 
bold claim which is at odds with the observation made in the previous chapter that diametrically 
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opposed views are not necessarily the products of different subjective capacities of rationality, and 
there is no reason to believe that these differences can be dissolved by communicative reason. 
For Habermas, the communicative process is an important source of political identity. 
Constitutional patriotism is supposed to be a post-national or post-conventional identity which 
binds citizens together based on their shared loyalty to the constitution which stands for the rules 
and principles of the deliberative procedure (such as liberal democracy) and the shared universal 
norms and values (such as human rights). Citizens are thus bound together on the basis of a 
common political culture, a constitutional culture that can effectively be universal and specific at 
the same time as it “mediates between universal norms and particular contexts.”288 This type of 
self-identification is supposed to stand in contrast to conventional, national identities which rely 
on pre-political ties such as ethnicity. The objection that such a separation between political and 
cultural identity is unrealistic is a valid concern; the problem is that it solely relies on the criterion 
of feasibility but, as Raymond Geuss argued, opinions about what is realistically possible always 
vary from one historical context to another and from one social agent to another.289 Following 
Margaret Canovan,290 I argue that it is theoretically problematic to separate the pre-political ties of 
birth from the political ties between citizens because it plays down the importance of the familial 
inheritance of citizenship. “To the vast majority of citizens, even the most Habermasian polity is 
‘ours’ because it was our parents’ before us.”291 Canovan took the case of European citizenship 
which she called the reductio ad absurdum of constitutional patriotism. European citizenship is 
currently obtained automatically with the acquisition of citizenship in one of the EU member 
states. For the overwhelming majority, this is obtained by birth and ultimately inherited from the 
parents. If, however, pre-political ties did not matter and European citizenship was supposed to 
indicate allegiance to a (hypothetical) European constitution, Canovan argued that being born into 
a family of European citizens should not imply a “privileged claim on European citizenship.”292 If 
ties of birth and blood were completely irrelevant, the decision about who is entitled to European 
citizenship should be made by means such as competitive examinations between applicants from 
all over the world to determine who is the most cognizant of and the most loyal to the constitution. 
Therefore, the problem with constitutional patriotism is that it presents a false dichotomy. “Either 
we insist on a non-national, patriotic polity to which birthright is irrelevant, or we open the door 
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to a national polity understood in racist terms... The fact is that any polity, however liberal its ethos, 
is and must be an inheritance passed from generation to generation.”293 
Müller based his thin conception of European memory on these two Habermasian ideas 
of communicative action and constitutional patriotism. For him, European memory did not mean 
the Europeanisation of “the contents of different collective memories,” but he envisaged the 
“Europeanisation of moral-political attitudes and practices in dealing with profoundly different 
pasts.”294 Müller thought that each European nation should self-critically work through its own 
past as Germany has done and that all these national Vergangenheitsbewältigungen would inevitably 
lead to “a series of apparently national instantiations of the politics of regret.”295 The relevant 
ethical framework with respect to the public representation of past events that should be adopted 
throughout Europe is thus a duty-based one. Similarly to the separation between political and 
cultural identity, my main concern with a Europe-wide politics of regret is not so much that it is 
practically unfeasible, but that it would be normatively undesirable. I have explained in the previous 
chapter that a narrative’s honesty about its mythical status is much more morally significant than 
its (regretful or boastful) tone; in and of itself, the politics of regret is not taken to be morally 
superior to other types of myth. But let us assume that the Europe-wide instantiations of the 
politics of regret do not make historical truth claims. Even then, the question would remain what 
the point of national deliberative processes is if their outcome is already prescribed to be consensus 
about a regretful narrative. Surely, a decision that was made collectively enjoys more democratic 
legitimacy than one imposed from above. It is nevertheless difficult to understand why the end 
point of deliberation between rational citizens is fixed to be an agreement on a particular type of 
narrative. 
On the practical level, the most common objection raised against Habermas’s call for the 
“development of a European-wide political public sphere”296 is that Europe does not have the 
common language which would be a prerequisite for meaningful transnational debate among equal 
citizens. Habermas thought that, given the political will, every practical problem that stands in the 
way of a European public sphere can in principle tackled. “Even the requirement of a common 
language—English as a second first language—ought not be an insurmountable obstacle with the 
existing level of formal schooling.”297 It is understandable why Habermas promoted English as a 
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“second first language” and not as a second language; if it was only a second language, the 
European public sphere would not be a communication among equals because those whose 
mother tongue is English would have a head start in the debate. I maintain that the idea that 
English, or any other language for that matter, can become a second language for the masses is 
possible, albeit improbable, but it cannot become a “second first language” as Habermas claimed. 
It is perfectly possible to have two first languages, of course, but this requires a lot more than 
“formal education.” For any language to become a second mother tongue, a child needs to receive 
almost as many impulses in this second mother tongue as in his/her first mother tongue from a 
very early age. This is why people who have successfully acquired two first languages either have 
parents whose mother tongues are different from each other and/or were brought up in a linguistic 
environment that was different from the mother tongues of their parents. At the moment, these 
people only amount to a fraction of the European population and it is difficult to see how their 
share can drastically change. 
A potentially much more serious practical concern with the idea of constitutional 
patriotism, however, is that the actual states which are presented as models approximating this 
ideal might be said to do so because of a series of historically contingent events and, in many ways, 
they do not even fulfil the basic criteria of a constitutional patriotic polity. Germany is often cited 
to be a post-national or even anti-national state where attachment to the Basic Law has largely 
replaced conventional identities. Indeed, the idea of constitutional patriotism arose in the very 
particular historical situation of West Germany; the term Verfassungspatriotismus was coined by Dolf 
Sternberger in 1979, on the thirtieth birthday of the Federal Republic, and was later borrowed and 
modified by Habermas. 
Habermas’s apparently abstract and universalizable “constitutional patriotism” is traceable to a very 
specific situation and a particular national history, raising questions about its wider relevance... the post-
war Federal Republic of Germany ... was a truncated state, including only part of the nation, with a set 
of liberal democratic institutions imposed from without and designed to run counter to the political 
traditions predominant in Germany for the previous century. Furthermore, the Nazi past made the 
whole topic of loyalty (patriotic or nationalist) uniquely sensitive.298 
Canovan argued that not only is the German case historically unique, but it is not even a 
very good example of a polity built on constitutional patriotic loyalties. She remarked that “behind 
the handful of constitutional patriots who talked about the nature of their loyalty were a great 
many German nationalists who did not. When the opportunity for unification arrived the political 
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significance of that tacit identity became apparent.”299 Even though the reunification did not take 
place under the aegis of traditional German nationalism, the fact that the vast majority of West 
Germans believed to have a special responsibility towards East Germans but not to the citizens of 
other states showed above all the endurance of pre-political ties in Germany. Canovan also 
demonstrated that in the other two countries cited to be good approximations of constitutional 
patriotism, Switzerland and the US, the pre-political ties of birth and blood remain similarly 
important. 
Given the ambition of Habermas to render a historically unique and contingent political 
cultural arrangement universal, it is easy to understand Jan-Werner Müller’s ambition to “export” 
a unique German experience, the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, to all of Europe. The problem, however, 
is not only this self-avowed ambition to realise “Thomas Mann’s nightmare—a German Europe, 
rather than a European Germany.”300 While Germany might indeed be a model of coming to terms 
with the past, as my brief overview of the history of the commemoration of the Holocaust in the 
previous chapter showed, even there the dominance of the politics of regret is not absolute. There 
is and has been no consensus on how the Holocaust should be remembered. In the last decade, 
one might even say that the relative importance of the politics of regret has decreased in the face 
of the rise of traditional stories of own victimhood. Müller also realised that the (supposed) 
German constitutional patriotism is characterised by a strong emphasis on memory and militancy. 
“Memory here refers primarily to a self-critical remembering of the Holocaust and the Nazi past; 
militancy, on the other hand, has been shown toward the enemies of democracy, mostly through 
judicial means such as banning political parties and restricting free speech.”301 In practice, the 
German public sphere, if it can be said to exist, is thus underpinned by a foundation myth, however 
post-conventional it might be, and a militant attitude towards the transgressors of this myth in 
particular and the radically different in general. Müller recognised that these two elements might 
be said to undermine the avowedly “liberal” and “progressive” nature of the whole constitutional 
patriotic enterprise, but he thought that these are specific to the German case and are not necessary 
conditions for constitutional patriotism. While admitting that there are “important conceptual links 
between the morality of constitutional patriotism, militancy, and memory,”302 Müller argued for 
not putting “too much stress on memory and militancy as aspects of constitutional patriotism, as 
both have an illiberal side.”303 He mentioned, but did not take a clear position with respect to, the 
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most prominent example of this exclusionary memory-militancy logic, the German legislation of 
1985 that made Holocaust denial punishable by imprisonment. The identity-constitutive and 
sacred status of the Holocaust was reaffirmed as the “relevant insult here was not just seen as 
being directed against the immediate victims (and possibly their descendants)—it was also an 
offense to the self-understanding of the German polity.”304 Holocaust denial is indeed a deeply 
troubling phenomenon to which everyone in their right mind should object to; however, 
reaffirming the status of a historical narrative as an unquestionable truth and restricting dissenting 
voices by legal means seem to be actions that are more characteristic of traditional nationalists than 
tolerant citizens with post-conventional identities. 
Finally, Müller’s account is also characterised by a nation-centric thinking that is in 
tension (if not in direct contradiction) with his claim that the “process of mutual opening and 
civilised confrontation of collective memories ... should not unfold simply along national lines.”305 
He spoke about how a “national collective can take responsibility for its past” and about how it 
cannot “argue about other nations’ pasts”306 as if nations were coherent and organic wholes. 
Proponents of the thick conception of European memory similarly tend to succumb to 
the simplicity of nation-centrism when they talk about conflicting national historical experiences 
and the reconciliation of national collective memories as if these were monolithic “things” out 
there. These scholarly works tend to be mostly historical accounts of what a consensual European 
memory could be and how this might be achieved in practice. As such, they are built upon the 
premise that the addition of ever more historical detail will magically solve difficult conceptual 
dilemmas and diametrically opposed interpretations of the past. They pay little attention to the 
host of conceptual and normative issues that the idea of European memory (or that of collective 
memory for that matter) involves and hope to “narrate their way out of” theoretical dilemmas. In 
their search for what Feindt et al. called an inventory of “homogeneous European lieux de 
mémoire,”307 they are also characterised by strong nation-centrism. It must be noted that most 
thinkers do pay lip service to the need to transcend the fixation on national memories. Georges 
Mink, for instance, noted the “stalemate that paradigms that aim to explain national situations end 
up in,”308 but this did not prevent him from talking about the “Eastern European memory”309 
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which is an even more totalising concept than national memory. Or as a critique of the seminal A 
European Memory? noted, despite the declared transnational perspective of the edited volume, 
“transnational here still tends to result in a comparison of national cases.”310 
The fixation on national communities and memories is much more than a mere analytical 
problem. If the search for an inventory of European landscapes of memory only considers the 
dominant myths from each national mythscape, surely the resulting consensual narrative can only 
possibly be an amalgam of these dominant myths and it would necessarily disregard the host of 
subaltern myths that are already in a disadvantaged situation. Therefore, with respect to the thick, 
cultural conception of European memory, my main objection is again not so much that a 
homogenised European memory would be unfeasible, as Bottici and Challand claimed, but that it 
would be highly undesirable because the search for it is bound to reinforce and further naturalise 
already powerful national narratives. 
Even if academic works in this vein did give serious consideration to the subaltern, it 
would still be based on a teleological thinking whose ultimate aim is the reaching of consensus and 
the dissolution of memory differences. In fact, both Europeanist scholarly conceptions of 
European memory are underpinned by this highly “teleological frame geared toward ending 
mnemonic conflicts.”311 On the one hand, thick conceptions of European memory aim to arrive 
at a consensual narrative or set of narratives which all European nations come to share; on the 
other hand, thin conceptions advocate a Habermasian communicative action within national 
frameworks where the outcome is invariably a consensus on regretful narratives. Even if some 
accounts of European memory take conflicts between different interpretations of the past 
seriously, like that of Claus Leggewie and Anne-Katrin Lang,312 these differences are presented as 
something to be overcome by “an increased Europeanization of memory.” However, as Feindt et 
al. noted, this “teleological approach risks denying the inherent polyphony of memory.”313 
Additionally, both conceptions are guilty of the “unreflected instrumentalization of 
European Memory.”314 They both see European memory as a means to strengthen the foundations 
of a European identity, although they differ with respect to the content of this identity. The thick 
conception envisages a shared cultural identity, whereas the thin conception calls for a purely 
political identity based on a common political culture. Whatever the nature of the identity 
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embedded in these conceptions is, by aiming to reinforce the legitimacy of European institutions, 
they both pursue a problem-solving logic. They take the importance of solving the “legitimacy 
problem” of the EU and the “problem of European memory” as given and set out to solve them 
without adequate self-reflection about whether legitimating the EU (or any other political authority 
for that matter) should be their task as academics. Even if there is some consideration given to 
this, it is not addressed convincingly. Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, for instance, explicitly 
sought to avoid repeating the mistake of nineteenth-century historians whose teleological stories 
of national glory effectively rendered the nation-state a social reality; they thought that “in the 
twenty-first century the long-term legitimacy of European unification requires a more critical 
historical understanding—one that acknowledges the conflicts, contentions, complexity and 
ambiguity of Europe’s past and thereby recognizes the fragility of its future.”315 They did not intend 
to replace stories of national glory with stories of regret, “to replace self-satisfaction with self-
flagellation,” but to argue for “a better balance between opposing sides in the outlines of the 
European past.”316 By contrast, Müller argued for the instantiations of the politics of regret within 
nations as he saw “no point in replacing self-congratulatory national histories with what 
paradoxically could be called self-congratulatory, self-critical supranational histories.” He thus 
argued for the replacement of traditional national narratives with regretful national ones while 
condemning “Euro-nation building through negative memory building.”317 Similarly, Konrad 
Jarausch claimed that “scholars must above all avoid ... propagandising for a nation state—even 
on a larger European scale” and then quickly opted for political regret, for “a more self-critical 
view of the past that freely admits a nation’s crimes against their own citizens and also against their 
neighbours.”318 These arguments clearly miss the point. What should be at stake here is not 
whether academics should promote self-congratulatory histories, self-critical histories or a “better 
balance” between the two. The question should be whether scholars should promote narratives 
that legitimate political institutions in the first place (and whether political institutions should 
project self-legitimating stories). The mistake of nineteenth-century nationalist historians was not 
that they propagated stories of national glory instead of stories of regret, but that they supplied 
nation-states with self-legitimating historical narratives. In the previous chapter, I argued that the 
politics of regret is also a form of self-legitimation and often relies on the same exclusionary logic 
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as traditional myths. For this reason, if academics are not to “turn into what Henry Rousso once 
called ‘agitators of memory,’”319 as Müller asserted, they should refrain from naturalising mythical 
representations of the past and from promoting any type of mythistory, be it self-congratulatory 
or self-flagellatory. Academia, however, has been all too ready to give a hand to national and 
European political authorities in the instrumentalization of memory in general (of both the 
regretful and the traditional type), and of European memory in particular. 
Publications on national lieux de mémoire as well as state-sponsored research agendas charged with 
Aufarbeitung of the past emphasize the strength and primordial role of political entities. Such a 
relationship is to some degree duplicated at the European level with scholars investigating the existence 
of European memory, sometimes supported by EU funds.320 
Dissatisfied by teleological frameworks, by the mainstream academic preoccupation with 
an inventory of “homogeneous European lieux de mémoire,”321 and by the “unreflected 
instrumentalization of European Memory,” Feindt et al. called for a different scholarly approach 
to the concept. They advocated a research agenda “concentrating on actors and their strategies 
that contributed to the emergence of European interpretations ... investigating an actor’s struggle 
to establish the dominant interpretation by marking other interpretations as inappropriate, 
illegitimate, or simply wrong.”322 I agree that the focus of scholarly attention should be the actors, 
their interpretations of European memory and the antagonistic relationships between them; 
however, I argue that the goal should not simply be to “concentrate” on and “investigate” these 
dynamics, but to challenge them and, at the same time, to provide a framework within which the 
antagonism could be overcome. I thus argue that we need to think more critically about the idea 
of European memory and to question the taken-for-granted assumptions that have hitherto 
characterised both academic and non-academic approaches to the concept. In the next two 
chapters, I will follow this logic and will critically engage with the conceptions of European 
memory that are prevalent in European institutions. 
Importantly, this does not mean the rejection of transnational European co-operation 
with respect to the public representation of past events. On the contrary, such co-operation is 
sorely needed. I even agree with Müller that the aim of this co-operation should not be a 
Europeanisation of “the contents of different collective memories, but rather a Europeanisation 
of moral-political attitudes and practices in dealing with profoundly different pasts.”323 Where I 
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differ from Müller sharply is what these shared attitudes and practices should be. As opposed to 
Müller who based his argument on Habermasian communicative action, I rely on Bakhtin’s 
concept of dialogue. In the framework that I propose the emphasis is on the process of dialogue, 
not on the teleological end-point of consensus; the focus is on overcoming antagonistic 
relationships, not on providing the foundations for a European constitutional patriotic identity. 
Therefore, the objective of transnational co-operation should not be a European memory or “a 
series of apparently national instantiations of the politics of regret,”324 but the creation of a pluralist 
European mythscape which will be explained in detail in Chapter 8. 
Finally, such a pluralist mythscape would also give a meaningful response to the 
Europeanist-functionalist objections to the idea of European memory. The standard answer given 
by Bottici and Challand is that every political entity needs legitimation in the form of attachment 
from its citizens, but this again only appeals to an argument about feasibility. The idea of a pluralist 
European mythscape makes a much more convincing case for the transnational European co-
operation with respect to the public representation of past events. In this framework, the objective 
of co-operation is not the symbolic legitimation of the EU or the strengthening of European 
identity. Free from these concerns whose importance has been taken for granted for far too long 
in the debate about European memory, the rationale for transnational co-operation towards a 
pluralist mythscape is that it would be an effective way to overcome the antagonistic relationships 
which currently dominate the politics of the past in Europe. 
The Role of Academics in the European Memory Wars 
The most prominent of these antagonisms is the debate known as the European memory 
wars. The memory wars are usually understood to stand for the allegedly different mnemonic 
cultures of Western Europe and the former communist member states, and for the resulting 
clashes on the European level. These clashes generally revolve around the historical interpretation 
and the evaluation of totalitarianisms (particularly Nazism and Stalinism) and their crimes (the 
Holocaust, the Gulag, the “Bloodlands”).325 For this reason, this debate, on the one hand, is an 
extension of the main issues discussed during the Historikerstreit to the European scene. The 
questions about the uniqueness, the comparability and the relativization of the crimes committed 
by totalitarian regimes figure prominently in the European memory wars. On the other hand, these 
abstract issues acquire new meanings once they are discussed in the context of the complex 
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European power dynamics. Many academics have been deeply involved in this debate and in this 
section I will critically explore their strategies and arguments. 
The detailed empirical analysis of how the memory wars unfolded in European 
institutions will be conducted in the next chapter. In order to understand the scholarly debate 
about the issue, it is sufficient to keep the following, necessarily oversimplified, story in mind. By 
the mid-2000s, public interest in the Holocaust has reached unprecedented levels; the 
transnationalisation of its commemoration was enshrined by a decision of the UN General 
Assembly and many believed that it was set to become a foundational, “commonly shared 
European memory.”326 This process did not simply coincide with the Eastern enlargement of the 
EU, but it was an integral part of the negotiations; as Tony Judt famously noted, the mature 
recognition and commemoration of the Holocaust was a sort of “European entry ticket” for the 
aspiring former communist states.327 The reality of this informal “Copenhagen Remembrance 
Criterion”328 is nicely demonstrated by how Slovakia was temporarily excluded from the EU 
enlargement negotiations in 1995 because it had adopted a textbook which could be read as an 
attempt to relativize the Holocaust.329 However, shortly after gaining membership, many of the 
newly elected representatives of the Eastern European member states began to question the 
exclusive attention paid to the Holocaust. These mostly conservative MEPs initially sought the 
Europe-wide recognition and commemoration of the crimes of Stalinism (or even of communist 
regimes in general) and the suffering of Eastern European peoples. As this appeared too self-
interested, they soon changed their rhetoric and began to emphasise the importance of a common 
European view towards all totalitarianisms. They were promptly accused by some other (mostly 
Western European left-wing) MEPs with the falsification of history and the relativization of the 
Holocaust. The ensuing European memory wars have basically been endless variations on this 
theme. 
Many academics agree on what the sources of these clashes might be, but they are highly 
divided with respect to the ethical questions involved. The common starting point on which 
scholarly accounts of the European memory wars usually agree is that the Western and the Eastern 
sides of the continent (meaning the old member states and the former communist member states) 
had markedly different historical experiences of totalitarianism. Western Europe has only 
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experienced right-wing dictatorships, while the East has experienced both right- and left-wing 
totalitarian regimes. Furthermore, whereas the free and democratic nations of the West had 
sufficient time to work through the dark parts of their pasts, or so the argument goes, the peoples 
of the East lived under the spell of historical myths imposed by communist regimes for a long 
time and only had the chance to confront uncomfortable events in their national pasts after the 
Cold War. 
Apart from sharing this simple cover story, scholars are in disagreement over what the 
appropriate course of action is in this situation. The dominant position (at least in English-speaking 
academic circles) is in line with the mainstream duty-based approach and claims that Eastern 
Europe should grow up and should critically work through its past. Instead of taking pride in some 
glorious events of the past and lamenting the wrongs that have been done to them, they should 
follow the example of the West (and more particularly, that of Germany), should acknowledge 
their role in the Holocaust and in other crimes of the Second World War. More generally, they 
should pursue the politics of regret which is more humble and mature than their current myths of 
glory and victimhood. Aline Sierp, for instance, made it clear that what stands in the way of the 
development of a truly pan-European “culture of memory” is the insistence of post-communist 
countries on certain stories that emphasise their own victimhood. She contended that these stories 
resemble the myths that were prevalent after the war in Western European countries, that they are 
the déjà-vu of a phase that the West has already overcome.330 This belief in the linear progress of 
national mnemonic strategies is shared by many other scholars in this “civilising Westerner” 
tradition, such as Aleida Assmann and Heidemarie Uhl.331 Sierp finally supported the Müllerian 
thin conception of European memory whose aim is not to “commit all divergent memories and 
group experiences to one master narrative but to integrate them into a general binding framework 
guided by certain values and principles.”332 By presenting the overcoming of traditional myths as a 
developmental stage that the West has already passed and the East is yet to face, Sierp arguably 
made use of the questionable assumption about linear and unidirectional progress that is common 
to duty-based accounts. A belief in the moral superiority of the politics of regret, and consequently 
in the existence of a moral and historical truth, is also evident in her account. In the previous 
chapter, I have already critically engaged with these assumptions and the resulting dichotomies 
between the mature and the immature, the rational and the irrational, the objective and the 
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emotional, the enlightened and the backward. Similarly to the practice of framing a social group 
which does not conform to a supposed moral imperative in these terms, labelling a country childish 
and uncivilised because it does not follow the example of a more “developed” one is in principle 
unjustified and in practice ineffective. 
When I talked about duty-based accounts of memory in the previous chapter, I presented 
Olick who proposed an ethic of responsibility instead of the ethic of conviction that currently 
dominates moral philosophical discussions; the two approaches share the same goals and 
principles, but they differ on what the most practical means to achieve these are. Similarly, some 
students of the European memory wars agree with the principles of the regretful approach 
discussed above, but think that its aims could be better realised with other, less confrontational 
and more patient, means. While Bottici and Challand upheld that the East has a “moral obligation 
to acknowledge the suffering of others” and should eventually work through the dark side of its 
past, it should have the right to determine the timing of this memory work; the East, and any 
society for that matter, should have the right “to say ‘The Holocaust, or the Holodomor, is not 
the central worry for us now’ and assert its own priority in terms of collective memory.”333 This 
typically ethic-of-responsibility thinking takes into account the historical conditions of possibility: 
the East ought to come to terms with its past, but it does not follow that it can quickly do this 
now. For Bottici and Challand, ought does not imply can. The East should be allowed to take its 
time in coming to terms with its past because pushing this too far now might have adverse 
consequences in the future. This argument still retains the paternalistic mental frame according to 
which the mature West needs to take care of its petulant child from the East; the difference from 
the previous approach is that instead of continuously scolding the child for its immature thinking 
and thus alienating the poor thing in the process, the sensible adult allows some childish behaviour 
for a time. While retaining this mental frame, Bottici and Challand gave another argument for the 
ethic of responsibility. The main reason for giving time to the East is not that a hasty transition to 
the politics of regret would not be practical, but that an externally imposed memory agenda would 
deprive these societies of their full autonomy. Bottici and Challand argued that repeatedly labelling 
Eastern European societies backward whenever they do not conform to Western expectations 
seriously interferes with their being fully autonomous. This is an important observation, but it 
raises the question why the East should only have the autonomy to determine the time when it 
comes to terms with the unsavoury parts of its past, and not whether it wants to confront these 
questions at all. The source of this apparent contradiction seems to be that Bottici and Challand 
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wanted to uphold both the moral imperative of the politics of regret and the autonomy of Eastern 
European societies. 
An academic who broke with the duty-based tradition completely and argued only for 
the right of the East to determine its own memories is Maria Mälksoo (at least in her early writings). 
Mälksoo approached the European memory wars with a postcolonial theoretical framework. She 
argued that the East should be considered a subaltern whose refusal to engage in the politics of 
regret that is practically imposed by the West is a form of resistance; this “resistance to the 
mnemopolitical authority of the West” is an important part in “Eastern Europe’s post-EU 
accession ideological decolonization.” 334 In the light of this, Mälksoo thought that Eastern 
European peoples’ “calls for equal remembrance of their pasts emerge as an essential part of their 
individuation process as European, of their becoming a European subject.”335 What this means is 
that the stories that the East tells itself about its own past in relation to the West are crucial in 
constructing its own Europeanness. For instance, the “Western betrayal” narrative, which 
probably has the strongest support in Poland, states that the Western powers effectively betrayed 
the East immediately before and after the Second World War; in order to prevent confrontation 
with totalitarian regimes (first Nazi Germany, then the Soviet Union), the West made concessions 
to these predatory states and left the East on its own. This story is meant to explain (and to shift 
responsibility to the West for) how the East was derailed from its natural course of historical 
development and was robbed of its rightful place in Europe. “Since victimhood gives the right to 
complain, to protest and make demands, Western Europe is placed in the uncomfortable position 
of owing a debt to Eastern Europe.”336 From this perspective, the accessions to the NATO and to 
the EU are seen as historical justice, as the fulfilment of a debt that the West owed to the East for 
long; it is the return to normalcy, the return of the East to the place where it rightfully belongs, to 
Europe. This completely reverses the mainstream Western view that regards the accession as the 
result of the democratising, liberalising and developing East fulfilling a set of political and 
economic criteria set by the democratic, liberal and developed West. This latter story implies that 
it was the West who was calling the shots and it was the East who had to do its homework. These 
two opposing narratives illustrate nicely why I argued that historical accuracy and rationality are 
not effective standards for the evaluation of myths. In and of themselves, these stories are not 
historically inaccurate or illogical. They nevertheless construct widely different images about, and 
serve different functions for, both the East and the West. While the first narrative reinforces 
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convenient stories about Eastern blamelessness and victimhood and Western debt, the second 
recreates the distinctions between the petulant child and the responsible adult. 
Mälksoo’s argument, that the ideologically colonised East needs to reclaim its right to 
determine its own memories, assumes a very high degree of homogeneity on both sides of the 
continent. First, this monolithic distinction disregards the many differences within each of these 
two idealised blocks. The politics of regret, with which “the West” is supposedly trying to colonise 
the East, looks very different in France than in Germany, for example. In fact, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, Germany is the great exception rather than the norm in that it is the only country 
in which the politics of regret has achieved a very high degree of dominance (but, as I indicated 
earlier, even this is a highly contingent phenomenon). Secondly, this dichotomic thinking 
overlooks the myriad of subaltern myths that challenge the dominant ones in both the East and 
the West. For example, the narrative about suffering under totalitarianisms, which is characteristic 
of the East according to Mälksoo, might be considered a subaltern at the European level; however, 
it is often in a dominant position at the national level, that is, it is prominent in the mythscapes of 
many Eastern European countries. While there is nothing inherently good or bad about a myth 
being dominant (or subaltern), it is important to bear in mind that when Mälksoo claims that 
Eastern European memories of communism are subaltern at the European level, she only 
considers half of the picture. As I argued in Chapter 2, once we extend Bell’s framework to 
transnational and subnational levels, it is perfectly possible for a memory to be in a dominant 
position on one level and in a subaltern position on another. Some Eastern European memories 
can be a case in point. For instance, in Estonia narratives about Russian repression are certainly 
dominating the national mythscape, but this set of myths can be considered a minority view when 
we are talking about the European mythscape as a whole. The problem is that Mälksoo only seems 
to insist on the right of mnemonic communities to define their memories on the European level, 
but not on the national one. If we remain at the case of Estonia, we see that the Russian minority, 
which makes up a quarter of the population, favours myths that are significantly different from 
the majority of Estonians. Should they not have the same right to resist the “mnemopolitical 
authority” of the majority? If their memories are not included on the European scene, how can 
they become “European subjects”? If Mälksoo was consistent with her argument about the 
“ideological decolonization” of the repressed subaltern, she should extend the “right to memory” 
to every level and to every minority group. Furthermore, if any social group had the right to define 
and represent its memories, they should be able to do this at any level, be it subnational, national 
or European. This would mean, in turn, that the monolithic distinction between the East and the 
West would no longer be tenable; instead of only allowing nationally dominant narratives to be 
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part of these regional categories, all the dissenting voices that are dominated by these myths at the 
national level should also be considered to be part of “the Eastern” or “the Western” set of 
memories. To her credit, Mälksoo did briefly consider subaltern memories in the Baltic countries 
when she talked about the Bronze Soldier. Nevertheless, her claim that “everyone should have the 
right to celebrate their victories and commemorate their losses”337 only applied to national 
communities, but not to subnational minorities. 
Mälksoo’s apparent support for Eastern European memories of victimhood is not only 
problematic because she did not consider the “subalterns within the subalterns,” but also because 
the exclusionary nature of, and the partial support for, these victimhood narratives is overlooked. 
While these myths’ right to existence might be unrightfully denied by the majority at the European 
level, they are often similarly repressive in their own national contexts. One can hardly find a better 
example of nationally marginalised dissenting voices in Eastern Europe than the aforementioned 
Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, to assume that victimhood myths are 
completely dominant within every Eastern European country is at best questionable. As it will be 
shown in the next chapter, these narratives are mostly supported by conservative political groups 
while the Eastern European left is usually more likely to advocate a regretful approach to the past. 
Additionally, Mälksoo seems to present these victimhood narratives as if they were the natural 
outcome of suffering under totalitarianisms; this does not only follow the theoretically problematic 
lay trauma theory that I explained in Chapter 2, but it also naturalises contingent and potentially 
harmful social arrangements. Finally, not only do the myths of victimhood themselves reinforce 
the futile “victim Olympics” that I have criticised in the last chapter, but also the competition 
language with which Mälksoo defends them. Deploring how little attention and research have been 
devoted to the dark side of communism, she contended that the “[i]nvestigators of the communist 
crimes have been ‘hopelessly at a disadvantage’ when compared to the investigators of the Nazi 
crimes.”338 This competitive thinking that assumes that the researchers of Nazi and communist 
crimes are somehow competing against each other is exactly what leads to the mindless “number 
wars” and endless uniqueness-comparability debates. In her more recent works, Mälksoo gradually 
distanced herself from some aspects of this initial “Eastern European freedom fighter” position. 
While remaining suspicious about the West expecting the East to adopt a more regretful approach 
to the past, she became more critical with respect to the Eastern European politics of memory, 
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and to the totalising concepts of national memory and national self-determination of memories. 
We will return to these later works in the concluding chapter. 
Finally, having explored the arguments of whom I called the “civilising Westerners” and 
the “Eastern freedom fighters,” we now turn to the third popular strategy that some students of 
the European memory wars follow which consists in trying to work out a compromise between 
the opposing camps. As attempts to reconcile different claims of victimhood on the European 
level are strongly linked to the more general competition-complementarity debate that was 
discussed in the previous chapter, in the following I will only consider the discussion about 
whether and to what extent victimhood narratives compete with each other or reinforce each other 
in the specific case of Europe. Advocates of this compromise approach argue that the European 
memory wars are based upon the false premise that victimhood narratives are inevitably locked in 
a competition against each other for the finite resources of public recognition and attention. 
Inspired by Rothberg’s idea about multidirectionality, Natan Sznaider339 and Dan Stone340 argued 
that the Europe-wide recognition and commemoration of the Holocaust does not necessarily 
crowd out the acknowledgement and the remembering of other suffering. They did not only assert 
that the European remembrance of the crimes of Nazism and communism can co-exist and that 
they do not necessarily exclude each other. The proponents of this multidirectional view also 
believe that the consolidation of the Holocaust memory regime in Europe is potentially a positive 
development for Eastern Europeans calling for the recognition of their own suffering since the 
Holocaust can provide a template, a reference point for their claims. Aleida Assmann also took 
this middle ground when she expressed support for a transnational European memory that 
incorporates both dictatorships based on Bernd Faulenbach’s formula; this states that the memory 
of Stalinism must not relativize that of the Holocaust, on the one hand, and the Holocaust must 
not trivialise the memory of Stalinist crimes, on the other.341 Assmann thought that an integrated 
European memory built upon these principles could overcome the exclusivist rhetoric of the 
European memory wars. Assmann, however, did not really clarify how this formula is supposed 
to function in practice and it is indeed difficult to see how it would magically end the “either-or” 
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mentality that dominates the discussion about the two totalitarianisms. It is also clear that when 
Assmann called for a “dialogic memory,” she actually argued for more attention to regretful 
memories. For her, “monologic” memories are what I called traditional myths, while a “memory 
policy” with a dialogic structure is a mixture between traditional and regretful myths as it “no 
longer evolves exclusively around a heroic self-image but also acknowledges historical violence, 
suffering and trauma within a new framework of moral and historical accountability.”342 
In general, I think that the goal of the compromise-seekers described above, the aim to 
curb the exclusivist and competitive tendencies of the European memory wars, is commendable, 
but the solutions that they propose are not satisfactory. Assmann, Stone and Sznaider all plan to 
overcome antagonism by making the category of the victim more inclusive; they thereby uphold 
the value of the positive recognition of victimhood and the central position of the Holocaust as a 
transnational template. As explained in the previous chapter with regard to the idea of 
multidirectional memory, both of these moves are problematic. The positive recognition of 
victimhood narratives (or of any type of narrative for that matter) inevitably leads to either 
narrative hierarchy or the pursuit of diversity for the sake of diversity, and neither of these 
scenarios is desirable. Making the Holocaust constitutive of the mythscape reinforces its status as 
the primary point of reference and entails its recognition as either uniquely evil or first among 
equals, and neither of these assumptions is likely to satisfy the advocates of other victimhood 
narratives who regard the Holocaust as a rival. In fact, many scholars in this compromise-seeking 
camp talk about the Holocaust as constitutive of European integration, as the “founding narrative 
of European memory culture,”343 in a way that it seems that for them it is almost a fact of social 
life. While a decade ago most academic accounts only speculated whether the Holocaust could 
become a common European memory,344 its commemoration has been recently hailed as “a new 
civilian religion in Europe”345 and as something that “has been agreed upon [to be] the foundation 
myth of Europe.”346 Such generalising statements raise a number of questions. Is it possible to 
agree on the founding myth of a community? Who can do this and under what authority? Is it 
conceivable that a community, especially one as diverse and contested as the European one, has a 
single founding narrative which everyone agrees upon? Should scholars talk about social 
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phenomena as things “out there” and assume that their statements do not influence them? Based 
on the answers I gave to these questions in Part I, I argue that such an uncritical and instrumentalist 
approach to the commemoration of the Holocaust, or of any other historical event for that matter, 
is inappropriate. The role of academics is not to engage in institutionalised myth-making, in “Euro-
nation building through negative memory building,”347 by asking questions about whether the 
Holocaust can or cannot be a memory for Europe, or about whether Europe needs a negative 
creation myth such as the Holocaust or a positive one such as European integration.348 I agree with 
compromise-seekers that it is important to overcome the present antagonism of the European 
memory wars, but the way to do this is not by making one side’s myth constitutive of the 
discussion. 
This leads us to the most problematic part of the compromise-seeking agenda which is 
that no empirical evidence is given to support the basic assumption that memory is not (or not 
necessarily) a competitive zero-sum game. On what basis can one say that victimhood narratives 
always complement rather than substitute each other? How can one be sure that the Holocaust is 
a template rather than a rival in every situation (or that it is the other way around)? As I explained 
in Chapter 4, it is impossible to show that calls for solidarity with past victims crowd each other 
out or provide a template for each other in a particular situation. Instead of arguing over such 
essentially unresolvable differences, I propose a conception of European memory (or, more 
precisely, of a European mythscape) that is built on the pluralist approach to myth developed in 
Part I. This a way to overcome antagonism that avoids the problems associated with positive 
recognition, template narratives and the assumption about complementarity. Before explaining in 
detail what this entails in the concluding chapter, I critically examine the conceptions of European 
memory that are prevalent outside academia in order to see what problems they encounter and 
what we can learn from them. 
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6 
Historical Trajectories of the Idea of European Memory 
Our categories of thought do not exist in a vacuum; they are intimately tied to the socio-
political environment in which they perform. The attempt to make sense of the idea of European 
memory should thus begin with historicising the concept, with investigating the historical context 
within which it has emerged and has become prominent. The following genealogical account of 
the concept sets the stage for the next chapter where the different understandings of the idea are 
explored and critically assessed in detail. This chapter identifies when and where the idea of 
European memory has been invoked and outlines these historical contexts; primarily, it shows 
how the concept became central in the European memory wars. What the concept actually meant 
in different occasions and for different social actors will be examined in the following chapter. 
The idea of European memory is relatively recent; it has only been systematically used 
since the mid-2000s even though there had been some isolated occurrences in the 1990s. Other 
concepts to which the term “European memory” is often understood to refer are naturally older 
and more established. For instance, the idea of European history, the idea to “treat the history of 
Europe as an aggregate of the histories of the different countries,”349 rose to prominence in the 
1620s. Discussions about European identity became ubiquitous after the Copenhagen Declaration 
on European Identity in 1973. Historical references abounded in the earliest treaties and speeches 
of the European integration process. The concept of European memory itself, however, has only 
been widely used in the last decade. In the following, I will first examine textual references that 
can be seen as preludes to the idea of European memory and then turn to the emergence and the 
popularisation of the concept itself. 
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Preludes to the Idea of European Memory 
The most basic precedents of the concept of European memory can be considered to be 
the references to historical events and to their impact on present political arrangements that are 
made within European institutions. As Aline Sierp showed,350 references to the Second World War 
and to its devastating effects were integral to the early days of European integration and were 
employed to argue for the need for co-operation between states. The “Europe out of war” 
narrative usually evokes the horrors of the war, claims that peace can only be safeguarded by 
creative means and concludes that innovative cross-border co-operation is necessary. This line of 
reasoning was pursued in Robert Schumann’s famous speech in 1950 and in the opening sentence 
of the preamble to the Treaty of Paris which established the European Coal and Steel Community 
(signed in 1951).351 However, Sierp demonstrated that after these initial occurrences, the number 
and the importance of historical references to the war decreased sharply. In the Treaty of Rome 
(signed in 1957), the intention to safeguard peace is only mentioned as one of the numerous aims 
of the newly formed European Economic Community.352 In the 1960s and 1970s, the “Europe 
out of war” argument disappeared almost completely from treaties, Commission documents and 
speeches. 
The period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s is known by some as the “‘lost decade’ 
of European integration,”353 as the time when integration virtually came to a halt; although the 
scope of European integration was broadened by the Mediterranean enlargements, its depth largely 
stagnated. After this period, the number and the importance of historical references made at the 
European level increased exponentially. 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second 
World War, can be regarded in many ways as a starting point of this process as the European 
Parliament passed two resolutions commemorating the end of the war and its atrocities.354 It was 
also the year when Jacques Delors became the president of the European Commission and set in 
motion a series of events that revived the integration process. Sierp mentioned many historical 
references in the documents of European institutions and the speeches of European officials after 
this date. The number of references erupted in the early 1990s, when it became possible to think 
outside the frozen dichotomy of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that 
proponents of European integration lost their main Other, the main geopolitical force against 
                                                          
350 Sierp, History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity. 
351 “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” April 18, 1951. 
352 “Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,” March 25, 1957. 
353 Bottici and Challand, Imagining Europe, 117. 
354 European Parliament, “Resolution Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Cessation of Hostilities,” February 
14, 1985; European Parliament, “Resolution on the Commemoration of 8 May 1945,” February 14, 1985. 
 143 
which they defined themselves. This sudden and unexpected event might explain why they turned 
to other, older legitimating stories such as the “Europe out of war” narrative in this period. 
There is, however, an important difference between the references to the Second World 
War made in the early 1950s and in the early 1990s. On the one hand, the first references treated 
the war as a deplorable, devastating event but refrained from mentioning specific events and from 
assigning levels of moral responsibility to specific actors. The reason for this might be that just a 
few years after the war a narrative could only seek consensus among the victors and the vanquished 
if it glossed over the issue of agency, and if it framed the war as a quasi-external shock as a result 
of which everyone in Europe suffered greatly. On the other hand, the narratives of the early 1990s 
had a much more moralising tone and speeches made at the European level constantly made 
references to one particularly (some would say uniquely) terrible aspect of the war, the Holocaust. 
These historical accounts subscribed to a minimalist understanding of the Holocaust, identifying 
the victims (the European Jews) and the perpetrators (the authorities of Nazi Germany) very 
clearly and restrictively, and claimed that the European edifice is the guarantee that this will “never 
again” happen. The two resolutions of the European Parliament passed in 1993 and in 1995 
indicate the increasing attention paid to the matter.355 This interest in the Holocaust at the 
European level is not surprising in the light of the national debates that already took place in the 
1980s (as explained in Chapter 4). 
The “never again” claim was undermined by the inability of Europe to intervene and to 
stop ethnic cleansing in its own “backyard” during the Bosnia crisis in 1995. This humiliating 
experience, Müller claimed,356 bolstered those calling for stronger normative foundations for the 
EU. The result of this, the increasing emphasis on human rights, was intimately connected to the 
increasing attention paid to the Holocaust, similarly to other parts of the world. In the late 1990s, 
national days of the commemoration of the Holocaust became more and more common in Europe 
and throughout the world (the most prominent advocates being Sweden and the UK). The 
Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust of 2000 was a landmark event in the process 
that gave a transnational standing to the commemoration of the Holocaust. Leading politicians 
and researchers from forty-six states participated in the conference and adopted a declaration 
expressing a commitment for education, research and commemoration related to the Holocaust. 
Among others, the signatories committed themselves to the inauguration of national annual 
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Holocaust remembrance days (without specifying the exact date). A year later, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation that linked the commemoration 
of the Holocaust to the teaching of history.357 The Stockholm Declaration was already a more 
global event than a distinctly European one, and five years later, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
liberation of Auschwitz, the commemoration of the Holocaust became truly international. Ten 
years after the Resolution on a Day to Commemorate the Holocaust of 1995, the EP once more 
encouraged the adoption of a European Holocaust Memorial Day and also specified the date this 
time as 27 January, the date of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp.358 This 
initiative, however, largely became redundant when the General Assembly of the UN made this 
day an international remembrance day in the same year.359 In the end, this day only became an 
official European Parliament event. 
The year of 2005 was not only remarkable with respect to the transnationalisation of the 
commemoration of the Holocaust. A number of political initiatives emerged which can be 
considered the precursors of the idea of European memory in certain respects. Most importantly, 
the draft of the ambitious Constitutional Treaty (signed in 2004) made a reference to “the cultural, 
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”360 which was in sharp contrast to the generally 
forward-looking texts of previous treaties. The European Constitution was ultimately rejected after 
the decisive “No” of the French and Dutch referenda, but the heated debate about the wording 
of the preamble that had preceded the signature of the treaty had a great impact on later discussions 
about Europe’s past and narratives of self-identification. Specifically, at the centre of the 
controversy was the question whether references to Christianity should be made when talking 
about Europe’s “inheritance.” The narrative of “‘Christian Europe’ ... points to the historical 
experience of the Christian Roman Empire as the first experiment of European unification, to the 
contribution of the Christian intellectuals traveling from one university to another as the first 
examples of European travelers, and to the feeling of sameness generated by the idea of being part 
of ‘Christendom’.”361 This position was most powerfully advanced by Joseph Weiler who thought 
that by not incorporating a reference to Christianity in the preamble, Europe missed an important 
opportunity to overcome its “Christophobia.”362 The most common objection to the “Christian 
Europe” narrative is that while the notion of Christianitas includes many people who do not live 
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in geographical Europe (even if understood in the broadest sense), it excludes many who do live 
in geographical Europe (even if understood in the narrowest sense). Bottici and Challand identified 
two other core narratives, those of “Classical Europe” and “Enlightened Europe,” whose 
“alliance” won the debate about the preamble of the Constitution. The former traces the roots of 
European culture back to the ancient Greek and Roman civilisations. Classical Greece, in 
particular, is viewed as the “cradle of European civilisation” and the “birthplace of philosophy.” 
The “Enlightened Europe” narrative, on the other hand, regards Europe as the birthplace of 
modernity, rationality and the scientific approach. By drawing “inspiration from the cultural, 
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the 
rule of law,”363 the preamble of the European Constitution joined the classical and enlightened 
narratives together in a subtle way. The Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007), which successfully entered 
into force in 2009, preserved exactly the same passage in its preamble. 
Another initiative in 2005 which did not gather sufficient political support in the end was 
a Europe-wide ban on the display of totalitarian symbols that was discussed and finally dropped 
in the EP. The significance of this event comes from the fact that it was the first major clash in 
what would later be known as the “East-West memory divide.” The original proposal aimed to 
ban the swastika in order to combat anti-Semitism and racism in Europe. However, this quickly 
ran into the opposition of a group of mostly conservative Eastern European MEPs364 who insisted 
that if the display of the swastika was to be banned, the use of the red star and the hammer and 
sickle should also be prohibited. Their reasoning was that banning the symbols of Nazism but not 
those of communism would lead to unjustifiable double standards. This was the first instance that 
the hegemony and the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust was questioned on the European level, 
arguably as a result of the changing composition of the EP after the Eastern enlargement of 2004. 
The debate about whether the two totalitarian systems are comparable, equally criminal or should 
be treated separately has overshadowed discussions of European memory ever since. 
Other less ambitious initiatives, however, succeeded in the same year. The EP did manage 
to adopt resolutions on the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Solidarity, and on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe.365 
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Crucially, the latter contained the first ever mention of the term “European memory” in the official 
documents of European institutions. This does not mean, however, that it instantly became a core 
concept of European initiatives related to the public representation of past events. In the following 
years, the EP adopted a number of resolutions on various historical matters without invoking the 
idea of European memory.366 In the last decade, the idea of European memory has risen to 
prominence through a slow process that is intimately intertwined with the European memory wars. 
The Emergence of the Idea of European Memory 
Bearing in mind that it is always an oversimplification to associate slowly changing socio-
political processes to particular moments in history, it is nevertheless a relatively uncontroversial 
claim that the year 2005 played a pivotal role in the development of the concept of European 
memory. Although it is true that many of the processes were well underway by this date, some 
genuinely new elements are clearly attributable to the mid-2000s. The commemoration of the 
Holocaust had gradually become more and more transnational since the early 1990s, but the 
decision of the General Assembly meant its complete internationalisation. By this time, the 
positively ancient, agent-free “Europe out of war” narrative had been completely replaced by that 
of the Holocaust and many began to think about it as the “founding myth” of Europe.367 
It was also in 2005 that this exclusive emphasis on the Holocaust created tensions and 
led to open confrontation within European institutions for the first time. Admittedly, the debate 
about the uniqueness, comparability and relativization of the Holocaust was definitely not new; as 
explained in Chapter 4, it was the central topic of the German Historikerstreit of the 1980s. It even 
appeared on the European level in the 1990s, albeit in a very limited way; Sierp noted that at the 
time when the EP debated the Resolution on a Day to Commemorate the Holocaust in 1995, a 
representative already expressed hope that the victims of communism would also be 
commemorated in the future.368 However, such isolated occurrences, of which there might well be 
many, do not change the larger patterns according to which debates unfolded over time. I maintain 
that the question about the uniqueness and the comparability of the Holocaust, and the 
commemoration of the victims of communism did not become visible, central issues in European 
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institutions until the mid-2000s, until after the Eastern enlargement. Markus Josef Prutsch also 
agreed that it was in 2005 that “the torment and anguish endured by Eastern European peoples 
under Communist rule powerfully entered the EU’s agenda.”369 
An important prelude to the debate about banning totalitarian symbols was a speech 
given in Leipzig by Sandra Kalniete who was expected to become the Latvian member of the 
European Commission. In March 2004, she caused public outcry in Germany when she declared 
Nazism and communism “equally criminal” and called for the equal treatment of the victims of 
both totalitarian regimes. The German press subsequently accused Kalniete of making an 
“illegitimate comparison,” of “downgrading the Holocaust” and even of “anti-Semitism.”370 The 
initiatives on banning Nazi and communist symbols decisively elevated this debate to the level of 
European institutions in the next year. The catalyst for the original proposal against the swastika 
was the public scandal that followed the publication of photos about Prince Harry, an heir to the 
throne of the UK, dressed as a Nazi German officer in January 2005. However, after it became 
clear that no consensus could be reached about the totalitarian symbols to be banned, the plan was 
dropped altogether in February 2005.371 
The controversial issue nevertheless remained and communist atrocities received more 
and more attention at the European level in the following years. The first official EU document 
invoking the idea of European memory,372 the resolution on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of 
the Second World War in Europe adopted in May 2005, already offered a recognition of the crimes 
of communism, albeit a limited and ambiguous one. The resolution depicted the war as primarily 
a struggle against Nazism which ignored that the principal enemy of several countries which did 
not have fascist political systems before the war (for instance, Finland) was the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, recognising the “tyranny inflicted” by the Soviet Union after the war left the story of 
wartime Soviet aggression and repression untold. The resolution even paid a “special tribute” to 
the Soviet Union, among others, for its fight against Nazism, while nothing was said about the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Notably, the EP did acknowledge “the magnitude of the suffering, 
injustice and long-term social, political and economic degradation endured by the captive nations 
located on the eastern side of what was to become the Iron Curtain” and confirmed “its united 
stand against all totalitarian rule of whatever ideological persuasion.” This wording carefully 
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avoided the issue of comparing different totalitarian systems and of establishing a hierarchy among 
them. It must be noted, however, that the EP did not specify which political systems it considered 
totalitarian and thus left obscure what exactly it unitedly stood against. The resolution did mention 
the “communist dictatorship,” the “tyranny inflicted by the Stalinist Soviet Union,” the “Nazi 
tyranny,” but at no point did it associate either of these with totalitarianism. Such deliberate 
vagueness is characteristic of this EP resolution which is clearly a carefully worded political 
compromise on a very sensitive topic. Even so, it managed to anger some (mostly Western 
European left-wing) MEPs who saw it as an attempt to discredit communism by equating it with 
Nazism. They criticised the proposal in the parliamentary debate that preceded its acceptance on 
the grounds that it disregarded the role that the communist resistance in Europe and the 
communist Soviet Union played in the defeat of Nazism. 
Despite considerable opposition by these MEPs, the subsequent resolution on the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity, accepted in September 2005, made a clearer statement with 
respect to the atrocities committed by communist regimes. More precisely, it praised actions 
against one particular communist system at a particular point in time (against the Polish authorities 
in 1980) and labelled this political system “totalitarian” three times in the text. Therefore, the 
resolution is far from calling all communist systems totalitarian and from condemning the crimes 
committed by all of them (as did the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe a few 
months later). Nevertheless, its acceptance is a small victory for what I call the “anti-communist 
group” (this refers to the loosely connected group of politicians and intellectuals who operate at 
the European level and argue for acknowledging more widely and for paying more attention to the 
crimes of communism in diverse fora, most importantly, in educational, cultural and research 
projects). The resolution did go further than the special case of Poland in 1980 by recognising the 
effort of “all people of central and eastern Europe who fought for human rights, freedom, 
solidarity and the unity of Europe.” The decision even intended to “place it in the collective 
memory of Europe” by urging the commemoration of this effort on 31 August, “the Day of 
Freedom and Solidarity.” There is a clear parallel between this resolution and that on the 
commemoration of the Holocaust adopted eight months earlier. An Eastern European narrative 
was offered a “place” in European memory and in the European calendar, next to the already 
established Holocaust narrative and the redundant European Holocaust Memorial Day. This place, 
however, was substantially different from that reserved for the victims of the Holocaust. The 
resolution on Solidarity did not portray Eastern Europeans as victims of grave crimes (words that 
were completely absent from the text), but as peaceful freedom fighters (terms that dominated the 
text). However appealing this image may be for some people, it did not satisfy those who called 
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for the recognition of communist crimes along with those of Nazism and who felt that Eastern 
Europeans were treated as “second-class victims.” The resolution on Solidarity thus failed to 
resolve the “East-West memory divide” which has dominated the “European memory agenda” 
ever since. 
It is worth noting that, in the resolutions of 2005 on the end of the Second World War 
and on Solidarity, the first two mentions of the term “European memory” and the first two 
(limited) recognitions of communist crimes in the official documents of European institutions 
were intimately connected. This is the opening of the European memory wars and I thus consider 
2005 to be a symbolic turning point in public discussions about Europe’s past. In the first half of 
the decade, debates were dominated by the Classical, Christian and Enlightened Europe 
perspectives while a (Western European) consensus was slowly being formed around the 
importance of the Holocaust. After the failure of the European Constitution, attention decisively 
shifted from the “European inheritance” narratives to more recent history, namely to the old 
“Europe out of war” narrative with the Holocaust in its centre. However, just when the Holocaust 
had achieved a certain degree of hegemony and was boldly proclaimed to be on its way to become 
“the foundational event for a European collective memory,”373 it came to be challenged by a 
(mostly Eastern European conservative) group who believed that their victimhood myth was 
equally worthy of recognition. This happened in 2005 for at least two reasons. First, the size and 
the composition of the EP changed drastically after the elections of June 2004 and the effect of 
the work of Eastern European MEPs could be seen in the following year. Secondly, this was a year 
of important anniversaries ending in zero and five which usually serve as good grounds for political 
action. While 2005 was the starting point of a crucial European debate, it must not be forgotten 
that it was also the beginning of rapprochement in some respects. The European Network 
Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS) was created by the governments of Germany, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia whose purpose is to support research and education in twentieth-century 
European history. This was significant in the light of the numerous clashes between the dominant 
myths in Germany and Poland on the one hand, and Hungary and Slovakia on the other. Since 
then, the ENRS has become an important forum in negotiating the “European culture of 
remembrance.” 
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The Rise of the Idea of European Memory 
The East-West memory debate continued after the tumultuous 2005 with the anti-
communist group claiming some important victories. In January 2006, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted the landmark Resolution 1481 on the Need for 
International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes which was in many 
respects stronger than those of the European Parliament a year earlier.374 It did specify sufficiently 
clearly some political systems (“the totalitarian communist regimes which ruled in central and 
eastern Europe in the last century, and which are still in power in several countries in the world”) 
and it did explicitly condemn them. Göran Lindblad, member of the Swedish Parliament, served 
as the rapporteur of the resolution and remained active in the later “memory debates” on the 
European level. This resolution was a strong blanket condemnation of all totalitarian communist 
regimes (even present ones) but it did not denounce communist parties or communist ideology as 
such. It even recognised that “some European communist parties have made contributions to 
achieving democracy.” The adoption of the text nevertheless outraged many communist parties, 
most notably in France. The most controversial part of the resolution was the comparability that 
it implied between the crimes of Nazism and those of totalitarian communist regimes; it 
emphasised that the perpetrators of the former had been brought to trial, while those of the latter 
had not. It is important to note that the resolution is not legally binding and, mainly due to the 
opposition of communist and Russian representatives, it was adopted by the Assembly but failed 
to achieve a two-thirds majority. 
Also in 2006, the commemoration of the victims of Stalinism became one of the goals of 
the Europe for Citizens programme, an initiative of the European Commission with the aim to 
promote European citizenship. In December, a joint decision of the European Parliament and the 
Council set the objectives for this programme for the period 2007-2013, and the “action” called 
“Active European Remembrance” envisaged funding for projects commemorating the victims of 
Stalinism as well as those of Nazism.375 Similarly to previous initiatives in this vein, giving a “place” 
to the commemoration of the victims of Stalinism in “European remembrance” next to those of 
Nazism did not mean that they were treated equally. In the decision, the European Parliament and 
the Council were much more specific about the type of commemoration they envisaged for the 
victims of Nazism than for those of Stalinism and this was reflected in the number of projects 
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funded. According to the official selection results, out of the thirty-six projects selected in 2007 
for “Action 4 Active European Remembrance,” thirty-four (almost all of them) dealt with Nazism 
while only nine included Stalinism in its theme.376 
Additionally, a closer look at the historical background of how agreement was reached 
about the first edition of the Europe for Citizens programme illustrates nicely the early 
development of the memory wars and supports the previous observation about the dramatic 
impact of the Eastern enlargement. Since the aforementioned EP resolution of 1993,377 each year 
the EU has contributed to the preservation of concentration camps with a part of its general budget 
(under Heading A-3035). In April 2004, the Parliament and the Council adopted a “Community 
Action Programme to Promote Bodies Active at European Level in the Field of Culture” which, 
among many other things, reinforced this commitment and it was not a matter of debate during 
the long codecision procedure.378 In July 2004, the Commission put forward a “Proposal for a 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Culture 2007 
Programme (2007-2013)”;379 the Culture programme was a programme that ran parallel to the 
Europe for Citizens programme and was also managed by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency. The original proposal referred to the Community Action Programme adopted 
earlier that year and reiterated that the “European and international protection of Nazi 
concentration camp sites as historic monuments” is “worthwhile pursuing.” Interestingly, the 
opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the proposal, published in February 2005, included 
some suggestions which can be considered quite radical at that time.380 It did not only propose that 
the “programme should also be open to projects associated with deportations, concentration camp 
sites and commemoration of victims who suffered under the Soviet totalitarian regime,” but also 
that the “Soviet regime was a totalitarian one ... not less harmful than the Nazi totalitarian regime.” 
The opinion of the Committee stopped short of calling both regimes “equally criminal” when it 
stated that the “former concentration camp sites within the system of the Soviet totalitarian regime 
are understood as forced-labour camps and are referred equal to the ones existed in the Nazi 
regime.” Not surprisingly, this radical comparison was not retained in the subsequent stages of the 
codecision procedure where the Committee of the Regions carries relatively little weight anyway; 
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what is surprising, however, is that the original reference to the “European and international 
protection of Nazi concentration camp sites” was also edited out of the final text.381 Deliberation 
on the Europe for Citizens programme started shortly after the opinion of the Committee of the 
Regions in April 2005. The Active European Remembrance theme was completely missing from 
the original proposal of the Commission;382 it was only added by the EP’s Committee on Culture 
and Education before its proposal’s first reading in the Parliament.383 It is also worth noting that 
the Committee first voted down the inclusion of a theme that focuses on Nazism and communism. 
Finally, a resolution was passed by the European Parliament in October 2006 on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. This could be interpreted as another attempt to 
“appease” the anti-communist group were it not for the fact that it repeated the double game 
played by the resolution on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. 
The EP called “on all democratic countries to clearly condemn the crimes committed by all 
totalitarian regimes” but refrained from labelling the Hungarian communist regime of 1956 
totalitarian, preferring the less controversial titles “undemocratic” and “dictatorial.” 
The PACE resolution, the ECP and the EP resolution explained above are three 
important moments in the unfolding of the “East-West memory debate,” but the idea of European 
memory was not invoked in any of these. The concept only became more central to these debates 
in the following years. Most importantly, a group of politicians, government officials and other 
intellectuals called for the establishment of an Institute of European Memory and Conscience in a 
document known as the Prague Declaration. Signed in June 2008, the declaration claimed that, 
similarly to Nazi atrocities, the crimes committed by communist regimes should be recognised, 
commemorated and taught throughout Europe. While the text did not go as far as saying that the 
two totalitarianisms are “equally criminal,” it stated that “there are substantial similarities between 
Nazism and Communism in terms of their horrific and appalling character and their crimes against 
humanity.”384 Furthermore, the declaration did treat the two “evils” as equal in the sense that 
“consciousness of the crimes against humanity committed by the Communist regimes throughout 
the continent must inform all European minds to the same extent as the Nazi regimes [sic] crimes 
did.” These arguments about comparability and equality are of course nothing revolutionary; what 
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is new in the Prague Declaration, however, is that this cause manifested itself as a pan-European 
effort of leading public figures and that the anti-communist group decisively connected the 
concept of European memory to their agenda. Arguing that “Europe will not be united unless it 
is able to reunite its history, recognize Communism and Nazism as a common legacy,”385 the 
declaration was a clear message to those who had previously argued that the Holocaust was or 
should be the founding memory for Europe. The main point of the signatories was that there could 
and should be a united European memory, but this is only possible if equal weight is given to both 
Nazism and communism. Following this logic, the declaration went as far as calling for “a day of 
remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, in the same way 
Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust on January 27th”; the day of commemoration was 
proposed to be the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 
which was supposed to represent well the aggressive nature of both totalitarian regimes. By 
explicitly demanding that the victims of Nazism and communism be remembered “in the same 
way” as those of the Holocaust, the proposal of the day of commemoration was the most overt 
bid of the anti-communist group for a “place in the sun” of European memory. Furthermore, the 
Prague Declaration was a stronger blanket condemnation of communism than any of the 
previously mentioned texts. Its scope was far larger than merely Stalinism (with which the Europe 
for Citizens programme was concerned at that time) and it even went further than condemning 
only those communist systems and parties that were totalitarian (which was what the resolution of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe did). The Prague Declaration put forward 
the bold, and highly contestable, claim that communist ideology itself is “directly responsible for 
crimes against humanity.”386 
Naturally, the loosely connected group of public figures behind the Prague Declaration 
could make radical and highly controversial statements because the text was not a product of 
political compromise achieved in some European institution. The lack of formal institutional 
backing also meant that, as strong as the language of the declaration was, it did not carry too much 
weight. Surprisingly, however, many of the claims put forward in the declaration were accepted by 
the EP in the following year. The proclamation of 23 August as a European Day of Remembrance 
for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism quickly gathered support. A written declaration in this vein 
was signed by the majority of MEPs in September 2008, a few months after the signature of the 
Prague Declaration (note that such declarations cannot be considered binding for the EP).387 Half 
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a year later, the EP adopted the Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism (RECT) 
in April 2009 which incorporated even more of the demands of the Prague Declaration.388 It agreed 
with the signatories of the latter in that “Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a 
common view of its history, recognises Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes as 
a common legacy.” The resolution of 2009 also supported the two most tangible goals of the 
Prague Declaration. It proclaimed 23 August a “Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the 
Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes” and called for the establishment of a 
Platform of European Memory and Conscience. It must nevertheless be noted that the resolution 
aimed to avoid the most controversial parts of the Prague Declaration. Apart from grouping both 
Nazism and communism under the broad term “totalitarianisms,” it refrained from making any 
comparison between the two. It did not advocate the commemoration of 23 August “in the same 
way Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust” and drawing parallels was avoided even in 
the naming of the day of commemoration: the originally proposed “European Day of 
Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism” was changed to the broader (and more vague) 
“Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes.”389 Most importantly, the resolution emphasised that “the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
must nevertheless be acknowledged,” thus attempting to take a clear stance in the seemingly never 
ending uniqueness-comparability debate. Despite these careful measures, most of those who spoke 
against the resolution in the EP debate (and thereafter) claimed that the text “equates” the two 
regimes, “normalises” (or at least, “dilutes the uniqueness” of) Nazi crimes and/or “criminalises” 
communist ideology. 
A few months later, many of the suggestions of the EP resolution were also endorsed by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
in July 2009. It condemned “totalitarian rule from whatever ideological background,” emphasised 
that “European countries experienced two major totalitarian regimes, Nazi and Stalinist,” and 
expressed support for a “Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and 
Nazism.”390 The OSCE resolution caused a controversy in which the arguments were similar to 
those in the debate that took place in the EP. The most significant difference was the response 
from Russia. The quasi-nostalgic attitude towards the Soviet past promoted by the Russian 
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government, increasingly strongly since Putin’s ascension to power, is in direct conflict with calls 
for the commemoration of the crimes attributed to Stalinism, to other totalitarian communist 
regimes or to communist ideology in general. The difference between the reception of the two 
resolutions mentioned above is that while Russian officials vehemently criticised the EP resolution 
as “outsiders,” Russian delegates in the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE could oppose that 
text “from the inside.” Similarly to the resolution adopted by the PACE, the OSCE resolution was 
not legally binding. In the following year, the EP also proclaimed the founding of a “collective 
European memory” as one of the main objectives of Europeana, the European digital library.391 
As we have seen before in the case of earlier transnational European memory initiatives, 
“round” anniversaries usually provide a good pretext for pushing forward commemorative events 
and resolutions. The important resolutions of 2009 (and the preparatory events leading up to them) 
can be explained in this vein, as catalysed by the 70th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. 
However, the changing composition of the EP and the “round” anniversary of such a pivotal 
historical moment should only be seen as factors providing the structural possibilities which 
allowed the transnational comparisons between totalitarianisms (and the subsequent European 
memory wars) to emerge. If we are to pay sufficient attention to agency in this matter, it is 
important to consider the actual actors who pushed for and opposed such political developments. 
The Actors in the Debate about the Idea of European Memory 
If we look at the relevant historical processes from this angle, it does make sense to talk 
about a (pan-European) anti-communist group. The reason is that not only the arguments of pan-
European efforts to recognise Nazism and communism as comparably or equally evil are similar, 
but the people sponsoring them form a rather clearly identifiable group. Immediately after the first 
two signatories the Prague Declaration (Václav Havel, former President of Czechoslovakia and 
the Czech Republic, and Joachim Gauck, former Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records and 
now President of Germany), one can find Göran Lindblad, rapporteur of the PACE resolution of 
2006. Until 2010, Lindblad was a Swedish MP for the right-wing Moderate Party and was also a 
member, and later vice-president, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In 
2011, he became the director of the newly-formed Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 
a project which the EP resolution of 2009 called for but did not actively pursue. Also among the 
first founding signatures are two of those Eastern European conservative MEPs, Vytautas 
Landsbergis (EPP, Lithuania) and Tunne Kelam (EPP, Estonia), who were the most vocal 
advocates of extending the proposed Europe-wide ban on totalitarian symbols of 2005 to 
                                                          
391 European Parliament, “Resolution on ‘Europeana—The Next Steps,’” May 5, 2010. 
 156 
communist insignia. In addition to them, a small group of (almost exclusively Eastern European 
conservative) MEPs were closely involved in the two events that catalysed the signature of the 
Prague Declaration and also signed it subsequently. In January 2008, Kelam and Landsbergis 
organised an EP conference and proposed the establishment of a working group on “United 
Europe–United History” along with three other Eastern European conservative MEPs, Girts 
Valdis Kristovskis (UEN, Latvia), Wojciech Roszkowski (UEN, Poland) and György Schöpflin 
(EPP, Hungary). The draft resolution was worded in a relatively vague and neutral way, and 
emphasised the importance of “truth, justice and reconciliation” without actually specifying the 
historical events whose differing interpretations it proposed to reconcile. The draft resolution was 
soon signed by around fifty MEPs and finally led to the foundation of the Reconciliation of 
European Histories Group. The other preparatory event for the Prague Process occurred a few 
months later. In April 2008, the European Public Hearing on Crimes Committed by Totalitarian 
Regimes was organised by the European Commission and the (conservative) Slovenian 
government which held the presidency of the Council at that time. The report that it produced 
made no mention of the idea of European memory, but it treated the crimes committed by Nazism 
and Stalinism, along with many other regimes such as Italian Fascism or Titoism, on the same 
page.392 Together with the fact that the overwhelming majority of the participants consisted of 
right-wing politicians and intellectuals from the new member states, the hearing was an important 
milestone of the activism of Eastern European conservative politicians in the matter. The MEPs 
participating in the hearing were also the same people behind the “United Europe–United History” 
conference and its draft resolution; they were joined in this event by Kalniete whose views on the 
“equally evil” totalitarian regimes were mentioned earlier and who became an MEP a year later. 
The original intentions behind the formation of the Reconciliation of European Histories 
Group might have indeed been to create a platform where different views about past events can 
be represented, confronted and (hopefully) reconciled. In practice, however, the informal group 
has become a front for what I call the anti-communist group. There are at least two reasons why 
it is fair to say this. Firstly, the initial draft resolution on the establishment of the “United Europe–
United History” working group stated that there is a need “to deal with the most important 
developments of the European 20th century history” because a “comprehensive reassessment of 
European history will strengthen the European integration.” Without mentioning any particular 
historical events, this leaves the question of what these “most important developments” are open. 
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On the contrary, the Reconciliation of European Histories Group does not leave so many things 
up for debate and quite clearly pushes for the wider acknowledgement of Eastern European 
memories of communism. In its current manifesto, the Group specifies that its aim is to “develop 
a common approach regarding crimes of totalitarian regimes, inter alia totalitarian communist 
regime of the USSR, to ensure continuity of the process of evaluation of totalitarian crimes and 
equal treatment and non-discrimination of victims of all totalitarian regimes.”393 This is a fine 
example of how the anti-communist group currently frames its agenda. Instead of calling for the 
wider recognition of communist crimes and for treating Nazism and communism as comparably 
or equally evil (which might give the impression in the case of Eastern European actors that they 
struggle for the recognition of their own victimhood), this passage argues for the equal treatment 
of the victims of all totalitarian regimes, among whom the victims of communist crimes are only 
one particular subgroup (rather conspicuously, it is the only one mentioned in the manifesto). 
Even though the Holocaust is not mentioned here explicitly, this line of thinking subtly challenges 
its “uniqueness”; if one states that the horrors of the Holocaust were historically unique, it follows 
that those who suffered from these horrors are also in a unique situation and should be treated in 
a unique way. This means that treating the victims of the Holocaust in the same way as the victims 
of other totalitarian crimes would be incompatible with the supposed “uniqueness” of the former. 
The above outlines a significant change in the rhetoric of the anti-communist group. Initially, they 
openly framed their argument in relation to the Holocaust; notably when they opposed the 
proposed Europe-wide ban on the swastika, they stated that paying exclusive attention to the 
victims of the Holocaust would treat the victims of communist regimes as second-class victims 
which would in turn constitute an unjustifiable double standard. As this reasoning was vulnerable 
to the charge that these (mostly) Eastern European politicians simply strived for the 
acknowledgement of the suffering of their own people, adherents of the anti-communist group 
shifted to a slightly more abstract language. They began to emphasise the need to develop a 
common approach to all totalitarian regimes and the non-discrimination of all victims. This shift 
in framing rendered their rhetoric less overtly “Eastern European” but also vaguer because it left 
the term “totalitarianism” undefined. If, following the tradition of Hannah Arendt’s seminal 
work,394 totalitarianism is interpreted in the narrow sense to refer to Nazism and Stalinism, the 
new argument of the anti-communist group is actually the old claim in a refurbished form. If we 
substitute “totalitarianism” with “Nazism and Stalinism” in the new argument, what we get is that 
“the crimes of Nazism and Stalinism should be judged by the same standards and the victims of 
                                                          
393 “Website of the Reconciliation of European Histories Group.” http://eureconciliation.eu/about/ 
394 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harvest Book, 1979). 
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Stalinism should not be discriminated against,” which is actually the old argument. If, on the other 
hand, one understands totalitarianism more broadly to stand for fascism, communism, religious 
fundamentalism and a host of other repressive ideologies (as did many of the presenters of the 
European Public Hearing on Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regime, for instance), the 
reframed argument of the anti-communist group is distinct from (and probably even more 
controversial than) the original one. 
The second reason why it is fair to say that the Group has come to effectively function 
as an anti-communist group is that it is mainly composed of Eastern European conservative MEPs 
who openly subscribe to such an agenda. As of 31 May 2014, the Group counted forty-one 
members, only eight of whom were from the old member states and merely five were not 
conservative politicians (see Table 1). Additionally, thirteen members of the Group are signatories 
of the Prague Declaration, all of whom are conservative MEPs from the new member states. Even 
many of those members of the Group who have not signed the Prague Declaration clearly support 
an anti-communist group agenda; Sandra Kalniete, for instance, is not a signatory, but she famously 
declared Nazism and communism as equally criminal and is currently the head of the informal 
group. 
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Not surprisingly, the attributes of the typical “anti-communist” described above (Eastern 
European, conservative, member of the Group, signatory of the Prague Declaration) also fit the 
profile of the majority of the most important figures behind the RECT (although it must be noted 
that the Group was formed after the adoption of the RECT). The background of the rapporteurs 
of the resolution is depicted in Table 2. Half of the sixteen rapporteurs are/were members of the 
Group and/or signed the Prague Declaration (most often, both). Only a quarter of the rapporteurs 
were from the old member states and only a quarter of them were not conservative politicians. 
Column1 Surname Forename
Signatory of 
the PD?
Political Affiliation Nationality Conservative?
Eastern
European?
1 KELAM Tunne Y EPP (2004-) EST Y Y
2 LANDSBERGIS Vytautas Y EPP (2004-2014) LT Y Y
3 MACOVEI Monica Luisa Y EPP (2009-) RO Y Y
4 PREDA Cristian Dan Y EPP (2009-) RO Y Y
5 ROITHOVÁ Zuzana Y EPP (2004-2014) CZ Y Y
6 SCHÖPFLIN György Y EPP (2004-) H Y Y
7 STASNY Peter Y EPP (2004-2014) SK Y Y
8 SURJÁN László Y EPP (2004-2014) H Y Y
9 SZÁJER József Y EPP (2004-) H Y Y
10 TŐKÉS László Y
NI (2007-2008), 
Greens/EFA (2008-
2009), EPP (2009-)
H Y Y
11 UNGUREANU Traian Y EPP (2009-) RO Y Y
12 VAIDERE Inese Y
UEN (2004-2009),
EPP (2009-)
LV Y Y
13 ZVER Milan Y EPP (2009-) SLO Y Y
14 BELDER Bas ECR (1999-) NL Y N
15 GÁL Kinga EPP (2004-) H Y Y
16 GUTIERREZ-CORTINES Cristina EPP (1999-) E Y N
17 HANKISS Ágnes EPP (2009-2014) H Y Y
18 HÖKMARK Gunnar EPP (2004-) S Y N
19 JÄÄTTEENMÄKI Anneli ALDE (2004-) FIN N N
20 JUVIN Philippe EPP (2009-) F Y N
21 KALNIETE Sandra EPP (2009-) LV Y Y
22 KARIŅŠ Arturs Krišjānis EPP (2009-) LV Y Y
23 KOVATCHEV Andrey EPP (2009-) BG Y Y
24 LAMASSOURE Alain EPP (1989-1994; 1999-) F Y N
25 MATULA Iosif EPP (2009-2014) RO Y Y
26 MIGALSKI Marek Henryk ECR (2009-2014) PL Y Y
27
MORKŪNAITĖ- 
MIKULĖNIENĖ
Radvilė EPP (2009-2014) LT Y Y
28 NEDELCHEVA Mariya Ivanova EPP (2009-) BG Y Y
29 OJULAND Kristiina ALDE (2009-2014) EST N Y
30 PADAR Ivari SD (2009-2014) EST N Y
31 POSSELT Bernd EPP (1994-2014) D Y N
32 PÖTTERING Hans-Gert EPP (1979-2014) D Y N
33 ŠADURSKIS Cristian EPP (2009-) RO Y Y
34 SARYUSZ-WOLSKI Jacek EPP (2004-) PL Y Y
35 SÓGOR Csaba EPP (2007-) RO Y Y
36 STOLOJAN Theodor Dumitru EPP (2007-) RO Y Y
37 SZYMAŃSKI Konrad
UEN (2004-2009),
ECR (2009-2014)
PL Y Y
38 TABAJDI Csaba SD (2004-2014) H N Y
39 USPASKICH Viktor ALDE (2009-) LT N Y
40 ZÁBORSKÁ Anna EPP (2004-) SK Y Y
41 ZALEWSKI Pawel EPP (2009-2014) PL Y Y
Table 1 - The Members of the Reconciliation of European Histories Group (as of 31 May 2014)
Source: http://eureconciliation.eu/about/
 160 
This evidence that shows that many of the signatories of the Prague Declaration were also behind 
the adoption of the RECT supports the observation made earlier about the “shift” in the anti-
communist rhetoric that took place around 2008-2009. The Prague Declaration and the preceding 
years were dominated by efforts that sought the equal treatment of Nazism and communism, and 
their victims. Beginning with the RECT, however, the new anti-communist narrative advocated a 
common stance against all types of totalitarianism. What Table 2 shows is that these were not 
conflicting claims made by different political groups; these claims were made by the same group 
of politicians who adapted their line of argument to the new circumstances and to the new 
institutional context. 
 
When comparing the proportion of the MEPs from the former communist member 
states to the total number of MEPs participating in a certain project (for instance, the Group, the 
RECT or the Platform), we need to bear in mind that the East-West ratio in the European 
Parliament is far from parity, that the number of total MEPs from the “East” and the “West” is 
far from equal. As Table 3 demonstrates, the share of MEPs from former communist member 
states in the EP has fluctuated over time, but it has never been higher than 27 per cent. Therefore, 
when I say that Eastern European MEPs are disproportionately represented in the Group because 
they make up more than 80 per cent of its members, it should not be read with the assumption 
Column1 Surname Forename
Signatory 
of the PD?
Member of 
the REHG?
Political Affiliation Nationality Conservative?
Eastern
European?
UEN?
1 KELAM Tunne Y Y EPP (2004-) EST Y Y N
2 TŐKÉS László Y Y
NI (2007-2008), 
Greens/EFA (2008-
2009), EPP (2009-)
H Y Y N
3 VAIDERE Inese Y Y
UEN (2004-2009),
EPP (2009-)
LV Y Y Y
4 HÖKMARK Gunnar Y EPP (2004-) S Y N N
5 HYBASKOVA Jana Y EPP (2004-2009) CZ Y Y N
6 KALLENBACH Gisela Y
Greens/EFA (2004-
2009)
D N N N
7 KRISTOVSKIS Ģirts Valdis Y Y* UEN (2004-2009) LV Y Y Y
8 ROSZKOWSKI Wojciech Y Y* UEN (2004-2009) PL Y Y Y
9 BIELAN Adam
UEN (2004-2009), 
ECR (2009-2014)
PL Y Y Y
10 FOLTYN-KUBICKA Hanna UEN (2005-2009) PL Y Y Y
11 HORACEK Milan
Greens/EFA (2004-
2009)
D N N N
12
NEYTS- 
UYTTEBROECK
Annemie
ALDE (1994-1999; 
2004-2014)
B N N N
13 PIOTROWSKI
Mirosław
Mariusz
IND/DEM (2004-
2006), UEN (2006-
2009), ECR (2009-)
PL Y Y Y
14 PODKANSKI
Zdzisław
Zbigniew
EPP (2004-2005), 
UEN (2005-2009)
PL Y Y Y
15 SZENT-IVANYI István ALDE (2004-2009) H N Y N
16 ZILE Roberts
UEN (2004-2009), 
ECR (2009-)
LV Y Y Y
Table 2 - The Rapporteurs of the Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism 
*Member of the “United Europe – United History” working group before losing mandate in 2009.
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P6-RC-2009-0165&language=EN
 161 
that their share would normally be 50 per cent, but with the knowledge that it would be less than 
27 per cent. 
 
It is also interesting to see the high number of Eastern European MEPs who were 
members of the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) when the resolution was adopted. 
Half of the rapporteurs came from this Eurosceptic political group which made up only five per 
cent of the European Parliament. This group regularly rejected political initiatives aimed at 
deepening European integration but was the main driving force behind the resolution which was 
a landmark in the “cultural integration” process. Although only the Eastern European members 
of the group were rapporteurs, the Western European members were also in favour. In order to 
make sense of this puzzle, we need to look at the complex politics of relations between EU 
member states and Russia at that time in history. First, it is important to note that in general the 
more right-wing a political party is in Eastern Europe, the stronger the anti-communist rhetoric is 
that it uses in front of its respective electorate. Second, many of these parties are more cautious 
about voicing grievances about the communist past on the European scene and the extent of this 
caution is a function of their position on Russia. With these two (inevitably oversimplifying) 
generalisations, it is easier to see the historical context behind, and the reasons for, the adoption 
of the RECT. First, we need to realise that at that time the UEN was primarily composed of MEPs 
from Italy, Poland and the Baltic states. The political right in Poland and the Baltic states is 
exceptional in the sense that it traditionally has a strong and uncompromising anti-Russian stance; 
Column1 2004-2007 2007-2009 2009-2011 2011-2013 2013-2014 2014-
 Bulgaria 18 17 18 18 17
 Croatia 12 11
 Czech Republic 24 24 22 22 22 21
 Estonia 6 6 6 6 6 6
 Hungary 24 24 22 22 22 21
 Latvia 9 9 8 9 9 8
 Lithuania 13 13 12 12 12 11
 Poland 54 54 50 51 51 51
 Romania 35 33 33 33 32
 Slovakia 14 14 13 13 13 13
 Slovenia 7 7 7 8 8 8
Total Number of MEPs from Former Communist Member States
151 204 190 194 206 199
Total Number of MEPs
732 785 736 754 766 751
Share of MEPs from Former Communist Member States (%)
20.6 26.0 25.8 25.7 26.9 26.5
Table 3 - The Number of MEPs from Former Communist Member States at Different Periods
 162 
other Eastern European right-wing parties, however, have shown some large fluctuations in this 
respect. Following the first generalisation, this explains why the far-right in Poland and the Baltic 
states could so vociferously support the resolution on the European scene, even in the face of 
threatening Russian opposition. Second, the timing of the adoption of the resolution was also far 
from accidental; like all political decisions, it required a political coalition at a specific time in 
history. The fact that the radical claims of the Prague Declaration could mostly be adopted by the 
EP becomes less surprising once we consider how cold most European states’ relations with Russia 
became after its invasion in Georgia in August 2008. The adoption of the RECT was possible at 
that particular point in history because most European political forces were willing to face Russia’s 
outrage. There are three important observations that can be made based upon this explanation. 
First, a particular political group’s position on relations with Russia largely influences its support 
for the pan-European anti-communist agenda. Second, it makes little sense to say that the anti-
communist group is also anti-Russian. As I have previously stated, the anti-communist group 
largely draws from Eastern European right-wing political circles; there are significant differences 
between how these groups see relations with Russia and these positions always change depending 
on the larger international political situation. The recent turn of the Hungarian Fidesz to a very 
pro-Russia position is a case in point. Finally, the history of the idea of European memory in the 
context of the memory wars is far from a linear progress in a vacuum towards the ever stronger 
recognition and condemnation of totalitarian crimes. The political support for these policies is 
always fluctuating and it always depends on the larger developments in international politics. 
The Platform of European Memory and Conscience is another important actor in the 
“European memory debate” that is connected to the Group in numerous ways. The Platform is 
an international non-governmental organisation whose main goal is to educate and to raise 
awareness about the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes; it also aims to become a platform 
for a pan-European network of public and private organisations that already work in this field. 
The ambition to encourage the commemoration and the education of the crimes of all totalitarian 
dictatorships (defined by the Platform as “National Socialism, Communism and Fascism” in the 
context of twentieth century Europe) seems to be in line with the reframed reasoning of the anti-
communist group. The founding document of the Platform, however, tries to be less controversial 
than the manifesto of the Group as it notes “the exceptionality and uniqueness of the Holocaust” 
in its second paragraph.395 This is an apparently clear position in the uniqueness-comparability 
                                                          
395 “Agreement Establishing the Platform of European Memory and Conscience” (Prague, October 14, 2011), 
http://www.memoryandconscience.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Agreement-and-Statute-of-the-
Platform1.pdf. 
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debate, but its meaning is soon brought into question when the text states that “both National 
Socialist and Communist dictatorships committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, including 
crimes against national minorities and genocide” and thus European citizens need to be “informed 
and educated about [communism] in the same manner as they are educated about National 
socialism.” As Mälksoo noted, the document is indeed “a curious mix of both claims” of 
uniqueness and comparability.396 Let us examine these statements more closely. 
a) a genocide committed by Nazism is exceptional and unique 
b) Nazi and communist dictatorships both committed genocide 
c) both Nazism and communism should be taught in the same manner 
The text gives no information about what the genocide committed by communist 
dictatorships was and whether it was exceptional and unique. If we assumed that it was not, it 
would be difficult to live up to the standard set by statement c). If there were two genocides, one 
exceptional and unique and another non-exceptional and non-unique, how would we be supposed 
to teach them in the same manner? Surely, we would need to handle the former in a special way 
by virtue of its exceptionality and uniqueness. Therefore, if we are to keep the above three 
statements internally consistent, we should assume that the genocide committed by communist 
dictatorships is also exceptional and unique. What is more, it needs to be as exceptional and unique 
as the Holocaust if the two are to be taught in the same manner. If we consider that it is generally 
argued that the Holocaust is unique because of its “radical evilness” and that the Platform implicitly 
assumes that the Holocaust and the communist genocide are equally exceptional and unique, we 
must come to the conclusion that, according to the Platform, Nazism and communism are equally 
evil. While the founding document of the Platform first appears to be less controversial than the 
manifesto of the Group, the arguments put forth by the former logically lead to the core claim of 
the anti-communist group. 
The Platform can be regarded as an anti-communist group for three more reasons. First, 
the composition of the Platform follows a pattern that is similar to that of the Group in that it is 
dominated by Eastern European conservatives. Out of the twenty-five representatives of the 
Platform,397 twenty are from the new member states (see Table 4). Fifteen of the representatives 
held and/or still hold political positions, which makes their affiliation relatively clearly identifiable, 
and only two of them were not affiliated with a right-wing political party. There is also a very 
                                                          
396 Maria Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism: Transnational Mnemopolitics in Europe,” International Political Sociology 
8, no. 1 (2014): 90. 
397 I understand representative in a broad sense here standing for the President, the Managing Director, and the 
members of the Executive Board, the Supervisory Board and the Board of Trustees. 
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significant overlap between the people involved in the work of the Platform and the Group, and 
the signatories of the Prague Declaration. Fourteen out of the twenty-five representatives of the 
Platform are/were members of the Group and/or signatories of the Prague Declaration. The few 
Western European members of the Platform are also more widely known for their strong positions 
on communism than for voicing their views about other totalitarian systems. As mentioned above, 
the president of the Platform is Göran Lindblad, the rapporteur of the PACE resolution on 
totalitarian communist regimes. One of the members of the Board of Trustees is Stéphane 
Courtois, the French historian who edited The Black Book of Communism, but the Platform cannot 
boast of a comparably influential expert on any other totalitarian regime. 
 
Secondly, the actual activities of the Platform are more concerned with the crimes of 
communism than those of other totalitarian regimes. The very first conference that it organised 
bore the title “Crimes of the Communist Regimes” in February 2010. In recent years, the Platform 
has hosted two conferences in the EP in co-operation with the Group on this theme: the “Legal 
Column1 Surname Forename
Signatory 
of the PD?
Member of 
the REHG?
Political Affiliation Nationality Conservative?
Eastern
European?
1 KELAM Tunne Y Y EPP (2004-) EST Y Y
2 LANDSBERGIS Vytautas Y Y EPP (2004-2014) LT Y Y
3 MACOVEI Monica Luisa Y Y EPP (2009-) RO Y Y
4 TŐKÉS László Y Y
NI (2007-2008), 
Greens/EFA (2008-
2009), EPP (2009-)
H Y Y
5 ZVER Milan Y Y EPP (2009-) SLO Y Y
6 ROSZKOWSKI Wojciech Y Y* UEN (2004-2009) PL Y Y
7 JANSA Janez Y
conservative PM (2004-
2008; 2012-2013)
SLO Y Y
8 LEHKY Miroslav Y SK NA Y
9 LINDBLAD Göran Y
conservative MP (1997-
2010)
S Y N
10 MAJSTRÍK Martin Y
independent senator 
(2002-2008)
CZ N Y
11 SZILÁGYI Zsolt Y
assistant (2007-) of 
MEP László Tőkés 
(EPP)
RO Y Y
12 WINKELMANN Neela Y CZ NA Y
13 KALNIETE Sandra Y EPP (2009-) LV Y Y
14
MORKŪNAITĖ- 
MIKULĖNIENĖ
Radvilė Y EPP (2009-2014) LT Y Y
15 APPLEBAUM Anne US/PL NA NA
16 COURTOIS Stéphane F NA N
17 HIIO Toomas EST NA Y
18 KOWAL Pawel Robert ECR (2009-2014) PL Y Y
19 MUTOR Marek PL NA Y
20 NOLLENDORFS Valters LV NA Y
21 REIPRICH Siegfried D NA N
22 SCHULZ Werner
Greens/EFA (2009-
2014)
D N N
23 UKIELSKI Pawel PL NA Y
24 VETCHY Ondřej CZ NA Y
25 VONDRA Alexandr
conservative senator 
(2006-2012)
CZ Y Y
Table 4 - The Representatives of the Platform of European Memory and Conscience (as of 29 January 2016)
*Member of the “United Europe – United History” working group before losing mandate in 2009.
Source: http://www.memoryandconscience.eu/2011/10/26/representatives-of-the-platform/
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Settlement of Communist Crimes” in June 2012 and the “Justice 2.0: International Justice for the 
Communist Crimes” in May 2015. The latter was also officially supported by the EPP Group. To 
be fair, the Platform does have some projects that deal with totalitarianism in general398 but there 
has not been any that would have dealt solely with Nazism and/or the Holocaust; given that the 
two largest events organised by the Platform were devoted only to the crimes of communism, this 
is at odds with its proclaimed ambition to promote the commemoration and the education of the 
crimes of all totalitarian regimes. 
Thirdly, the circumstances of the establishment of the Platform also tell us a lot about its 
orientation. The idea of such an organisation was raised during the European Public Hearing on 
Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes and was subsequently supported by the Prague 
Declaration and the EP resolution of 2009. In preparation for the Presidency of the Council, the 
Czech government invited all member states to a meeting in November 2008 where the working 
group on the Platform of European Memory and Conscience was formed. Subsequently, although 
the EP also called for “the establishment of a Platform of European Memory and Conscience to 
provide support for networking and cooperation among national research institutes specialising in 
the subject of totalitarian history,” it did not take any concrete measures in this direction. In 
February 2010, the aforementioned working group organised the conference “Crimes of the 
Communist Regimes” where the “Declaration on Crimes of Communism” was adopted by almost 
the same people who were behind the Prague Declaration. In August 2011, important government 
officials from several member states—the most prominent of whom was Jerzy Buzek (EPP, 
Poland), President of the EP at that time—signed the Warsaw Declaration which practically 
restated the demands of the Prague Declaration and hasted the implementation of the plans for 
the Platform. It was only founded as late as October 2011, two and a half years after the EP 
resolution, thanks to the activism of Donald Tusk, then Prime Minister of Poland which held the 
presidency of the Council in the second half of 2011. The Platform was officially established during 
the summit of the Prime ministers of the Visegrad group (all conservative politicians) with funds 
provided by the International Visegrad Found. Among the nineteen founding institutions, those 
from Eastern European member states were largely over-represented as only five organisations 
were from the West (three from Germany, one from the Netherlands and one from Sweden). The 
number of member institutions has since risen to forty-eight, but only four of the new members 
were from the old EU member states. 
                                                          
398 The travelling exhibition “Totalitarianism in Europe,” the conference “Legacy of Totalitarianism Today” in June 
2014 and the reader for secondary school students “Lest We Forget: Memory of Totalitarianism in Europe.” 
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It is worth noting that whenever an Eastern European country holds the presidency, 
something important happens in the pan-European commemoration of the victims of 
totalitarianisms, usually with an (explicit or implicit) emphasis on the crimes of communist regimes. 
In 2008, the Slovenian presidency pushed for the European Public Hearing on Crimes Committed 
by Totalitarian Regimes where most presenters were Eastern European conservatives who 
unsurprisingly talked about communism most of the time. The EP resolution of 2009 was adopted 
during the Czech presidency while the establishment of the Platform was made possible by the 
work of the Hungarian and Polish presidencies of 2011. When it was Lithuania’s turn, the 
presidency hosted the conference “Totalitarian Regimes’ Heritage in Hate Crimes” in October 
2013; the keynote address was given by Kalniete; the managing director of the Platform, Neela 
Winkelmann, talked about the killings committed by the border guards of communist regimes 
along the Iron Curtain; the final speech was given by another member of the Reconciliation of 
European Histories Group and of the Board of Trustees of the Platform, Radvilė Morkūnaitė-
Mikulėnienė. 
All this is not to say that the Group and the Platform were established with the intention 
to function as anti-communist groups. The original motivation may well have been (and may still 
be) to initiate debate between people of diverse views. What is clear, however, is that these 
institutions do not currently function in this manner; the people involved are almost exclusively 
Eastern European conservatives with an “anti-communist” agenda and the work that the Group 
and the Platform do is also in this line. 
Finally, it is worth noting how keen the adherents of the anti-communist group are to 
spell Nazi out as National Socialist. This serves a double function: on the one hand, it emphasises 
that Nazism and communism stem from the same root and are thus comparably/equally evil; on 
the other hand, this framing pushes the responsibility for both totalitarian ideologies to the radical 
left. In the light of this, it is not surprising that the most vociferous opponents of the anti-
communist agenda are members of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
Group, the Western European “far left,” who could not be further on the political spectrum from 
the Eastern European conservatives dominating the anti-communist group. In the parliamentary 
debate of the RECT, the members of this political group were among the strongest critics of the 
text. When the Committee on Culture and Education of the EP debated the Commission’s 
proposal for the second edition of the Europe for Citizens programme, the members of the 
GUE/NGL issued a minority opinion that went as far as criticising the programme for telling 
future generations “the historical lie that seeks to put Communists on a par with Nazis.” They 
even criticised the concept of European memory directly, considering it “an ambiguous term that 
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goes beyond the ‘duty of remembrance’ in respect of the victims of totalitarian regimes.”399 Finally, 
the GUE/NGL felt that the Europe for Citizens programme, by putting too much emphasis on 
Nazism and Stalinism, encourages forgetfulness about “both the Fascist dictatorships that once 
held sway in southern Europe and the colonial past” and thus promotes a “biased view of history.” 
Recalling the importance of commemorating fascism and colonialism is understandable from the 
perspective of this left-wing political group. What is less clear is why the members of the 
GUE/NGL accused the proposals of the second edition of the Europe for Citizens programme 
of forgetfulness about fascism whereas it was already implicitly included as a legitimate theme in 
the Commission’s original proposal,400 and was explicitly mentioned in the proposal of the 
Committee to which the GUE/NGL added its dissenting opinion.401 Nevertheless, the minority 
opinion did make a good point about colonialism which is conspicuously absent from every aspect 
of European memory politics. 
Despite this opposition, the new “edition” of the Europe for Citizens programme for the 
period 2014-2020 visibly moved in the direction of the anti-communist agenda. One of the two 
new strands is called “European remembrance.” The scope of the programme has been 
significantly expanded as it can now fund initiatives that reflect on any of the “totalitarian regimes 
in Europe’s modern history (especially but not exclusively Nazism which led to the Holocaust, 
Fascism, Stalinism and totalitarian communist regimes).”402 The most striking developments are 
that the commemoration of the Holocaust and Nazism here does not have the special status that 
it enjoyed in the first edition of the project, and that the original narrow focus on Stalinism has 
been replaced by “Stalinism and totalitarian communist regimes.” By calling for the remembrance 
of all totalitarianisms, the Europe for Citizens programme of 2014-2020 has clearly adopted one 
of the main arguments of the anti-communist group. What is more, the project has become open-
ended to such an extent that it can now even encompass “activities concerning other defining 
moments and reference points in recent European history.”403 Naturally, it remains to be seen 
whether this different wording of strategic plans will actually mean that the winning applications 
will be more diverse than in the first edition of the Europe for Citizens programme, whether the 
                                                          
399 Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament, “Report on the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation Establishing for the Period 2014-2020 the Programme ‘Europe for Citizens,’” December 11, 2012, 49. 
400 The scope of the programme initially proposed by the Commission was “totalitarian regimes in Europe’s modern 
history (especially but not exclusively Nazism and Stalinism).” Ibid., 32. 
401 The Committee proposed to expand the scope to “all the dictatorships in Europe’s modern history, such as Nazism, 
Fascism and totalitarian communist regimes including Stalinism.” Ibid., 23. 
402 Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 390/2014 Establishing the ‘Europe for Citizens’ Programme for 
the Period 2014-2020,” April 14, 2014. 
403 Ibid. 
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number of funded programmes that focus on Nazism, on the one hand, and Stalinism and other 
totalitarian regimes, on the other, will be more balanced. 
What can be safely deduced from the current trends, however, is that “European 
remembrance” has gained importance within the Europe for Citizens programme compared to its 
previous edition. Importantly, the number of themes has been reduced from four to two; while 
the other “actions” of the first edition of the programme have been classed together in the new 
catch-all “Democratic engagement and civic participation” strand, “European remembrance” has 
remained a theme on its own with a greatly enlarged scope. Additionally, it receives more funding 
than in the first edition of the programme, both in relative and absolute terms. Its share of the 
total budget increased from 4 per cent to 20 per cent while the aggregate amount earmarked for 
the Europe for Citizens programme has only been partially reduced, from €215m to €185m.404 
House of European History 
The latest major development in the European memory debate is the museum called the 
House of European History (HEH). Although numerous previous cultural projects have been 
devoted to European history and to the history of European integration, what makes the HEH 
stand out is that it is the first museum project whose conception is explicitly based on the idea of 
European memory. In the following, I will depict the historical context within which it arose. 
Several scholars date the beginnings of the interest in giving a European perspective to 
museums to the late 1970s.405 In 1977, the European Commission encouraged the addition of 
“European rooms” to already existing national museums. This idea did not succeed as a sole such 
room was opened in Norwich in 1980. The first plans of museums entirely dedicated to represent 
certain aspects of European history only arose in the mid-1980s. The timing is not surprising if we 
consider that this period is often considered to be the beginning of the “memory boom” and a 
time of renewed impetus for the European project. It must be noted, however, that calls for 
extending Europeanisation to the cultural realm were made a decade earlier with the 
aforementioned Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity of 1973, and that a central theme 
of the Tindemans Report of 1975 was how to boost the legitimacy of European institutions and 
                                                          
404 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Decision No 1904/2006/EC Establishing for the 
Period 2007 to 2013 the Programme ‘Europe for Citizens’ to Promote Active European Citizenship”; Council of the 
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establish a link between the EU and “the people.” These goals were endorsed by several museum 
projects initiated in the ‘80s and ‘90s. An extended analysis of the “museums of Europe” by 
Camille Mazé revealed that they aimed to reinforce European identity, and thus support the 
legitimacy of the EU, similarly to the way national museums tried to uphold (and more often than 
not still try to uphold) national identity and political legitimacy.406 Many of these plans came to 
realisation, such as the short-lived Museum of Europe (opened in 2007 as Musée de l’Europe in 
Brussels), the European Museum Schengen (opened in 2010), the Museum of European and 
Mediterranean Civilisations (opened in 2013 as Musée des civilisations de l’Europe et de la 
Méditerranée in Marseille) and the Lieu d’Europe (opened in 2014 in Strasbourg); and some of 
them were dropped, for instance the Museum of the Union (Luxembourg), the Museum for 
Europe (Museion per l’Europa, Turin) and the Bauhaus Europa (Aachen). Mazé observed that 
these projects were overwhelmingly operated from “below.” The initiative and the funding came 
mostly from private individuals and, to a lesser extent, from municipalities and regional authorities; 
the role of national, let alone supranational, actors was very limited. 
The idea of an EU-backed museum already emerged towards the end of the Cold War 
and political steps were taken in the early 1990s. A group of historians, chaired by Krzysztof 
Pomian, was commissioned to work on its conception, but the project was postponed several 
times.407 It was only in 2011 that the Parlamentarium, the first truly “top-down” project which 
represented historical events from a European perspective, opened. It is the visitors’ centre of the 
European Parliament, a supranational initiative whose aim is to bring the institution closer to “the 
people.” Its middle level houses an exhibition of the history of European integration that begins 
with the Second World War and ends in the present day. The integration process is portrayed as a 
sometimes slower, sometimes faster, but overall rather continuous progress. The exhibition thus 
wedded the “Europe out of war” and Holocaust narratives with the “progress of European 
integration” narrative. 
The most recent addition to this list will be the House of European History (scheduled 
to open in May 2017) which stands out from the crowd for a number of reasons. Similarly to the 
Parlamentarium, it is a supranational initiative, established and funded by the EP. Contrary to the 
Parlamentarium, the HEH is clearly defined as a museum project and it is entirely dedicated to the 
representation of European history. Moreover, and more importantly for my research interest, its 
latest conception explicitly envisages a “reservoir of European memory.” It is because of this last 
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407 Assmann, “Europe’s Divided Memory,” 25. 
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unique feature that the HEH has an important role to play in my analysis of the development of 
the idea of European memory. 
It must be noted that the concept of European memory has only recently become central 
to the conception of the HEH. The idea of the HEH entered mainstream debates when Hans-
Gert Pöttering was elected the President of the European Parliament and called for its 
establishment in his inaugural speech in February 2007: 
I should like to create a locus for history and for the future where the concept of the European idea can 
continue to grow. I would like to suggest the founding of a “House of European History.” It should 
[be] a place where a memory of European history and the work of European unification is jointly 
cultivated, and which at the same time is available as a locus for the European identity to go on being 
shaped by present and future citizens of the European Union.408 
In a single and singularly confusing sentence, Pöttering condensed three core concepts around 
which the proposed museum was to be organised: European memory, European history (more 
precisely, “a memory of European history,” whatever that may be) and European identity. As the 
project slowly took shape, however, what we may call the “European history” aspect became 
dominant. 
Pöttering was an MEP of the EPP group from the first European parliamentary elections 
of 1979 to the most recent elections of 2014. Between 2007 and 2009, he was the President of the 
EP and it was in this quality that he initiated the House of European History project. He was also 
one of the few Western European members of the aforementioned Reconciliation of European 
Histories Group. While he did not go as far as Sandra Kalniete, the chair of the Group who directly 
compared and equated the evilness of Nazism and Stalinism, Pöttering did speak highly of the 
“great Jewish political scientist” Hannah Arendt who, in his interpretation, developed scientific 
criteria based upon which she established that “both totalitarian systems are comparable and 
terrible.”409 
  
                                                          
408 Committee of Experts, “Conceptual Basis for a House of European History” (Brussels, October 2008), 4, 
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Following Pöttering’s public commitment to the project, the Bureau of the European 
Parliament entrusted a Committee of Experts in late 2007 with the task to work out the general 
conception of the museum.410 The nine-member committee was mainly composed of historians411 
which might explain the historical “bias” of the resulting report, entitled Conceptual Basis for a 
House of European History and completed in October 2008. The Conceptual Basis envisaged a 
rather traditional history museum, a “modern exhibition, documentation and information centre” 
with a “chronologically based narrative [that] will help the likely target group to understand 
historical events and processes.”412 In more than half of the report, the authors described what 
topics and historical events the future museum should give information about. It becomes clear 
from this lengthy prescription that what should be represented is European history in the 
(geographically and temporally) broadest possible sense, from the origins of civilisation to the 
future of Europe. However, apart from quoting Pöttering’s speech mentioned above, the 
document did not make any mention about memory or identity. 
In 2009, the decision was made about the location of the HEH; it was to be housed in 
the European Quarter in Brussels, in the Eastman building of Leopold Park. The renovation of 
the building started in 2012. Although the opening of the museum was originally planned to be in 
2014, works are still ongoing at the time of writing and the current plans foresee the opening of 
the HEH only in May 2017. 
The Academic Project Team was put together in early 2011 with the mandate to work 
out the details of the museum project and to oversee the implementation process. It is advised by 
the Academic Committee. Under this team, which is considerably larger than the Committee of 
Experts and includes people from more diverse backgrounds, the conception of the museum 
changed significantly. After the initial dominance of a purely “historical” approach, the concepts 
of memory and identity slowly gained prominence. The nature of this conceptual shift will be 
analysed in detail in the next chapter. 
The political actors behind the HEH are quite different from those discussed so far (the 
anti-communist group and its far-left counterparts). The two political bodies of the museum are 
the Bureau Contact Group, which oversaw the initial stages of the project, and the Board of 
Trustees, which currently supervises the implementation of the plan in an advisory capacity. The 
former was chaired by Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez (SD, Spain) while the latter is chaired by 
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Pöttering, both of whom are regarded by the Academic Project Team as the “political ‘godfathers’ 
to the project.”413 As Table 5 demonstrates, the Bureau and the Board have a composition that is 
significantly different from that of the Group or the Platform. With seven conservative and ten 
non-conservative members, and with a conservative and a socialist “godfather,” the bodies are 
rather politically balanced. Only three of the twenty-one members (14.29 per cent) are from 
Eastern European member states which means that this time they are actually underrepresented. 
One of these Eastern European members, Włodzimierz Borodziej, is not a politician but a 
historian who also chairs the Academic Committee. There is only one member who is a “typical” 
member of the anti-communist group, Roszkowski Wojciech, who was an Eastern European 
conservative MEP, signatory of the Prague Declaration, representative of the Platform and was a 
Member of the “United Europe–United History” working group, the predecessor of the REHG. 
Apart from him, only two other members of these bodies are active in the Group, Alain 
Lamassoure and Pöttering. In the light of this, it is understandable why Schöpflin told me in an 
interview that the Group did not have much word in the development of the project; they tried to 
make an input when the idea of the HEH first emerged, but they felt that it had not really been 
taken into consideration. 
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Column1 Surname Forename
Member of the 
HEH Bureau?
Member of the 
HEH Board?
Signatory 
of the PD?
Member of 
the REHG?
Representative 
of the PEMC?
Political Affiliation Nationality Conservative?
Eastern 
European?
1
MARTÍNEZ 
MARTÍNEZ
Miguel Angel Y Y SD (1999-2014) E N N
2 ANGELILLI Roberta Y
NI (1994-1999), 
UEN (1999-2009), 
EPP (2009-2014)
I Y N
3 DURANT Isabelle Y
Greens/EFA (2009-
2014)
B N N
4 LIBERADZKI Bogusław Y SD (2004-) PL N Y
5 PAPASTAMKOS Georgios Y EPP (2004-2014) GR Y N
6 PITTELLA Gianni Y SD (1999-) I N N
7 VIDAL-QUADRAS Alejo Y EPP (1999-2014) E Y N
8 BORODZIEJ Włodzimierz  Y PL NA Y
9 DAVIGNON Étienne Y B NA N
10 HÜTTER Hans Walter Y D NA N
11 LAMASSOURE Alain Y Y
EPP (1989-1994; 
1999-)
F Y N
12 ONESTA Gérard Y
Greens/EFA (1991-
1994, 1999-2009)
F N N
13 PACK Doris Gisela Y EPP (1989-2014) D Y N
14 PALIADELI Chrysoula Y SD (2009-2014) GR N N
15 PICQUE Charles Y
Socialist Party 
(Belgium)
B N N
16 PÖTTERING Hans-Gert Y Y EPP (1979-2014) D Y N
17 ROSZKOWSKI Wojciech Y Y Y* Y UEN (2004-2009) PL Y Y
18 SUTHERLAND Peter Y IRL NA N
19 VASSILIOU Androulla Y
United Democrats 
(Cyprus)
CY N N
20 WALLIS Diana Y ALDE (1999-2012) GB N N
21 WURTZ Francis Y
GUE/NGL (1979-
2009)
F N N
Table 5 - The Members of the Bureau and the Board of the House of European History (as of 2013)
Source: European Parliament Directorate-General for Communication, “Building a House of European History.”
*Member of the “United Europe – United History” working group before losing mandate in 2009.
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In the press, the HEH has not yet received significant attention, but when it does, it is 
routinely depicted by British newspapers as yet another expensive European vanity project whose 
only function will be to disseminate federalist propaganda. In the next chapter, remaining agnostic 
with respect to the costs of the project and the question of utility, I will only be interested in how 
the conception of the museum imagines European memory. 
In conclusion, the term “European memory” has not been extensively used until the 
Prague Declaration in 2008 whose agenda was largely absorbed by the EP a year later. Since then, 
the popularity of the idea of European memory has increased exponentially; it has become a key 
concept in the European memory debate, and European institutions have become the main fora 
in which the idea of European memory has been discussed. Having introduced the historical 
context of the term, in the next chapter I will explore and critically evaluate how the idea of 
European memory is used and understood in five institutions: the European Parliament, the 
Reconciliation of European Histories Group, the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, 
the Europe for Citizens programme and the House of European History. 
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7 
European Institutions and the Idea of European Memory 
In the previous chapter, I gave a general overview of how the idea of European memory 
developed over time, and I identified the main actors and fora in this process. Specifically, I 
concentrated on how the idea can be situated in the context of the European memory wars. In 
this chapter, I examine the concept itself more closely; I look at each of the five most important 
institutions in turn and I critically analyse how different actors conceptualised European memory. 
The European institutions that I am concerned with are the European Parliament, which has 
adopted a number of resolutions with reference to European memory in the last decade, three 
projects that are closely related to the EP (the Reconciliation of European Histories Group, the 
Platform of European Memory and Conscience and the House of European History), and the 
Europe for Citizens programme of the European Commission. As previously, I will not consider 
important projects which do not explicitly mention European memory as one of their main 
concepts, such as the New Narrative for Europe or the European Cultural Routes initiatives. 
European Parliament 
As I explained in the previous chapter, I consider the year 2005 to be an important 
turning point in discussions about the past at the European level because this tumultuous time was 
at the crossing point of several overlapping and interconnected trends. Just as the intellectual battle 
for European inheritance that characterised the preceding years was temporarily won by the 
alliance of the Classical and Enlightenment visions of Europe against the Christian perspective, 
the whole debate started to diminish in importance.414 As attention turned once again to more 
recent, mostly post-war, events, discussions about more ancient history were quickly relegated to 
a secondary status. The “Europe out of war” story made a comeback coupled with a powerful 
Holocaust narrative whose commemoration had only recently acquired a transnational (and even 
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international) standing. However, just when the Holocaust seemed to offer a consensual and 
indisputable founding memory for Europe, its dominance began to be questioned by an emerging 
anti-communist block. The idea of European memory was not yet in frequent use, but it was 
already mentioned in these early stages of the European memory wars in two resolutions adopted 
by the EP in 2005; not surprisingly, one primarily emphasised the victims of the Holocaust, while 
the other focused on the fight against communism. 
The resolution on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe 
(RWW2), where the idea of European memory first appeared in official EP documents, can be 
considered as the finest example of the “Europe out of war”-cum-Holocaust narrative. It 
portrayed the war as primarily a “war against Nazism and fascism” and argued for the need to 
commemorate the victims of this “common European tragedy ... in particular all the victims of the 
Holocaust.” The RWW2 did not only reject and condemn Holocaust denial, but also considered 
“revisionist views ... as shameful and contrary to historical truth,” implying that an undisputable 
morally right reading of the Holocaust is already at our disposal. Additionally, as described in the 
previous chapter, the resolution did contain recognition of the crimes committed by the Soviet 
Union, but this was very limited and vague. With respect to the more abstract question of 
remembrance, the resolution relied on the vocabulary duty-based moral philosophical accounts. It 
highlighted “the importance of keeping the memories of the past alive, because there cannot be 
reconciliation without truth and remembrance,” and of “overcoming the atrocities of the past.” 
The way the resolution talks about memories and truth in the singular seems to suggest that the 
historical truth and the memories of the past are realities that exist “out there.” In the context of 
duty-based ethical approaches to the public representation of past events, I called these the 
historical truth and the collective memory assumptions. Similarly to duty-based accounts, the 
resolution rejects the “closing the books” approach to the past when it argues for the need to keep 
the memories alive, considering this as the only way toward future reconciliation. However, the 
following passage, which contains the first use of the idea of European memory in official EU 
documents, complicates the easy classification of the resolution as a text working within a standard 
duty-based moral philosophy framework. 
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The European Parliament ... [w]elcomes this first opportunity to commemorate the anniversary with 
elected Members from all 25 Member States as an expression of the ever closer union of our nations 
and citizens, who have overcome the divisions between aggressors and victims and between victors and 
the defeated, an occasion to share and combine our remembrances on the way to a truly common 
European memory and an opportunity to prevent recurrences of nationalism and totalitarian rule.415 
In this part, remembering in national contexts is depicted with the standard mnemonic 
community and collective memory assumptions; the use of the first person possessive (“our 
nations and citizens” and “our remembrances”) evokes the image of pre-existing national 
mnemonic communities with their pre-existing memories. Although it is never explicitly specified 
in the resolution that memories and remembrances should be understood to be those of national 
communities, the spirit of the text strongly suggests this: the resolution never talks about social 
groups and minorities, but refers to nations and countries almost once in every clause. When it 
comes to the idea of European memory, however, the text departs from mainstream moral 
philosophy assumptions significantly. European memory is not presented as a memory that has 
prior existence, but as something that needs to be developed (we are “on the way” to it). Similarly, 
the mnemonic community is not yet formed; more precisely, a community exists (sufficiently 
clearly delineated as the then twenty-five member states) but it does not yet do the remembering 
together, it has not yet acquired a mnemonic dimension. Therefore, the mental frame conjured up 
by the resolution is that national communities and their national memories exist, and a European 
community, which has been formed by national communities coming together, needs to acquire a 
mnemonic dimension by combining the memories of these constituent national communities into 
a common European memory. Consequently, this conception of European memory does have a 
transnational dimension, as it considers the “common European memory” somewhat distinct 
from national ones; nevertheless, this transnational standing is very weak, as the European memory 
is not only highly dependent on national memories, but it is effectively composed by them. The 
term “European memory” does not stand here for more than a combination of national memories 
which means that it is only slightly more transnational than the commonsensical “national 
memories in Europe” understanding of the concept. Furthermore, the resolution does not 
consider the possibility of conflict between nationally specific interpretations of past events. The 
vision of a harmonious process of “sharing and combining” memories can only be conceived, 
however, if a certain authoritative reading of the past is assumed to always prevail in the case of 
potential disagreements, or if there are no disagreements between national accounts of the past as 
they all already conform to this historical truth. If such a historical truth exists, as posited by the 
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passage of the resolution mentioned above, then it is not clear why it needs to be created and 
combined on the basis of national memories. If we assume that the resolution is internally logically 
consistent to a certain extent, the only plausible explanation for this is that it considered European 
memory as a collection of selected and combined historically true statements, each of which already 
exist in national contexts. 
The resolution adopted on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity later in 2005 
followed this line of thought. It stated that in order to commemorate the effort of Polish workers 
and of “all people of central and eastern Europe who fought for human rights, freedom, solidarity 
and the unity of Europe ... and to place it in the collective memory of Europe, 31 August is to 
be celebrated as the Day of Freedom and Solidarity.”416 The resolution thus called for a memory 
of primarily national importance, the signing of the Gdańsk Accords on 31 August 1980, to be 
given a place in the European memory “pantheon.” 
After these two texts, the idea of European memory was not mentioned in official EP 
documents until the crucially important Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism 
adopted in April 2009 (RECT). Similarly to the resolution on the end of the Second World War, 
this resolution upheld the importance of keeping the memories of Europe’s past alive so as to “lay 
the foundations for reconciliation based on truth and remembrance.” It also argued that Europe 
needs to “form a common view of its history” if it is to be united. The resolution is not clear about 
how this common view of history should be created, but it does specify that the subject of this 
common view should be totalitarian political systems in general (defined as “Nazism, Stalinism 
and fascist and Communist regimes”) which should be recognised “as a common legacy.” In this 
respect, the RECT significantly departs from the resolutions of 2005. In the latter, the common 
European memory stood for a combination of (mostly) national narratives; it was envisaged to be 
composed of national memory building blocks. The underlying logic here is very simple: “I accept 
your memory as a memory that is partly mine as well.” To say that Europe needs to “form a 
common view” of a historical issue, however, is a different matter. By using this language, the 
RECT implies that Europe needs to work towards a single, unified, consensual historical account 
of totalitarian regimes. The idea that “we should discuss and agree on what totalitarianism means 
to us” requires much more interaction from participants than the “let us put our memories 
together” plan. To form a common view, to seek a consensus about a historical issue already 
implies a dynamic relationship between the actors whose initial conceptions might very well change 
in the process. Consequently, this vision accords greater autonomy to a transnational European 
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memory than previous ones because it is not said to be a simple collection of pre-existing and 
unchanging national memories, but a consensual narrative about totalitarianisms. In order to 
achieve this, the RECT did not only call on member states and European institutions to work 
towards such “an honest and thorough debate” about the crimes of totalitarian regimes, but also 
proposed the institutional framework within which such a debate could unfold. It urged the 
“establishment of a Platform of European Memory and Conscience to provide support for 
networking and cooperation among national research institutes specialising in the subject of 
totalitarian history”; the resolution even envisaged “the creation of a pan-European 
documentation centre/memorial for the victims of all totalitarian regimes.” Although the latter 
has not yet been created, the nature of the initiative contributed to the transnational character of 
the European memory conceived in the resolution. 
As the short excerpts from the resolution and the short description of the plan of the 
Platform reveal, the RECT decisively turned to a victim-oriented memory politics with respect to 
the subject matter of remembrance. This stands in contrast to the resolutions of 2005 which 
concentrated on the uplifting human experiences that followed long periods of repression and 
suffering; specifically, they recalled the stories about how European unity was born after the 
tragedy of the war and the Holocaust, and how brave Eastern European freedom-fighters prevailed 
after decades of hardship. While the RECT did have some forward-looking aspects, while it did 
mention that European unity and reconciliation might be strengthened by a common approach to 
the past, it clearly put the emphasis on remembering the horrors of totalitarian regimes and those 
who suffered because of them. At one point, nevertheless, the resolution departs from a narrow 
focus on totalitarianisms and their victims; it significantly widens the scope of past events about 
which a common European view can or should be formed when it calls for “a comprehensive 
reassessment of European history and Europe-wide recognition of all historical aspects of modern 
Europe.” 
While the RECT was arguably a landmark text in the development of European memory 
politics, to assume that it elucidates (or that it even intends to elucidate) a relatively coherent 
conception of European memory would be a mistake, especially if we consider the resolution’s 
numerous internal contradictions. The most glaring of these problems concerns the status of 
“memories.” The resolution highlighted “the importance of keeping the memories of the past 
alive” and recommended the “appropriate preservation of historical memory.” Talking about 
memory as something that needs to be preserved and kept alive conjures up the image of an 
endangered species; here, memory is portrayed as a precious “thing” that can be either preserved 
with care in its current form or left on its own to perish. In other parts of the text, however, 
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memory is not presented as something essentially unchangeable that is either given “out there” or 
not existing anymore. Much like in the thick version of the Europeanist scholarly conception, 
European memory is considered by the RECT to be the result of negotiation and consensus, a 
discursive reality that can be constructed from scratch; as such, it has no fixed form. This is not 
new since we have seen that the RWW2 of 2005 already treated European memory as belonging 
to an ontological order that is different from national memories. However, by imagining European 
memory not as a combination of primordial national memories but essentially as a compromise 
reached on the basis of national narratives, the RECT implies the possibility (indeed, the necessity) 
of national memories changing in the process of deliberation on a consensual “common view” of 
history. By implicitly suggesting that national memories might also be malleable to a certain extent, 
the RECT differs significantly from the earlier resolutions; this conception, on the other hand, is 
in tension with the “endangered species in need of preservation” image of memory that is prevalent 
in the other parts of the text of the RECT. 
Finally, the resolution begins with an interesting proviso that tries to explain the role of 
history as an academic discipline and the responsibility of political bodies in this domain. Naturally, 
it would be difficult to say anything meaningful about these big questions in the short and 
condensed format of an EP resolution, but the problem is that these clauses cause more confusion 
than clarity. 
A. whereas historians agree that fully objective interpretations of historical facts are not possible and 
objective historical narratives do not exist; whereas, nevertheless, professional historians use scientific 
tools to study the past, and try to be as impartial as possible, 
B. whereas no political body or political party has a monopoly on interpreting history, and such bodies 
and parties cannot claim to be objective, 
C. whereas official political interpretations of historical facts should not be imposed by means of 
majority decisions of parliaments; whereas a parliament cannot legislate on the past, ... 
E. whereas misinterpretations of history can fuel exclusivist policies and thereby incite hatred and racism 
By rejecting the possibility of completely objective historical narratives but upholding the 
existence of historical facts and the value of historians’ struggle for maximum possible impartiality 
in clause A, the resolution seems to subscribe to a weak version of the objective historian approach. 
This, however, does not sit well with the “there can be no reconciliation without truth and 
remembrance” mantra that is repeated three times in the resolution. The only way to square this 
circle is to take “truth” in the latter to mean the “truest” possible narrative given the impartiality 
limitations of historical research, that is, the historians’ best approximation of the singular objective 
historical truth. If we can achieve a “truest” possible interpretation of history, however, does this 
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mean that all the narratives other than the “truest” are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
misinterpretations of history? If yes, these “less-than-truest” interpretations can promote 
exclusivist tendencies according to clause E which means that anything other than the “truest” 
narrative is potentially dangerous. This is clearly a highly exclusionary statement that the EP could 
not have intended to make. A more plausible explanation is that the resolution is torn between the 
irreconcilable differences between the attempt to dampen the edge of effectively legislating on the 
most controversial questions of history (because whatever clause C says, this is what the EP was 
really doing) and the mindless repetition of the “truth and remembrance” mantra. Admittedly, it 
is all too easy to prey on the statements issued by a political organisation, and no one can expect a 
text that is clearly the result of compromise and has severe space limitations to express a coherent 
historiographical theoretical framework and to give complex arguments about the ethics of the 
representations of the past. But the question remains as to whether several clauses should be 
included in the text that address these issues at a very elementary level and actually make things 
even more confusing. 
After the RECT, the Parliament adopted a number of resolutions with historical themes 
and opened its Parlamentarium, but the idea of European memory was not invoked in any of these. 
The latter, being the first supranational representation of European history, paved the way for the 
House of European History project which will be analysed in the next section. Additionally, the 
Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament commissioned a study in 2013 
that bore the title European Historical Memory.417 In this document, Markus Prutsch explored the 
possibilities and the challenges that European memory policies face. He declared that simply trying 
to transpose memories from the national to the European level, essentially what the early 
resolutions of 2005 argued for, is not possible. He thus suggested three possible strategies for 
European memory policy-makers. First, they could just accept the European memory landscape 
as it is with all its diversity and its conflicts. Second, the EU could attempt to organise a shared 
European memory around grand ideas and themes, such as freedom; the main challenge here is to 
agree on topics that are abstract enough to be acceptable for every member state but are specific 
enough to be something meaningful to them, something that can act as a common point of 
reference. Finally, the third option identified by Prutsch was the construction of a “genuinely new 
European collective memory working with clearly defined historical landmarks.”418 He felt that EU 
initiatives at that time were mainly following this path, which is essentially equivalent to the thick 
version of the Europeanist vision. Finally, Prutsch concluded that none of these three strategies is 
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viable for EU decision-makers and instead openly subscribed to Müller’s approach to European 
memory. Typically for an advocate of what I labelled the thin Europeanist conception, he 
supported “a critical ‘European culture of remembrance’ ... a critical ‘reworking the past’ at national 
levels ... based on common European principles and values”419 and thought that the rise of the 
politics of regret is a favourable development in this direction. It is important to bear in mind that, 
contrary to what some previous students of European memory politics claimed,420 Prutsch’s study 
does not define the views of the Committee on Culture and Education on European memory, let 
alone those of the EU in general. The document explicitly says that it should not be taken to 
represent the EP’s official position on the matter. 
Reconciliation of European Histories Group and Platform of European Memory and 
Conscience 
As noted in the previous chapter, there is a significant overlap between the signatories of 
the Prague Declaration, and the members of the REHG and the PEMC. For this reason, it makes 
sense to examine the latter two together with respect to their conceptualisation of European 
memory. Given that the anti-communist stance of these two bodies has already been extensively 
criticised earlier, in this chapter I will only give a brief overview of their visions of European 
memory. The goal of the REHG is to consolidate different national narratives into a united 
European one. The manifesto of the group only talks in terms of nations and national memories 
so it is fair to say that the REHG only envisages a reconciliation of national memories. According 
to the REHG, the “true reunification of European history based on truth and remembrance” can 
only be completed by “converging the views of all the Europe [sic] about the history of the 20th 
century.” This is highly reminiscent of the “common view of European history” envisaged by the 
RECT on which the member states of the EU need to agree if they are to be united. Furthermore, 
the goals of the REHG and the RECT are also similar in that they both focus on totalitarianisms 
of all sorts and their victims. This is not surprising in the light of the fact that many of the 
rapporteurs of the RECT were also members of the REHG. Where the REHG differs sharply 
from the RECT is its overtly anti-communist agenda. Although it calls for “a common approach 
regarding crimes of totalitarian regimes,” its members do not hide their belief that the crimes of 
communism have not received enough attention and that its victims have been discriminated 
against. After lamenting that “a number of European nations were still deprived of having a voice” 
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and calling for the “equal treatment and non-discrimination of victims of all totalitarian regimes,” 
the members of the REHG are open about their main objective which is to integrate “the 
experience of the post-communist nations into [the] common narrative of the European History 
[sic].”421 
The previous chapter put the Platform squarely in the anti-communist camp, but there 
are important differences between the conception of European memory put forward by the 
REHG and the PEMC. Contrary to the other actors, the Platform does not suggest that the work 
on developing a common understanding of totalitarian regimes is a means towards a larger goal; a 
common commemoration of these crimes is not important because it would strengthen European 
unity, increase the legitimacy of the EU or contribute to the emergence of a European identity. In 
the rhetoric of the PEMC, raising awareness of the crimes of totalitarian regimes and honouring 
their victims is the goal in itself. This clearly non-consequentialist thinking renders the PEMC a 
more devoted follower of the “duty to remember” framework than any other actor. For this 
reason, the PEMC is even more narrowly concerned with the development of a common view 
about totalitarianisms, and not about other aspects of history, than any of the other institutions 
discussed in this chapter. As we will see with the Europe for Citizens programme and the House 
of European History, the current tendency is to widen the historical scope of European memory 
rather than focusing narrowly on one particular group of phenomena. Even the REHG, another 
platform of the anti-communist group, calls for a common European view of twentieth century 
history, not simply of totalitarian crimes. The narrow focus of the PEMC, however, allows it to 
work closely with other specialised organisations in other parts of the world. Although it is only 
interested in “totalitarian regimes on European territory,”422 the Platform has several partner 
institutions in North America which makes it unique in that other institutions working in the field 
of European memory rarely have connections to the world outside Europe. 
Europe for Citizens Programme 
Since its early stages, the Europe for Citizens programme has consistently employed a 
language that centres around the need to preserve and keep alive the memories of Europe’s past. 
One of the objectives of the first edition of the programme was to bring Europe “closer to its 
citizens by promoting Europe’s values and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past”; 
this preservation of the memory of Europe’s past was to be “implemented on a transnational 
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basis.”423 This decision was taken in late 2006 and, typically for that time, the memory of Europe’s 
past was meant to stand for the transnational commemoration of the crimes of totalitarian regimes 
and their victims. With respect to the totalitarian crimes that should be remembered, the decision 
on the first edition of the ECP stood between the RWW2 of 2005 and the RECT of 2009; 
compared to the RWW2, it expanded the scope of commemoration to cover Stalinism, but it did 
not go as far as the RECT because it still gave primary importance to Nazism and the Holocaust, 
and it did not include other totalitarian regimes (such as fascist and communist regimes) at all. 
With time, the programme came to use the term “European memory” more openly and retained 
the language that called for its preservation (for instance, in setting the annual priorities for 
2013).424 The conference convened by the ECP in 2014 in order to evaluate the first edition of the 
programme sought to answer whether there is a “a European memory creating a sense of 
belonging and encouraging civic participation.” We can thus safely say that the concept of 
European memory was already deeply embedded in the programme after its first seven years. 
Finally, as explained in the previous chapter, the second edition of the programme for the period 
2014-2020 significantly broadened the scope of commemoration so that it now encompass all 
“totalitarian regimes in Europe’s modern history” and “other defining moments and reference 
points.”425 Importantly, the new conception explicitly specifies in its objectives that the memories 
of the past need to be kept alive in order to raise awareness, among other things, about the 
historical importance of the EU as a peace project. It remains to be seen what projects will be 
funded under the new edition of the programme, but this wording suggests that the good old 
“Europe out of war” narrative is making a comeback not with the strong references to the 
Holocaust that it had in the mid-2000s, but with a new emphasis on all totalitarianisms. 
House of European History 
The HEH is the most recent and also the most ambitious project of European memory 
politics. Indeed, it has recently gone as far as choosing the idea of European memory as its single 
most important guiding concept. As mentioned in the previous chapter, after Pöttering’s initial 
vision of the HEH as a fusion of European memory, history and identity, the Committee of 
Experts defined it as primarily a project about European history. The Conceptual Basis produced by 
the Committee relied on a traditional “objective historian” framework in which there was little 
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room for concepts like memory and identity. The Committee made it clear that the museum should 
give a “multifaceted and impartial presentation of historical facts and processes,” an accurate and 
“objective portrayal of history” based on “scientifically proven findings and methods.”426 In the 
last few years, the decision-makers behind the museum seemed to have departed from this vision 
of an objective, monolithic and univocal representation of Europe’s past based on the historical 
truth. It is difficult to know for certain the magnitude of this shift because, as Wolfram Kaiser, 
Stefan Krankenhagen and Kerstin Poehls noted, the particulars of the exhibition are still shrouded 
in secrecy despite the fact that it is due to open in May 2017.427 Nevertheless, it is possible to 
reconstruct the direction of this conceptual change based on the information materials provided 
by the museum, on the one hand, and the publications by the members of the Academic Project 
Team, on the other. Contrary to the “objective historian” stance of the Committee of Experts, 
this more recent conception of the museum prioritises European memory over the two other 
foundational concepts of European identity and history. Taja Vovk van Gaal and Christine 
Dupont, the director and another member of the Academic Project Team, gave several reasons 
for this choice.428 
First, in opposition to the previously dominant idea that the member states should work 
towards a “common view” of European history, Vovk van Gaal and Dupont claimed that the 
HEH will refrain from the top-down imposition of a politically correct, consensual narrative as it 
would be difficult to develop and would make “a very boring museum.”429 Instead, they aim to 
convey a “multifaceted view of European history”430 by confronting visitors with different 
historical interpretations. Second, with respect to European identity, Vovk van Gaal and Dupont 
admitted that its construction had figured prominently in the initial political justifications of the 
HEH, but the Team decided not to rely on this concept at all. They reasoned that since there is 
“no commonly agreed definition”431 of European identity, the HEH would need to impose its own 
definition on the visitors from above. As this move would inhibit open debate instead of fostering 
it, the Team concluded that the notion of European identity “is too reductionist and too static to 
be used as a basis for the HEH.”432 Dissatisfied with the notions of the “common view of history” 
and European identity, this novel conception of the museum thus explicitly placed the idea of 
European memory at its centre. The importance of promoting debate 
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is the reason for the choice of the more fluid notion of collective memory as a tool to support the 
narrative of the permanent exhibition and the various programmes. Memory is at the same time what 
divides and what unites Europe. This notion has a strong critical potential, which can be used to 
promote a dynamic dialogue with the visitors ... Building the HEH as a reservoir of European memory 
offers the possibility to reflect on different perceptions of the past and different interpretations of 
history. The Academic Project Team is aware of the difficulty of this mission. But the HEH is neither 
the first nor the latest museum meant as a “forum for contested issues.”433 
This ambition to become a multi-perspective reservoir of European memory and “a place 
of meeting, discussion and debate”434 about different historical interpretations has been 
consistently repeated in other, and more recent and more official, sources which implies that the 
museum will eventually follow this conception. In November 2012, Vovk van Gaal spoke about 
the HEH in exactly these terms during a panel debate in Cambridge.435 The official information 
material provided by the museum and the museum’s website all echo this reservoir of European 
memory conception and the importance of promoting reflection and debate.436 Andrea Mork, 
another member of the Academic Project Team, repeated the argumentative moves made by Taja 
Vovk van Gaal and Christine Dupont almost word for word in presentations as recent as October 
2014.437 She first talked about the vagueness of the notion of European identity which makes it 
unsuitable as a guiding principle of the HEH; she then moved on to argue that instead of the top-
down definition and imposition of a European identity, the HEH should become a reservoir of 
European memory; finally, she concluded that this concept’s “multiple perspectives and its critical 
potential” would allow the HEH to present history in a manner that is “complex rather than 
uniform, more differentiated than homogeneous, critical rather than affirmative.”438 
There is little information available about what this transnational, multi-perspective 
reservoir will actually look like. What we do know is that, unlike the Parlamentarium, the narrative 
presented by the HEH will not start in 1945 and will not only concentrate on the process of 
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European integration. The museum will present a chronological narrative which will consist of six 
parts. An introductory theme will explain to the visitors the “philosophy of the House of 
History.”439 This will be followed by an overview of the nineteenth century with an emphasis on 
the technological developments and on the rise of the European colonial powers. The third part 
will tackle the two world wars and the interwar period. The next two themes will present the post-
war period and the last section will be devoted to different visions for the future. Geographically, 
the scope of the HEH will encompass the whole of the continent, not only the European Union. 
Furthermore, the HEH will not be a mere “representation of the multiplicity of national 
histories”440 but will offer a “transnational perspective on Europe’s history.”441 The three criteria 
for historical processes and events to be included in the narrative of the museum are that they 
originated in Europe, were relevant for all of Europe and are relevant for the present. The 
continuity between the different themes of the narrative will be maintained by some recurrent 
motifs and concepts, such as the centre-periphery distinction. Finally, the creators of the HEH are 
open about having drawn a lot of inspiration from the House of German History (Haus der 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). In fact, the director of the latter, Hans Walter 
Hütter, chaired the Committee of Experts of the HEH. This might explain the name of the project, 
but Vovk van Gaal and Dupont also pointed out that the political initiators might have been 
reluctant to use the word “museum” because of its authoritative, top-down connotations.442 
After presenting the conception of the museum, I will now turn to its critical analysis. 
My objective here is to critically evaluate how the decision-makers behind the museum 
conceptualised European memory and not how they imagined the museum itself. However, in this 
unique case, the conception of the cultural project and the conception of European memory are 
one and the same thing. An important critic of the HEH project has been Wolfram Kaiser.443 
Above all, he was sceptical about whether the team behind the museum would be able to resist 
the political pressure to tell a success story about the EU, a one-directional fairy tale about the 
linear progress of European integration. Based on previous instances of member states throwing 
a tantrum whenever their national holy myths had been threatened, Kaiser doubted whether the 
HEH could present anything more than a watered-down, politically correct, self-congratulatory 
narrative whose message would basically be: “Believe me, the EU is good for you.” Consequently, 
he also doubted whether the HEH could actually adopt multi-perspectivity, deal with controversial 
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historical issues (such as collaboration) and foster open debate. Finally, he raised some practical 
issues such as how the museum will establish a collection from scratch. 
Vovk van Gaal and Dupont directly responded to Kaiser and attempted to quell these 
fears. They acknowledged that, as every museum, the “HEH is a political initiative” but upheld 
that “the contents of the project are developing independently from the political authorities.”444 
The name of the museum itself, House of European History, had been chosen so as not to imply 
the ownership of the EU or its institutions (in the way that the Parlamentarium does, for 
instance).445 They vowed that the museum will not try to present the process of European 
integration as “a smooth easy path to success but rather a succession of steps forward and 
backwards” and that the museum will incorporate a rather defeatist theme on “the difficulties of a 
continent in surviving the loss of its hegemony.”446 They also promised that it will be made “very 
clear to the visitor that the contents of the museum are only the product of the choices made by a 
team at a certain moment,” that the HEH “does not possess a truth on European history.” They 
hoped that with this modest attitude they would be able to break with the “authoritative role of 
the museum” which would not be worthy of a “museum of the 21st century.” Vovk van Gaal and 
Dupont regretted that despite “all efforts to remain as open as possible the HEH will be received 
by some as a kind of truth on European history imposed top-down on the public,” and that it is 
already presented in this manner, even by academics (for instance, by Kaiser).447 
Apart from repeating the promises (that look too good to be true indeed), Vovk van Gaal 
and Dupont provided very few concrete examples about how they would avoid presenting the 
history of European integration as a teleological success story. Most notably, they explained how 
they plan to present the “peace narrative,” the story about European integration being the 
guarantor of peace on the continent, in a non-didactic and unequivocally positive way. This is 
rather difficult to do given that the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012; the medal and 
the certificate have been donated to the museum as the first items in its collection and they will be 
presented towards the end of the exhibition. Vovk van Gaal and Dupont assured that “precisely 
in order to avoid a one-directional perspective, it will be presented in the broader context of the 
debate and the challenging and opposing voices,” such as the voices of those who demonstrated 
against the award ceremony in Oslo.448 
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In my opinion, we do not yet know enough about the museum project to voice fears 
about how the grand promises might not be fulfilled in the end. Admittedly, the secrecy 
surrounding the project is not an encouraging sign. Kaiser et al. were right in saying that, 
paradoxically, the lack of transparency “simply confirmed the view, held by many, that the EU was 
an opaque bureaucratic apparatus”449 which was precisely the belief that the democratic-deficit-
reducing museum project was meant to disprove. Even so, I think that it is unfair and premature 
to criticise the museum for mistakes that we anticipate that they will make but that they have not 
yet actually committed. The time to attack the decision-makers behind the HEH for only paying 
lip service to multi-perspectivity and to the engagement with visitors will be when they have 
actually done that. Until then, until we see what the expectations and promises are that they have 
eventually failed to live up to, let us give them the benefit of the doubt. 
More importantly, I argue that it is not the time to worry about the practical 
implementation of the grand ideas behind the HEH because there is plenty of wrong with those 
grand ideas themselves. It is the current conception of the museum itself that we should criticise 
for a number of issues, and not the way we speculate that it will be implemented. The following 
critique is also a “speculation,” in a way, of course, simply because it aims to reconstruct the 
conception of the museum and the intentions of the creators based on limited information. 
However, this “speculation” differs from previous ones in that it is “abstract speculation” about 
the general direction of the museum that could logically follow from the most fundamental ideas 
behind it, and not “concrete speculation” about how particular historical events and particular 
controversial issues will be presented in the HEH. 
To start with, there are some serious internal contradictions within the conception itself 
and some logical gaps in the argument supporting it. The most obvious flaw in the argument of 
the creators of the HEH is that they claimed to dismiss the notion of European identity on the 
basis that it has “no commonly agreed definition” while they appreciated collective memory for 
its “fluidity.” As Chapter 2 has demonstrated, however, one could hardly find a more polysemous 
and vaguer concept than collective memory. If the HEH claims to be able to present a non-
monolithic historical narrative and to become a place of debate about the non-predefined notion 
of European memory, the question that naturally arises is why it would not be able to convey, and 
to promote reflection about, a non-predefined, non-monolithic notion of European identity. The 
argument is certainly very weak, but this becomes of secondary importance when one realises that 
the notion of European identity is actually cunningly smuggled into the conception in disguise. 
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While official statements by the team behind the museum indeed refrain from using the “i-word,” 
they employ a number of euphemistic phrases which can be considered anything but identity-
related. When they claim that, as a reservoir of European memory, the HEH will provide “the 
basis for the evolution of a common consciousness,” will help “to forge a common European self-
awareness”450 and will “contribute to the formation of a European historical consciousness,”451 
how do their statements differ from Pöttering’s initial plans for the museum to “help to promote 
an awareness of European identity?”452 How can the forging of “a common European self-
awareness” be interpreted as anything other than the process by which people become conscious 
about their being European (which is a fine definition of European identity if I have ever seen 
one)? Only Mork stated plainly that the “HEH should become a platform for the dialogue on 
European identity.”453 Even if the creators of the HEH generally shy away from using the term 
openly, European identity is in fact deeply embedded in the conception of the museum under the 
calls for a common European consciousness and common European awareness. 
Another issue is the tension between the two main goals proclaimed by the HEH. On 
the one hand, the creators of the museum wish to “convey a coherent historical narrative” in the 
permanent exhibition; on the other hand, they intend to “raise awareness of the existence of a 
variety of different historical interpretations ... so as to stimulate reflection and debate.”454 The 
decision-makers themselves admitted that this dichotomy “could appear contradictory,” but they 
thought that these dual objectives are reconcilable and are “at the basis of many museums.”455 In 
principle, the two goals are not completely incompatible indeed. A coherent narrative will 
necessarily be composed of a chronological succession of historical events. Each of these events, 
and the historical processes that connect them, can be explained from many different points of 
view which might produce a reasonably multi-perspective whole. The real problem comes not 
when these two goals are pitted against each other, but when they are considered in the light of 
the third proclaimed ambition of the museum to become a reservoir of European memory. It may 
be true that other museums have the same dual objectives, but it is also true that no other museum 
purports to be a reservoir of collective memory. The intention to build a memory reservoir raises 
a number of questions with respect to the other two objectives of the museum. A reservoir collects 
all the water coming down a mountainous area indiscriminately, irrespective of its origin. If we 
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take this metaphor seriously, on what grounds are the historical events and processes that compose 
the coherent narrative of the exhibition selected? On what grounds are the (necessarily limited 
range of) dissenting voices that are to be presented selected? Choosing historical events and 
alternative interpretations to be exhibited necessarily involves a good deal of selection from the 
infinite number of events and voices that could be presented. This is perfectly normal for any 
museum that aims to present a coherent narrative and a multiplicity of interpretations, but I argue 
that it is not acceptable for a museum that claims to be a reservoir of collective memory. For this 
reason, it seems that, if anything, the exhibition will be an ordered collection of water samples 
taken from different, pre-determined points of the imaginary memory reservoir. The problem of 
selection is exacerbated by the fact that the events and the voices that are the most likely to be 
included in the exhibition are the ones that are already strongly embedded in the public 
representations of the past. Truly marginalised and minority myths, however, are likely to fall under 
the exhibitors’ radar. 
Thirdly, the current conception of the museum is quite ambiguous about how the HEH 
will engage with the visitors in particular and with the public in general, how debate will be 
generated and between whom. The creators acknowledged the importance of involving the larger 
public in the deliberation about the museum’s conception, but they were at best ambivalent 
towards the idea. They reasoned that there is “no ideal recipe” as some previous attempts in the 
Netherlands and France were “abandoned after endless public debates about the political nature 
of the project and the legitimacy of spending public funds for that purpose” while museums in 
Germany dealt with this successfully.456 It appears that, rather than risking these “endless public 
debates,” the creators of the HEH decided not to seek the input of the public, at least at this stage. 
They nevertheless stated that the participation of visitors in enriching the museum’s collection will 
be of utmost importance as their “stories, memories and even objects” will “fill this ‘reservoir of 
collective memory’ that the HEH is expected to become.”457 In principle, incorporating the 
personal stories of the visitors into the museum could certainly ease the tension between the three 
ambitions discussed in the previous paragraph. Whether the stories that visitors bring to the 
museum can succeed in this largely depends on how they are actually integrated into the museum. 
There is no information available on this issue, but if we think about what could logically follow 
from this, there are two dilemmas that the HEH may face. Should all personal stories that fit the 
three criteria mentioned above (originated in Europe, relevant for all of Europe and relevant for 
the present) be in principle admissible or only those that fit into the initial narrative of the 
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exhibition (that is, those that are related to the historical events and processes that the creators 
selected for the narrative)? Should these stories be incorporated into the main narrative of the 
exhibition or should they be presented in another way (for instance, in a separate part of the 
museum)? Given these questions, there are four main strategies that can be followed. 
a) The HEH will accept only those stories that fit into the initial narrative and will 
incorporate them into the main narrative. 
b) The HEH will accept only those stories that fit into the initial narrative but will not 
incorporate them into the main narrative. 
c) The HEH will accept even those stories that do not fit into the initial narrative and will 
incorporate them into the main narrative. 
d) The HEH will accept even those stories that do not fit into the initial narrative but will 
not incorporate them into the main narrative. 
The problem is that all of these scenarios run counter to one of the three stated goals of 
the museum. The promise about building a reservoir of memory cannot be fulfilled if the stories 
that do not fit into the main narrative are excluded. Some social groups might cherish certain 
historical events and processes that the creators of the HEH do not find important enough to 
include in the initial narrative of the exhibition. If such stories are considered inadmissible by the 
HEH, how can it hope to eventually become a true reservoir of memory? Options a) and b) thus 
violate this promise. With respect to the other dilemma, the choice not to integrate the stories 
received from the visitors into the main narrative of the museum would effectively create a 
hierarchy between the memories contained in the museum. A distinction between first-class and 
second-class memories, between the memories that the creators of the museum deem worthy to 
be included in the main narrative and the memories that are only important for the visitors, would 
also significantly curtail the ability of the HEH to become a memory reservoir. Options b) and d) 
thus undermine this ambition, with b) now being a double offender against this goal. Lastly, 
following scenario c) would be a big step towards a reservoir of European memory, but it would 
not sit well with the expectation to convey a coherent narrative. Considering all memories in 
principle admissible and including them in the main narrative would necessarily erode the 
coherence of the initial narrative. Whichever strategy the team behind the HEH chooses, they will 
definitely have to do a good deal of selection. While I vowed not to engage in speculation about 
the practical implementation of the museum’s grand promises, I cannot help but wonder what will 
prevent the visitor input of the HEH from degenerating into something like the propaganda room 
of the Parlamentarium where carefully selected “ordinary people” tell their stories about how 
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European projects have changed their life (surprise, surprise) for the better. The bulwark against 
this undesirable outcome would be a high degree of transparency about the decision-making 
process, something that the HEH is not well-endowed with at the moment. 
But let us assume that, despite the apparent tensions between the stated goals of the 
museum, despite the practical difficulties of implementing these goals, the team behind the HEH 
manages to arrive at a good compromise that satisfies all three of their expectations reasonably 
well. Even in this unlikely situation, I would raise questions about some of the more fundamental 
theoretical choices that the creators of the museum have made. Specifically, the conception of the 
museum is heavily influenced by the work of Habermas, Müller and Aleida Assmann. The 
inspiration from these figures, with whom I have already critically engaged in previous chapters, 
was even made explicit by the creators of the museum. The influence of Habermas can be most 
clearly felt in the ambition of the museum to become a forum where deliberation on European 
memory and identity can take place. Mork even asserted that “the construction of a transnational, 
pan-European memory should take place through a process of communication, in the light of 
public discussion—as Jürgen Habermas would put it.”458 This is a fine example of the teleological 
consensus-seeking ambition of communicative reason which has been extensively criticised in 
Chapter 4. As made clear by Mork,459 Assmann’s conception of European memory, which was 
discussed in Chapter 5, is the other main influence on the conception of the museum. 
I argue that, if the initiators of the HEH are to take the reservoir metaphor seriously, they 
should not think in terms of a museum whose content is managed by a team of experts. To take 
the reservoir idea to its logical end point, one should rather think in terms of a (virtual or actual) 
social space where individuals and organised social groups can come together, represent the stories 
that are important to them and engage in dialogue about past events. Visitors do not only 
contribute to the content, but they generate the content themselves (in fact, they should be thought 
about as participants instead of visitors). This would effectively strengthen connections between 
the transnational and the subnational analytical systems of myth. Apart from making it possible 
for individuals and social groups to generate their own representations of the past and engage in 
dialogue, what is also needed in this mythspace is critical and sentimental education which would 
challenge exclusionary tendencies and would make understanding between participants easier. The 
vision of a pluralist European mythscape, within which such a social space is a possible way to 
promote dialogue, will be outlined in detail in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion: Pluralist European Mythscape 
In the previous chapters, I explored many different conceptualisations of European 
memory that are prevalent in academia and in European institutions. I concluded that they all tend 
to instrumentalize the idea in the service of a political and/or cultural identity, and they are all 
based on a teleological framework that envisages the dissolution of conflicting visions of the past. 
However they conceive the idea, European institutions primarily pursue European memory in 
order to bolster a certain European identity (or, at least, a “common European self-awareness”). 
Most scholarly conceptions of European memory are also geared towards providing foundations 
for some form of self-identification and are thus dominated by problem-solving thinking. I argued 
for a more critical approach that is free from these teleological assumptions and from the burden 
of providing legitimation for a political authority. In the following, I will conclude my dissertation 
by outlining the vision of a pluralist European mythscape based on the ethics of myth developed 
in Part I that calls for simultaneously challenging and acknowledging all myths. 
About Memory Zealots and Herodians 
I argued that at the core of the European memory wars lies the antagonism between 
“civilising Westerners” and “Eastern European freedom fighters” (which are necessarily ideal 
typical rather than actual scholarly positions). Crudely put, the civilisers would like to see Eastern 
Europeans adopt a more regretful approach to their past while the freedom fighters uphold the 
validity of their traditional national myths of glory and victimhood. The civilisers accuse the 
freedom fighters of backwardness, the latter accuse the former of ideological colonisation, and 
both of them appeal to some version of moral and historical truth. It is important to note that 
many “civilising Westerners” are not from the West and a few “Eastern European freedom 
fighters” are not from the East. In fact, most Eastern European societies are split between civilisers 
and freedom fighters. In the following, I will explain the reason for this division in terms of the 
two strategies that Eastern Europeans can employ to deal with the “backward” label, comment on 
its destructiveness and suggest ways to overcome it. 
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The Enlightenment belief in the linear progress of history is in many ways still the 
framework with which most people make sense of the world. Most of them no longer (or at least 
not explicitly) divide the world into civilised and barbaric nations, but we still talk about developed 
and undeveloped (or at best developing) regions, democratic and authoritarian regimes, and 
progressive and traditional ways of life. The label of backwardness has become a powerful 
rhetorical tool in the hands of those who have already established their position as modern, the 
“normals.” The reason for this is that the standard of modernity has become so pervasive that 
even the people who are stigmatized as backward by the “established” evaluate themselves in terms 
of this standard. If those who are labelled backward did not care about the standard of modernity, 
the label would not carry much weight, it would not become a stigma.460 It is therefore the fact 
that even the “backwards” have internalised the standard that renders the label potent and 
stigmatizing. There are two popular strategies that are often taken by the individuals stigmatized 
as backward by those in the position of authority: they either become the active confirmation of 
that label or the active contradiction of it, a “Herodian” or a “Zealot.”461 Those who follow the 
first strategy play the part of the “brute” and take pride in their backwardness; they still see 
themselves through the standard of modernity, but they consider backwardness to be a virtue, not 
a sin. Those who choose to actively contradict the stigma do everything in their power not to be 
perceived as backward by the normals; as they live in constant fear of their backwardness being 
discovered, they are obsessed with appearances and take extra caution not to have any association 
with the backwards and their customs. In reality, most responses to stigma are somewhere in-
between these two extremes, but I will use these two labels as heuristic tools to illuminate the 
situation in Eastern Europe. 
In her theory of international stigmatization, Ayşe Zarakol extended the notion of stigma 
to the realm of the international based on the claim that “stigma has the same effect on states that 
it has on individuals.”462 She argued that the stigma of backwardness weighs heavily on non-
Western states; it determines their actions, their self-image and their relationship with the West. 
Thinking about national collectives as bearing a stigma in the same way as individuals creates 
certain problems; most importantly, it gives the impression that Western individuals are free from 
the stigma of backwardness, whereas this label is an important disciplining tool within Western 
states as well. However, Zarakol’s suggestion does contain an important insight, namely that the 
backwardness of one’s country can also be a source of stigma for the individual. Therefore, I argue 
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that it is useful to think about stigma as if it functioned on (at least) two levels: individuals can be 
stigmatized for their own backwardness within their society and also for the backwardness of their 
country within the international system. Viewed in this light, the stigmatized non-Western 
individuals, and not the states, face a choice between becoming Zealots or Herodians. In their 
attempt to become more Western than the Westerners, the Zealots take on everything that they 
associate with the West uncritically, while the Herodians take pride in rejecting everything Western. 
The dilemma between Zealots and Herodians is difficult for every stigmatized, but it is 
even more acute for the individuals in the (social or international) semi-periphery. The semi-
periphery is torn between the core and the periphery, it is neither completely modern nor 
completely backward. It is a liminal situation, a state of being in-between categories, being neither 
here nor there, being neither really us nor completely the “Other.” Mälksoo and Wydra463 
borrowed the term from the field of anthropology464 to make sense of the situation in which most 
Eastern Europeans find themselves. They are neither really the West nor really the East; they are 
Europe, but they are not quite Europe; they need to live with the “stigma of being poor, backward 
cousins in the European family.”465 The stigma of backwardness is discrediting in every case, but 
it “bites” especially deeply in the flesh of those in a liminal situation, such as Eastern Europeans, 
because for them Europeanness, modernity and Westernness are so close yet so far. The Zealots 
find themselves torn between the desire to be one of the West and the impossibility of ever being 
perceived as truly one of the West. They stand for everything that they perceive to be universal, 
advanced, liberal and cosmopolitan and cut every tie with what they consider to be the 
idiosyncrasies of their country. The Herodians are the active negation of everything that they 
perceive to be Western; they are also obsessed with their appearances, but they choose to 
exaggerate their particularistic ties, such as nation, ethnicity, ancestry, religion and tradition. These 
categories are ideal types, of course, but I think that they illuminate the situation in liminal cases 
such as Eastern Europe. I repeat that my argument is not that the opposition between the 
progressives and the traditionals is specifically non-Western; in fact, this opposition describes most 
political struggles over the world at least since the French Revolution. My argument is that this 
opposition between Zealots and Herodians in certain liminal situations is often particularly 
pronounced and antagonistic because of the overlapping layers of stigma. The source of this 
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insecurity is that Eastern Europeans do not only need to deal with the question of individual 
modernity within their countries, but also with the anxiety of their country not being modern, 
Western, European enough. 
Thinking in terms of overlapping layers of stigma also provides a possible explanation 
for the fickle internal and external politics of liminal countries. The Hungarian poet Endre Ady 
described Hungary as a “ferry country,” as a country that is constantly going back and forth 
between the East and the West throughout its history.466 This image was influential for later 
theorists of Eastern European development, such as István Bibó and Jenő Szűcs.467 In the 
framework of overlapping layers of stigma, the relative strength of the Zealots and the Herodians 
within a given country at a certain point in history determines its general orientation, both internally 
and externally. This produces an oscillating movement between forced modernisation and 
obsessive “return to the roots” where the sharp changes between the two “ports” of the ferry 
could be associated with the turning points of world history. 
In the case of Eastern Europe, the stigma of backwardness has many destructive effects. 
It contributes to antagonism on two levels: between Western and Eastern Europe, and within 
Eastern European countries. These relationships are antagonistic because of the shared belief in 
modernity as an absolute standard. What is even more worrying is that the standard of modernity 
perpetuates these antagonisms. One would expect that once the liminal state fulfils the demanding 
criteria of modernity, it would gain entry into the exclusive club of the normals. However, there 
are two reasons why this might not be the case. First, the stigma is necessary for upholding the 
self-image of the normals. Stigma does not simply discredit its possessor, but it also serves the 
function of reinforcing the normality of the normals. “Eastern Europe has traditionally been 
indispensable to Western Europe’s self-image”; as “alike alters,” the Easterners have been a point 
of reference in relation to which the Westerners could imagine themselves as modern and 
innovative.468 This why Zarakol said that the bar of entry keeps moving;469 as the normal needs the 
stigma as much as the backward wants to overcome it, stigmatization is a very rigid and self-
perpetuating system. The second reason for this self-perpetuation is that the opposing forces 
within the backward state also frame their struggle against each other in the modern-backward 
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dichotomy; they also need each other and the stigma because beyond the obsessive pursuit of 
Westernness and its forceful negation, they have little on which they could base their identity. 
The antagonism that underlies the European memory wars is therefore part of a much 
greater pattern. The struggle between the unruly, backward and emotional Eastern nationalists 
who are driven by historical resentment and the principled, modern and rational Western civilisers 
who face the dark side of their past in a mature way is just one aspect of the broader antagonism 
caused by the modern-backward dichotomy and the resulting stigmatization. Overcoming this 
stigma is crucial in reducing the antagonistic nature of the memory wars. But what can be done to 
change such a rigid, self-perpetuating system? For the stigmatized, the choice is “between 
becoming a Zealot or a Herodian, but it is actually the fact that one is faced with this choice, more 
than the actual choice itself, that reinforces the condition of stature inferiority.”470 Zarakol thus 
suggested that the stigmatized should refuse to make this choice and embrace ambivalence. This 
is a necessary step, but it is far from sufficient. What gives power to the stigma of backwardness 
is the internalisation of the standard of modernity by all parties. The stigmatized does not only 
need to reject the choice between Zealotry and Herodianism, but also the standard of modernity 
itself. However, this would still only end the antagonism within the state and the “modern” states 
would still regard it as backward. Since stigma is relational, a one-sided rejection of the underlying 
standard does not bring an end to the antagonism. What is needed is that all parties concerned 
(Western and Eastern, Zealot and Herodian) co-operate in challenging the dichotomy between 
moderns and backwards. This needs to be done case by case, debate by debate. I situate my 
argument for a pluralist European mythscape within this broader, much more ambitious project. 
I believe that this dialogue reinforced by critical and sentimental education would contribute to 
the broader effort to end the antagonism created by exclusionist categories of thought such as 
moral truth, historical truth and modernity. 
It must be noted that the rejection of the standard of modernity does not mean the 
rejection of everything that are associated with modernity. Human rights, the eradication of 
diseases and democracy would still be important goals (at least for those who subscribe to them). 
The rejection of modernity only means that the justification for these goals should not be framed 
in terms of unwavering certainties such as truth and the progress of history. This should not be 
read as a Herodian call for the “return to the roots”; I argue for anti-foundationalism, not anti-
modernism. I agree with Rorty that many highly desirable social institutions that are associated 
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with modernity have become “facts of the world,” and the attempt to build solid foundations for 
them on unquestionable Enlightenment reason no longer serves its purpose.471 
The Vision of a Pluralist European Mythscape 
The main promise of a pluralist European mythscape is that it would be an effective way 
to overcome the antagonisms that currently dominate the politics of the past in Europe. Contrary 
to previous conceptualisations of European memory, it is not aimed at providing foundations for 
a political authority and at ending mnemonic conflicts. Ending antagonism does not mean the end 
of conflict; it only means that the nature of difference changes to a more peaceful, agonistic 
relationship. The following account of what a pluralist European mythscape might look like is 
inspired by the later works of Mälksoo in which she departed from several arguments that I have 
criticised in Chapter 5. She became critical about the concept of collective memory, the notion of 
national memory and, most importantly, about Eastern European attempts to securitise these 
“national” memories. She came to agree with the “impossibility at any time of excluding conflict, 
disagreement and discord from political action”472 and argued that the “alleged anti-communist 
consensus varies greatly in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe.”473 Mälksoo even 
advocated a Bakhtinian dialogue and “agonistic mnemonic pluralism” on the European level that 
reconceptualises “a self-other relationship from that of enemies to ideological and mnemonical 
opponents,” but this needs to be fleshed out because sometimes she seemed to be content with a 
“mutually accepted agreement to disagree on the ‘national’ interpretations of historical events.”474 
The vision of a pluralist European mythscape requires a transnational European co-
operation with respect to the public representation of past events. In some sense, it is already 
happening, but its current aim is mostly to find a common narrative for Europe. I agree with 
Müller that what is necessary is not the harmonisation of the content of historical narratives, but 
the harmonisation of the values and practices with which Europeans deal with conflicting visions 
of the past; however, contrary to Müller, I think that these shared values and practices should be 
based on the pluralist ethics of myth outlined in Chapter 4. This calls for simultaneously 
acknowledging and challenging all public representations of the past. Acknowledgement means 
that all identity groups have the right to represent their narratives and participate in the process of 
identity formation, but it does not mean the positive endorsement of the narrative. It avoids the 
most common problems associated with positive recognition: narrative hierarchy and the 
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competition of victimhood narratives. The challenge to all narratives takes the form of critical and 
sentimental education which are primarily meant to overcome the mutually exclusionary nature of 
myths. 
The transnational harmonisation of these values and practices would primarily happen 
on the national level. Realistically, only the states have the resources to drastically change 
educational practices and to take steps towards a dialogical relationship between identity-
constitutive narratives in their national mythscapes. While subnational and transnational actors are 
certainly important in initiating change and encouraging states to act, national governments still 
have an important role to play in bringing about a more agonistic European mythscape. The 
linguistic differences in Europe also favour a more localised approach at first. This would not 
reinforce the supposed primordial status of nation states as the hitherto official narratives would 
be challenged on two fronts: by subaltern narratives on a more level playing field and by new 
educational approaches. It is expected that, despite the linguistic differences, more agonistic 
national mythscapes would mean more interaction between actors operating on different analytical 
systems of myth, on the transnational, the national and the subnational levels. This might be 
facilitated by new technologies, but it might simply mean the strengthening of the existing ties 
between different actors, such as NGOs. A House of European History, not conceived as a 
museum but as a transnational social space, a mythspace, where visitors create the content and 
engage in dialogue, is also a potentially fruitful interaction between the transnational and the 
subnational levels. With time, the critical and sentimental educational tools could also take on a 
more transnational character. This does not mean joint history textbooks of the kind currently 
produced; this means the education of the critical tools with which different historical narratives 
can be evaluated, on the one hand, and the telling of sentimental stories that are meant to 
“manipulate” emotions, on the other. The aim of these educational practices is to challenge 
exclusionary characteristics that might be based on moral and historical truth claims and the 
distinction between the modern and the backward. 
Since dialogue is not about winning a rational debate, but about furthering understanding 
and tolerance, linguistic competence in a shared “second first language” is not a requirement in 
these transnational contexts. In a debate, a linguistically less competent participant is at a 
disadvantage. A dialogue is also conflictual, but it is less competitive because the aim is not to 
convince but to understand each other. The overall aim is a less antagonistic mythscape; this 
requires intense dialogue which is not affected by the fact that the narrative of an identity group is 
not able to reach everyone. 
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This pluralist European mythscape envisions that widely different voices can engage with 
each other in a dialogical relationship within and across national boundaries. It is certainly a 
demanding vision, but it is much less demanding than the other solutions to deal with conflicting 
mythologies. It is less difficult to achieve than the European public sphere of Habermas which 
would require a transnational forum where participants, who all share a common second first 
language, can engage in rational debate free from material interests. It is more realistic than Müller’s 
view where each national community engages in a similarly rational debate and comes to a 
consensus about political regret. It is certainly much less demanding than the attempt to find a 
single unified narrative or set of narratives on which all (or at least most) Europeans can agree. It 
is also not necessary that the participants owe political loyalty to the process of deliberation, or 
share a cultural identity with everyone else on the continent, as the thin and thick conceptions of 
European memory require. 
Some might find that this lack of political and cultural attachment to the pluralist project 
is something that renders it unworkable. The criticism might be that all political institutions require 
some mythical foundations. I think that this misses the point that the pluralist mythscape is not a 
“thing” or an institution, but an ideal. Unlike other conceptions, it does not require a transnational 
forum or the transnational projection of a narrative. What it requires is a commitment from the 
states to the harmonised values and practices. This is already demanding, but it requires just as 
much attachment from the citizens as European competition law or the Emissions Trading 
System, for instance. If the states guarantee the conditions for agonism (that is, they adhere to the 
pluralist principles and implement the changes to their educational system), the actual dialogue is 
supposed to follow. The commitment of the states does not necessarily come from a top-down 
“push” from Euro-technocrats. Such a push might help, but what is much more important is that 
subnational actors realise the value of dialogue and they themselves demand a more agonistic 
approach to the past from the states. 
Finally, some would argue that it is very naive to expect states to act as benevolent 
guardians over the mythscape and that it is unrealistic to entrust states with the organisation of an 
agonistic mythscape as they are the biggest threat to it. This is a valid criticism, and it is true that 
states have a tendency to aggressively promote exclusionary narratives, especially in times of crisis. 
However, there is no reason to believe that this cannot change. The pluralist ethics of myth 
emphasised the self-reflexive potential of social agents, their capacity to reflect on social structures 
and to try to change them if they find them wanting; if enough people engage in this self-reflexive 
process, in which education and academia have a special role, this can make states commit to the 
idea of an agonistic mythscape. Moreover, this criticism does not take into account that modern 
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democracies are built on the logic of “entrusting the wolf with tending to the sheep.” The rights 
of individuals are supposed to be protected by states when we know that at the same time these 
very states are the greatest threats to individual rights. In this sense, the vision of an agonistic 
mythscape is not more naive or unrealistic than that of democratic rule. 
Towards a European Memory Armistice 
In a pluralist European mythscape, the points that currently generate the most heated 
debates in the European memory wars can be accommodated and challenged at the same time. 
The debate about the uniqueness and the comparability of totalitarian regimes and the related 
“number wars” can all take place within this framework and the role of critical education is not to 
provide the “right” answer to these issues. What critical education would teach in this respect is 
that it is important to see these debates (and any debate about historical narratives for that matter) 
as partly a question of faith because every historical account is partial in both senses of the word, 
that is, biased and incomplete. Pluralism also implies that difference should be a viable option in 
these debates and that participants should be open to each other’s views, which are the essence of 
dialogue. The critical and sentimental educational tools would thus encourage participants not to 
regard their position in terms of moral and historical truth, and of modernity and backwardness. 
As I indicated earlier, the antagonism of the European memory wars is only part of a 
greater antagonism that flows from the stigmatization of the “backward” by the “modern.” The 
conflicting visions of the past are just one aspect of this problem, but dealing with one aspect 
already changes the situation. The ideal of a pluralist European mythscape does not promise the 
resolution of differences between myths, it does not promise a European memory peace. Conflicts 
will most certainly remain central to the European politics of the past, but this does not necessarily 
mean memory war; the aim of my dissertation was to propose a pluralist approach where these 
conflicting visions of the past can and should be made to work in the interest of (rather than 
against) democracy, and they can and should be embraced in a way that their advocates transform 
from enemies to adversaries If anything, this is a European memory armistice. After the long 
antagonism of the European memory wars, it is certainly time now to return from the trenches to 
agonistic politics. 
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